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Abstract 
The success of Reduced Emission from Deforestation and land Degradation, forest 
conservation, sustainable forest management and enhancement of carbon stocks 
(REDD+), depends on effective participation of local communities because 
ultimately they are the ones to implement REDD+ on the ground and are the 
potential benefactors of such policy. But few studies have examined community 
involvement in the design, implementation and monitoring of REDD+ projects. This 
study critically examines the level of community’s engagement in the Mount 
Cameroon National Park (MCNP) conservation project. Cluster multi-stage random 
sampling was used to collect data from 259 respondents from four geographical 
clusters with cultural and livelihood differences. Quantitative data were analysed 
using Chi-square, Mann-Whitney test, t-test, ANOVA and linear-regression models 
to understand the contribution of predictors on independent variables, while Kruskal-
Wallis and Jonckheere-Terpstra tests compare results and establish trends between 
different clusters respectively. Qualitative data were coded and thematically analysed 
to show different perceptions between different levels of stakeholders. Results show 
that insecure tenure, ineffective and inappropriate communication between park 
managers and communities, inadequate benefit-sharing mechanism, and top-down 
government strategies have impeded community's engagement in the REDD+ 
projects within all clusters. Communities perceive REDD+ as having the potential to 
conserve forest, generate income and improve livelihoods. However, the present 
level of local engagement in the MCNP conservation project makes the attainment of 
these goals difficult. REDD+ should be based on effective participatory bottom-up 
approaches that empower and allow more decision-making powers to communities to 
achieve effectiveness and potential co-benefit expectations of REDD+. Assessing 
community’s engagement as the project progresses should be embedded within 
strategies to ensure sustainability in REDD+. This study provides practical insights 
into the effective co-management of MCNP-REDD+ projects and recommends 
adaptable management strategies that favour appropriate social-safeguard standards 
for sustainability of any REDD+ projects. 
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1 Introduction 
Reduced emission from deforestation and land degradation, forest conservation, 
sustainable management of forest resources and enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
(REDD+), is a United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) mechanism, aimed at financially supporting developing countries to 
reduce greenhouse gas emission by taking action to mitigate climate change. This is 
helping in transforming tropical forest conservation to a critical tool in fighting 
climate change, conserving natural resources and has the potential to improve the 
livelihood of local communities. The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report now estimates a 10% annual global carbon 
emission from deforestation (IPCC, 2013) which is lesser than its former 17.4% 
estimate (IPCC, 2007). However, a third of total emission in developing country is 
blamed on land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) (WRI, 2005). Thus, 
global awareness in the importance of tropical forest in addressing climate change 
has been raised by REDD+. The key role of tropical forest in securing livelihood 
and wellbeing of local communities, and critical understanding of the role played by 
tropical forest in providing ecosystem services has further been stressed through 
REDD+. 
Rewards from REDD+ can be either national or result-based, where incentives would 
be in proportion to actual carbon emission reduction after carbon accounting. 
Performance is measured against a reference level which is a representation of 
the estimated emission that would have occurred if there was no REDD+ 
intervention and this also takes into account the national forest estate to deal with 
internal leakages. According to Skutsch & McCall (2012), UNFCCC favoured a 
national-level instead of project approach because REDD+ requires national policies 
and legislations that are far beyond the forest sector, as drivers of deforestation 
are rooted outside the forest sector. Payment for REDD+ activity may be through a 
market structure (carbon-credit) or through global funds or other financial 
instrument, but most observers see the use of market instrument as most efficient and 
effective because the Conference of Parties (COP) failed to agree on binding 
emission target for developed countries. Based on Payment for Ecosystem Services 
(PES), a national organised integrated community forest management strategy is 
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crucial for REDD+ programme, but how and to whom payment would be made 
to, has not yet been specified (Skutsch & McCall, 2012). Effective capacity 
building of local communities and knowledge and skills to engage in sustainable 
forestry is essential for REDD+ to succeed. This cannot be achieved without 
effectiveness and equity in customary resource rights, so tenure needs to be the 
starting point to REDD+. Westholm et al. (2011) also state that “the importance of 
resolving tenure ambiguity and assuring community participation in REDD+ has 
now been recognised”. Communities need to fully participate in REDD+ project 
implementation to reduce the risk of government and conservation NGO grabbing 
land and carrying out forest protection approach that marginalise forest dwellers. 
There is a growing consensus that if REDD+ is properly designed, it should generate 
social co-benefits, government benefits and environmental co-benefits. Local 
communities are keys to forest management and improving tenure security is 
crucial for carbon sequestration potential of forest. Some REDD+ projects restrict 
access of forest dwellers to projects areas which are sources of carbon additionality 
and revenue. Thus, conditional performance based compensation is applied as 
incentives to local communities. 
1.1 The importance of forest to local communities 
Forest is an economic resource and provides goods and services; human survival 
and wellbeing depends on forest because it provides oxygen, food, shelter, 
recreation, raw materials and spiritual sustenance. According to Roehr (2007), 
forests are host to about 70% of the world’s biodiversity and also provide 
essential ecosystem services such as flood control, soil protection from erosion and 
water resource. It also support the livelihood of about 300 million people (Von 
Braun, 2007), of whom most are economically poor. “Forests yield subsistence and 
income for more than 60 million indigenous people who are almost wholly 
dependent on forests, for some 350 million people who are depending on forests to 
a high degree, and more than 1.6 billion people who depend on forest products 
to some degree, for survival necessities e.g. for fuel wood, medicinal plants and 
some foods” (FAO, 2011; World Bank, 2009). 
Africans depend mostly on natural resources from forest and non-forest ecosystems. 
With the ongoing global climate change negotiations, more value has been placed 
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on forest ecosystems which have proven to be relevant to mitigation and adaptation 
in terms of carbon stock and sequestration potentials. A typical forest plays an 
important role in global carbon budget acting either as a sink or as a source of 
carbon. The total carbon content of forest ecosystem is greater than carbon in the 
atmosphere and tropical forests store about 50% more carbon per unit hectare than 
forest outside the tropics. Busch et al. (2009) argued that, “forest vegetation holds 
20 to 50 times more carbon per unit area than the ecosystems that replace it.” Rates 
of deforestation and degradation are determinable, but carbon accounting or 
quantifying emissions reduction resulting from these processes is another challenge, 
due to different capacity of sequestration and storage capacities. Deforestation and 
forest degradation do not only result to a loss of biodiversity; it also leads to 
reduction in forest carbon stocks and almost 20% increase in global CO2 emissions 
(Thompson et al., 2013). Emissions also depend on land use systems (Houghton, 
2005). The carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration in the air alters the carbon cycle and 
modifies climate by greenhouse effect. 
According to IPCC (2007; 2013), a sustainable forest resource management 
strategy such as REDD+, which has as objective to mitigating climate change while 
simultaneously sustaining provision of food, timber or fibre, will result to a greater 
climate change mitigation benefits. The positive contribution to forest is based on 
sequestration, storage and substitution and these cannot be achieved without 
Sustainable Forest Management (SFM). Forest owners therefore, play a vital role in 
mitigating climate change because they implement SFM strategies in their 
everyday forest projects. Human demands for good and services from the forest is 
on the increase and the natural resources are depleted more than they are being 
replaced. Every year about 13 billion hectares of forest disappears globally, most 
especially in the biological rich tropical forest (FAO-FRA, 2010). Forest therefore, 
plays a major role in climate change discussion, because they are a source of 
emissions as well as a strategy for mitigation and adaptation (CIFOR, 2008). 
According to Gender Climate Change (2007), the direct underlying causes of 
deforestation should be addressed, rather than focusing on technical and 
methodological issues alone. Valuing forest beyond their carbon value could take 
into account protection of biodiversity, safeguard forest ecological balance, and 
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protect the forest and the livelihoods of local communities through full 
engagement of all stakeholders and capacity-building amongst people living in and 
from the forest. This will help provide maximum benefits from natural forest 
resources. Van Der Ploeg (2011) goes further to state that some countries with 
natural resources do not benefit from it because: 
 “A resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
deindustrialization, and bad growth prospects, and that these adverse 
effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and 
lack of rule of law, corruption, presidential democracies, and 
underdeveloped financial systems; 
 A resource boom reinforces land-grabbing and civil conflict 
especially if institutions are bad, induces corruption especially in 
non-democratic countries, and keeps in place bad policies; 
 Resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully 
convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive 
assets”. 
Thus, good governance and land tenure rights are key to benefits from natural 
resources. 
Societal wants are insatiable and as the world`s population density increases, 
level of consumption and technology increase. The exploitation, benefits and 
services from natural resource are far more than the natural ecosystem can 
replenish. The forest therefore, needs to be sustainably managed in such a way that 
the benefits and services provided from it get a balance with its health and 
biodiversity. People affect natural ecosystems when they use natural resources 
from it and return waste product to it. Population increase has resulted to increase 
in human activities which are impacting global ecosystems. With present global 
high population of seven billion (Carl & Gribble, 2011), increasing human 
activities exert pressure on several sectors creating problems that impact the 
ecosystems (Fig. 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1: Linkages and interactions between ecosystems and human social systems. 
Human survival and livelihood depend on the ecosystem. If our attitudes and actions 
are not changed, then the pressure on the ecosystems will continue to increase 
globally and the future generations will have nothing left. So there should be a 
change in life styles, behaviours, aspirations, expectations and reduction in the use of 
natural resources. We are answerable to the condition of the earth. It is our duty to 
protect it, restore it and sustainably manage it for continued provision of benefits and 
services to mankind. Therefore, there should be a balance between the socio-
economical needs and the health of the environment. 
25 
1.2 Trends and drivers of deforestation 
Tropical forest is second to natural disaster such as volcanic eruption and El Niño in 
contributing to CO2 emissions (IPCC, 2007), which is responsible for about 56% of 
climate change; but still about 13 million hectares of forest is loss every year (FAO, 
2004) despite present policies. In North America and European countries, the net 
forest area seems to be stable due to establishment of forest plantations and 
regeneration while tropical forest continues to suffer from substantial net loss of 
forest cover and lack adequate forest institutions to mitigate deforestation (Earth 
trends, 2008). Nevertheless, the net remaining frontier forests are declining globally. 
Africa has a large diversity of ecosystems, land cover types, and different land use 
practices, but since the 1970s, emissions from land use, land use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) have increased by 40% in Africa with an estimated loss of 440 to over 
1200 Mt CO2/year (Walker et al., 2008). The drivers of deforestation make it 
difficult to find a global solution as many of them are found outside the forestry 
region. Agricultural expansion contributes to 96% of present studies around 
deforestation (Geist & Lambin, 2002), though population growth, increase in 
infrastructure and timber exploitation also contribute greatly. Other underlying 
drivers include state forest policies, lack of adequate governance, forest institutions 
and markets prizes for both agricultural and forest products due to population and 
economic growth. The drivers of deforestation are uncertain due to few reliable 
statistics of forest cover, but these are embedded in the socio-economic dynamics 
between the states, private sectors, local people and poor governance within the 
forestry sector (Mustalahti et al., 2012). According to Kissinger et al. (2012), 80% of 
deforestation is believed to be as a result of smallholder’s slash and burn agricultural 
practices and fire-wood harvesting, but these are seen as secondary effect of timber 
exploitation which degrades forest cover leading to further decline in biodiversity. 
The 1997 Kyoto protocol to combat climate change excluded emissions from forest 
deforestation because of fear that challenges in quantifying emissions could impede 
climate regime. Tropical countries also feared that reducing deforestation could 
weaken their rights and sovereignty over land. However, developed countries could 
earn carbon credits through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), from 
reforestation projects in tropical countries, but this did not encourage forestry 
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projects. Reforestation may be a good mitigation strategy, but keeping existing 
forests present a better opportunity to mitigate climate change (Baumert et al., 2005).  
Reducing emission through halting deforestation preserves ecosystems and provides 
livelihood and environmental benefits. When making the links between poverty, 
deforestation and reduction in CO2 emissions, it is very critical to strike a balance 
between mitigating climate change, providing food security and improving 
livelihood. According to Ngendakumana et al. (2012), conversion of land for 
agriculture is a survival strategy which is also a source of carbon emission as argue 
by Neerly & Leeuw (2012). While a strong correlation has been established between 
income and deforestation in developing countries (Bhattarai & Hamming, 2001), it is 
also presumed that  increase  in income may shift the economic structure and demand 
of energy from wood toward petroleum based fuels, thereby, reducing pressure on 
forest. So, there is need to improve socio-political and economic institutions, rather 
than only the factors itself. The economic decision to convert forest into agriculture 
for improvement of livelihood may be a rational one; therefore, mitigation should be 
linked to rural development which is aimed at simultaneously sustaining life and 
reducing carbon emissions. REDD+ is considered as having the potential to mitigate 
climate change and improve livelihood to local communities in forest ecosystems 
(Mustalahti et al., 2012; Hoang et al., 2013). Therefore, a holistic approach is 
required to tackle climate change and critical understanding of the socio-economic 
relation with forest cover loss will enhance the effectiveness of reduction in emission 
and social disconnect in Cameroon. 
1.3 Forests, carbon and payment for ecosystem services 
In the year 2000, the United Nation Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) to assess the impacts of ecosystems 
changes on the livelihood and wellbeing of humans and also seek ways to improve 
the conservation and usage of these ecosystems, and its positive influence on human 
wellbeing. This assessment was carried out between 2001 and 2005 and involved 
about 1,360 experts (MEA, 2005). The results included the state and trends in 
world’s ecosystems, including services provided (water, food, flood control, resource, 
and forest products) and ways to restore, conserve and improve the use of 
ecosystems in a sustainable way. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment result 
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shows that ecosystems services have changed extensively and rapidly in the past 
50yrs due to rapid demands for fuel, water, food, timber and fibres. These changes 
have resulted in the loss of biodiversity and deterioration of 60-70% of world’s 
ecosystem services with dramatic impacts on dependent communities. The 
substantial net gain in economic development and human wellbeing have been 
achieved at the expense of degradation of ecosystem services, poverty for some 
minority, and risk of non-linear changes which if not addressed will diminish the 
benefits of ecosystem services for future generation. The Millennium Development 
Goals may not be achieved if the degradation of ecosystems gets significantly worse 
in the next 50yrs. Meeting-up with the demands of ecosystem services is challenged 
with reversing the rate of degradation of these ecosystems and it is possible with 
changes in current policies, practices, institutions and implementing options to 
conserve and improve certain ecosystem services which offers positive synergies 
alongside other ecosystem services. “The productivity of ecosystems depends on 
policy choices on investment, trade, subsidy, taxation, and regulation, among others” 
(MEA, 2005). If we cease to perceive ecosystem services as being ‘free and 
limitless’, while local communities are given the right to own natural resources, 
share and benefit from it and involved in all decisions made around them; then we 
can better protect our natural  resources through coordinated involvement of 
government, NGOs, local communities, businesses, sub-national, national and 
international institutions. The increase in human activity is depleting the ecosystem 
services in such a way that the earth’s ecosystems may not be able to support future 
generations, and appropriate behaviours and actions are needed to mitigate 
degradation of vital ecosystem services with substantial changes in policy and 
practice that still need to be established, of which full participation of local 
communities is one of them. 
As stated in the MEA (2005), ecosystem services are the benefits (provisional, 
regulating, supporting and cultural services) people derive from the ecosystems, 
while Wayne (2009) defines it as “the product of ecological functions or processes 
that are directly or indirectly contribute to human well-being, or have the potential 
to do so in the future”. While well-being denotes the state of happiness, good health 
and prosperity, quality of life represents that measurement or degree of well-being. 
Turner & Daily (2008) argue that the Ecosystem Service framework which 
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emphasises on the role of healthy ecosystems in sustainable provision for human 
well-being, alleviating poverty and economic development is considered to have both 
practical and theoretical implications and forms a holistic analytical template for 
decision-making (Fig. 1.2). Turner & Daily (2008) also urge for a better approach in 
mapping, modelling and valuing ecosystem services since there is lack of 
information to scale the benefits of humans from specific services, thus the need to 
develop and implement a more firm classification, distinguishing intermediate and 
final products for a more reliable and realistic valuation of services rendered by the 
ecosystems. 
Figure 1.2: The ecosystem services framework (Turner & Daily, 2008). 
Rewarding ecosystem services is a complex issue. The most worthy can be rewarded 
at market places. Creating incentives for sustainable ecosystem services provision 
should not only be from market places, they can also come from public policy where 
the beneficiary can be public authority securing the provision of the services in 
question or individuals, local communities, fishermen, hunters amongst others. 
Ecosystem services deserve some form of sustainable financing (economic 
29 
incentives) as payment for ecosystem services (PES) in the form of financial transfer, 
compensation or rewards in transfer of technology, debt relief and capacity building. 
Thereby, offering an effective and efficient way in promoting sustainable 
development. Though PES cannot be considered a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model, it is still 
a specific policy strategy which is geared toward sustainable development. 
According to Wunder (2005), “PES is a voluntary transaction where a well-defined 
ecosystem service (or a land-use likely to secure that service), is being ‘bought’ by a 
(minimum one) ecosystem service buyer from a (minimum one) ecosystem service 
provider, if and only if the ecosystem service provider secures ecosystem service 
provision of the service (conditionality”). The scheme used in PES tries to formulate 
a value to ecosystem services, estimate the price, and establish institution and 
redistribution systems for sustainable land use practices. Worthy or high value 
ecosystem services with lower cost of provision best suit this scheme. 
At the Rio de Janeiro conference (June 2012) on Sustainable Development, the issue 
of development, wellbeing and wealth was reconsidered and it was stressed that the 
values of ecosystem services be incorporated into policy and management strategies 
so as to balance the socio-economic and environmental needs with sustainable 
development. The Rio deliberation (points 39 and 40) state: ‘The Future We Want’: 
“We recognize that Planet Earth and its ecosystems are our home and that ‘Mother 
Earth’ is a common expression in a number of countries and regions, and we note 
that some countries recognize the rights of nature  in the context of the promotion of 
sustainable development. We are convinced that in order to achieve a just balance 
among the economic, social and environmental needs of present and future 
generations, it is necessary to promote harmony with nature. We call for holistic and 
integrated approaches to sustainable development that will guide humanity to live in 
harmony with nature and lead to efforts to restore the health and integrity of the 
Earth's ecosystem” (Minang & van Noordwijk, 2013). 
Ecological services are “the storage of carbon in trees, the regulation of water 
supplies, provision of non-timber forest products to local people, and the ecotourism 
opportunities provided by rare and endemic animals and plants” (Mwakalila et al., 
2009). We are faced with a major challenge of preserving the ecosystems while 
developing socio-economically, and avoiding deforestation and land degradation, 
30 
thus, striking a balance between production and preservation. This can be done 
through forest certification schemes, sustainable forestry techniques, improving 
environmental forest services, innovative financial mechanisms (CDM, REDD+), 
and integrated land use planning amongst others. In 2009, a community PES funded 
by the Department For International Development (DFID) in UK was created 
alongside the Congo Basin Forest Fund. This was the ‘first wave’ in linking 
community-based REDD+ project with community forest management and PES on 
carbon storage for improving livelihood in different socio-political and economic 
settings. While PES is performance-based depending on a reduction of forest 
conversion or achievement of measurable environmental benefits, they are 
synonymous to REDD+. ICDPs and PES have been found to have strong linkages 
with REDD+ and their knowledge helps to improve REDD+ effectiveness while 
reducing implementation cost. 
REDD+, while representing a better way to protect biodiversity, enhance local 
communities’ livelihoods and address climate change, lack effective institutional and 
governance framework. REDD+ initiatives propose to compensate tropical countries 
for the carbon stored in their forests which render sustainable forest management a 
more profitable alternatives than the current economic incentives favouring 
deforestation. For REDD+ to generate meaningful emissions reductions, it will 
require huge resources to be transferred to tropical countries. How then do we pay 
for REDD? A potential payment mechanism to compensate emission reduction was 
proposed in 2005 by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, whereby, credits are 
awarded to developing countries for reducing deforestation. These credits are in turn 
traded in international carbon market. Developing countries consider market-based 
approach as a better source of funding conservation programmes and a cost-effective 
way of reducing emissions (Busch et al., 2009). Design and implementation of 
REDD+ are faced by numerous technical issues, which are problematic under the 
market-based REDD+ regime and which remains a challenge to climate change 
mitigation policy. If developing countries sell carbon offsets that does not represent 
actual emissions reduction, the system will fail to achieve positive outcomes. Non-
market options such as development assistance, redirecting carbon tax revenue may 
also be considered for funding REDD+. 
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The central REDD+ objective is to financially reward tropical countries that reduced 
CO2 emissions through reducing deforestation and forest degradation, by allowing 
REDD+ credit to be traded on international market. Hence entire nations may 
probably be credited rather than individual projects. According to this mechanism, 
countries with reduced national level below a baseline level will receive a 
performance-based payment (Minang & van Noordwijk, 2013). Although developing 
countries favour a market-based approach, the effectiveness of REDD+ will depend 
on the financial costs and benefits to developing countries. However, a debate on 
compensation mechanism, including deforestation baseline level, role of tropical 
countries with low rate of deforestation, and measurement, reporting and validation 
of emissions reductions is ongoing (Miles & Kapos, 2008). 
1.4 Research problem 
The REDD+ mechanism is a multi-level governance system faced with 
implementation challenges in developing countries which need to be understood. 
There is need for targeted policy actions in enhancing regulatory compatibility and 
institutional synergy between global, national, sub-national and local levels. In 
addition to conflicts between forms and functions of governance (formal, national 
set-ups and local community), there is lack of common understanding between them. 
More open-minded, effective reciprocal communication, and respect for differing 
perception in the implementation of REDD+ is required to overcome these gaps. 
REDD+ should support forest stewardship activities of local communities providing 
benefits like strengthening of community resource rights, empowering local 
institutions and improving income through benefit-sharing. But there is fear that this 
might restrict customary rights (land and resource), increase centralisation of forest 
management, restrict local participation, lack free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) 
and inequitable benefit-sharing. The lack of information on local perspectives, lack 
of FPIC, insecure tenure, inequitable benefit-sharing mechanism, bad governance 
and lack of communities’ engagement in REDD+ programme design, 
implementation and monitoring at both national and sub-national levels, could inhibit 
effectiveness of REDD+ measures in Cameroon, and indeed across the tropics. 
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1.5 Research design 
The research design is based on an interactive framework consisting of separate 
research components that interact with each other to achieve the overall research 
objective. This framework has five components (goals, conceptual framework, 
research questions, methods and analysis) that form an integrated and interacting 
whole. 
1.5.1 Goals - aims and objectives 
According to Corbin & Strauss (2007), “The touchstone of your own experience may 
be more valuable an indicator for you of a potential successful research endeavour.” 
My personal goal is to determine whether local engagement in REDD+ project 
enhances communities’ livelihoods. The research aims to gain insights and better 
comprehension on how local events, actions, perceptions and understanding are 
shaped by unique circumstances to influence local behaviour. This inductive and 
open-ended strategy helps in “generating results and theories that are 
understandable and experientially credible both to the people being studied and to 
others” (Bolster, 1983). This research is aimed at providing policy makers and 
participatory communities with vital information and analysis needed to ensure a 
cost-efficient and effective reduction emission with equitable impacts and co-benefits 
base on sustainable forest management and to shape forest policies and strategies that 
are geared towards protecting poor marginalised local communities through 
implementation of cost-efficient REDD+ strategies. 
The general objective of this research is to provide a critical assessment of local 
communities’ involvement in the design, implementation and monitoring of the 
MCNP-REDD+ Project. There is need for constructing national REDD+ schemes 
that produce real emissions reduction through effective, efficient, and equitable 
methods while also providing benefits to local communities. 
1.5.1.1 Specific objectives 
 To critically assess community- forest relationships and how these are 
influenced by MCNP-REDD+ projects; 
 To evaluate how family farming system intersect with MCNP initiatives in 
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enhancing livelihood and food provision; 
 To assess the effectiveness of national policies and institutional measures 
that are meant to enhance efficient, effective and equitable REDD+ schemes 
and prevent local marginalisation; 
 To examine how effective communication is used to enhance local 
participation in the MCNP-REDD+ projects; 
 To quantify local communities’ voices during negotiation and decision-
making processes for environmental legitimacy of MCNP-REDD+ projects; 
 To assess the effectiveness and equity in benefit-sharing mechanism within 
MCNP to determine if local expectations are met; and 
 To evaluate if MCNP-REDD+ projects create an opportunity to link 
conservation, sustainable resource management and development of local 
communities by identifying the functional roles carried out by members of 
local communities. 
1.5.2 Conceptual framework 
Key to research design is the conceptual framework comprising concepts, key factors, 
assumptions, expectations, perceptions, and theories that provide the fundamentals 
for the research project (Robson, 2011) and the relationship among them. This helps 
in assessing and refining research goals, developing realistic and relevant research 
questions, selecting appropriate research methodology, identifying potential research 
gaps and justifying research findings (Maxwell, 2012). This conceptual framework 
has been constructed by incorporating pieces from existing theories and research 
relevant to the study, as well as my own speculative views to give an overall 
coherence of the project phenomenon. Locke et al. (1993) argue that “In any active 
area of inquiry the current knowledge base is not in the library - it is in the invisible 
college of informal associations among research workers”. Therefore, focusing only 
on literature alone may lead to ignoring or neglecting our own experience, 
speculative thinking and relevant pilot or exploratory research carried out. 
This section provides a synthesis of the main areas of literature and cross-over 
themes used in developing this research project; tenure, governance, effective and 
appropriate communication, PES and collaborative co-management approach. Sen 
(1999) argues that improved livelihoods can be enhanced through opportunity (job, 
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revenue, infrastructure and education), security (secure tenure, food, improved 
livelihood and climate change adaptability) and empowerment (local empowerment 
to participate and influence decisions affecting land use and development). The main 
themes that are linked to the research problems have been identified alongside with 
the conceptual cross-over from these bodies of literature. This conceptual and 
empirical research is aimed at establishing and exploring the main elements of the 
conceptual space through interpretative approach by identifying discourse, framing, 
knowledge, realities and multiple perspectives of interactions. Identification of a 
conceptual space and cross-overs which align with the research questions is used to 
guide this research process (Fig. 1.3). Perceptions of different levels of actors 
(international, national, sub-national, non-governmental organisation, local groups 
and communities) on the main themes are discussed. Finally, collaborative co-
management approach that linked conservation effort to community development 
and improved livelihood is examined, drawing the core concepts together to 
determine if REDD+ is a threat or opportunity to local communities. This conceptual 
framework incorporates and aligns the main concepts that have been identified 
within the conceptual space to approach the research. 
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Figure 1.3: Conceptual research space and how this aligns with the research 
questions. 
1.5.2.1 Research paradigm 
Interpretivism paradigm is used for this qualitative research to understand what 
shapes the practices of local communities by linking the four areas of literature. 
Exploring and understanding how individual subjectively assign meaning to their 
world, depend on their life experiences, beliefs and perceptions. Jasanoff (2004) 
argues that, science and society are co-produced by one another and cannot be 
separated; therefore scientific facts, nature, viewpoints and reasoning all exist in 
conceptual space. According to Blom et al. (2010), community based natural 
resource management (CBNRM), forest certification, access to market for non-
timber forest products (NTFP) and integrated conservation and development 
programmes (ICDP) which were once hailed in topical forest conservation did not 
meet-up to expectations due to application of impracticable assumptions and there is 
fear that REDD+ might be next. The supposed ‘win-win’ programmes were found to 
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be ineffective in terms of conservation and development by the agency involved and 
these were blamed on issues like corruption, cultural differences and inadequate 
engagement by local stakeholders which require other approaches to solve these 
emergent issues (Leach et al. 2010). Forsyth & Walker (2008) argue that, through 
interpretive method of enquiry, new projects which are based on same old 
perspectives, framing, assumptions and viewpoints may be confronted with the same 
limitations and concerns; therefore interpretive studies will help uncover factors like 
detailed discourses, perception, embedded assumptions and ways of understanding 
that help in tackling environmental and developmental issues and also create 
opportunities for alternative approaches. 
Leach et al. (2010) define framing as “the particular contextual assumptions, 
methods, forms of interpretation and values that different groups might bring to a 
problem, shaping how it is bound and understood.” A more effective, sustainable 
and legitimate approach to environmental and developmental issues entails a detail 
understanding of ways in which individual actors frame same situations so as to 
better comprehend and address the complex challenges associated with environment 
and development (Leach et al., 2010). But the big question is; “whose perspectives 
should be incorporated into decision-making?” Escobar (1998) argues that, local 
framing should be prioritised, but we shouldn’t aim at a perfect scenario, rather, we 
should focus on a better understanding of a legitimate approach. Discourse is defined 
as the “process through which social reality comes into being ... the articulation of 
knowledge and power” (Escobar 1996). Discourse analysis is used to better 
comprehend and address complex and dynamic environmental and developmental 
issues. Forsyth (2003) argues that it is a core focus for exploration of ways in which 
knowledge and nature are produced and reproduced to reflect political struggle of 
resources and power. According to Thompson et al. (2011), discourse analysis has 
the potential to uncover framing that “validates and legitimizes specific tools, actors, 
and solution while marginalizing others”. Leach et al. (2010), go further to state that 
it also uncovers hidden assumptions, beliefs, power relationships and alternative 
perspectives. Critical realism approach as advocated by Forsyth (2001) argues that, 
though science contributes to understanding of complex environmental issues, it 
provides limited insights due to complex social issues in the way it is produced, 
communicated and used. This approach enhances better understanding of 
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stakeholders’ engagement. Critical constructivism supports that post-development 
era should be moved from the use of traditional science to societal perception of 
social movement and local communities (Escobar, 1998). While the constructivism 
paradigm enables an inductive, grounded theory approach to understanding 
perspectives, the critical realism enables engagement with many stakeholders. 
Therefore, a pragmatic approach which includes both objective and subjective truth 
is essential in engaging many stakeholders groups (Leach et al., 2010) as the case of 
MCNP management. 
Critical development ethnography is an in-depth exploration of systems and 
processes involved in environmental and developmental interventions. This research 
explores the populist approach which advocates for a deeper understanding of 
bottom-up development which depends on local perspectives and requires 
participatory methodology to serve the needs of those affected by initiative while 
achieving development and conservation objectives. According to Long & Van Der 
Ploeg (1989), development is a complex set of evolving processes and practices that 
is made-up of ongoing social and political struggles taking place between the social 
actors involved. Here the linear and simplistic approaches are challenged and the 
development system is critically deconstructed as involving processes, programmes, 
and systems of interventions involved. Murray Li (2007) explicitly uses the 
deconstructive approach to provide critical analysis of development and unpacked 
complexity, and also exposed factors omitted from technocratic approaches to 
interventions. Therefore, this study explores conservation and development through 
the deconstructive approach (critical development ethnography). Research on 
planned interventions should be focused on developing frameworks, suggestions and 
outcomes; interventions should be conceptualised as multiple realities that are made-
up of different social interests; and cultural perspectives and actor-based perspective 
are needed to unpacked planned interventions (Long & Van Der Ploeg, 1989). Lewis 
& Mosse (2006) argue that development ethnography will uncover hidden issues, 
improve attention to discourse and policy processes, and identify groups, agendas 
and individual goals. Though actor-based approach risks inadequate consideration of 
other issues like political economy, power and structure. 
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Recognition-based-justice provides a lens through which we can fully unpacked 
conservation and development, and helps resolve conflicts between socio-ecological 
factors (Martin et al., 2013) through in-depth understanding of different perceptions. 
One of the key elements in the conceptual space is pursuit of social and 
environmental justice (Sen, 2011). Tenure, governance, PES and communication all 
seek to address social justice which need a better understanding of how society and 
environmental knowledge are co-produced (Forsyth, 2008). Martin et al. (2013) 
framed social justice as uneven distribution of goods. However, contemporary 
theories have challenged this viewpoint, calling for better exploration and framing 
that include the ‘why’ and the ‘what’ of injustice to give a coherent understanding of 
the underlying causes of uneven distribution of resources (Fraser, 2007). Thereby, 
including the concept of economic distribution, cultural recognition and political 
representation in the conceptualisation of injustice (Martin et al., 2013; Fraser, 2007), 
must be considered to achieve justice. In the case of integrated conservation and 
development projects like the MCNP, justice is considered in terms of participation 
and revenue distribution, but recognition is often ignored, so local stakeholders need 
to align themselves with dominant way of knowing to get involved (Martin et al., 
2013). Even when recognition is discussed in project design, it often gets resisted in 
practice. 
These approaches (interpretivism, critical development ethnography and recognition-
based justice) form rich sources of perspectives on environment and development, 
providing a systematic and in-depth exploration of power and politics that are often 
hidden by the dominant ways of knowing the world, and highlights hidden 
alternative perspectives (Shivji, 2006). There is need for a more critical, interpretivist 
analysis of conservation and developmental processes because different ways of 
knowing produce different outcomes and approaches to conservation projects as 
argued by Forysth (2003). The integrated nature of conservation and development 
programmes create different perspectives on the same issue, and prioritising human 
rights, wellbeing, and biodiversity conservation is often contested (Hirsch et al; 
2011) as well as definition of forest (Forsyth & Sikor, 2013), social justice and 
environmental sustainability (Dobson, 2003). These concepts are used in this thesis 
to explore different framings and perspectives of different actors and to understand 
how these relate to actual engagement in programme design, implementation and 
39 
monitoring. Though, Benjaminsen & Svarstad (2010) state that conservation 
discourses does not often mirror conservation practices. Knowledge is co-produced 
between science and society through a myriad of perspectives, realities and 
perception that offer in-depth insight into conservation and development issues. 
Methodology of discourse and concepts of framing are used to explore different 
perspectives. The processes and practices of conservation and development are also 
critically analysed through deconstructive approaches to better understand the role of 
communities’ engagement in critical development ethnography. While the 
recognition-based justice lens is used to bring together all the concepts involved and 
provide a better framing for the research towards academic and instrumental results 
for sustainable development. 
The ontological realism assumes that a real world exist independently of our 
perceptions and theories; while the epistemology constructivism assumes that our 
knowledge of the world is inevitable of our own construction which is often not a 
pure objective perception of reality, so no construction can claim absolute truth 
(Maxwell, 2012). People’s perception and beliefs are shaped by their assumptions, 
previous experience and on-ground reality; therefore, the theories or conclusions 
presented here are just simplified attempt to grasp knowledge of a complex reality. 
1.6 Approach and methods 
The study is approached through a Human Ecological Perspective that emphasises on 
a holistic approach to better understand the institutional synergy between global, 
regional, national, sectorial, sub-national and local levels, with respect for different 
audiences and perceptions in the implementation of REDD+. Information were 
gathered from Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC), Ministry of 
Environment, Nature Protection and Sustainable Development (MINEPDED), 
Ministry of Forestry and Fauna (MINFOF), South West Regional office of MINFOF 
(MINFOF-SWR), Planet Survey, German International Cooperative (GIZ), Mount 
Cameroon Prunus Common Initiative Group (MOCAP-CIG) and 12 park villages to 
generate knowledge that does not only address societal problems, but also contribute 
to their solution as new policies and REDD+ projects develop. 
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1.6.1 Method of data collection 
Based on the literature review and study objectives questionnaire, interview and 
focus group guidelines were designed and administered to the 12 participatory park 
villages while consultations and interviews were administered to proponents from 
COMIFAC, MINEPDED, MINFOF, MINFOF-SWR, Planet Survey, GIZ, and 
MOCAP-CIG to generate both quantitative and qualitative information (Fig.1.4). 
Figure 1.4 Research pathways showing all participatory villages and NGO, sub-
national, national and regional stakeholders involved in data collection. 
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Sampling size and techniques - cluster multi-stage random sampling. 
The MCNP management involves 41 peripheral villages, who signed a Conservation 
Development Agreement (CDA) at cluster platform meeting. The 41 park villages 
are divided into four geographical clusters based on natural boundaries, culture and 
livelihood differences to facilitate collaborative management activities (Map 1.1; 
Table 1.1). A cluster platform is then established to coordinate all activities and 
entails a constant flow of information between the park managers and park villages, 
and within the villages. Cluster multi-stage random sampling was adopted because it 
permits subsequent sampling and one can estimate characteristics of the clusters 
under investigation (Daniels, 2011). Random sampling limits bias and capture 
random variation in population from where a more confident statement can be made 
about the population in question. A minimum of 240 households were surveyed with 
a leakage of 10% factored in (in case of default due to drop-outs). This gives a target 
group of 264 participants. This sample size permits intermediate and detailed levels 
of statistical analysis, ensures that variation in responses is captured and allows for a 
more robust test of the hypotheses. 
 
Map 1.1: Map of MCNP showing the cluster conservation zone and participatory 
villages involved in MCNP-REDD+ project (adapted from GIZ, 2013). 
42 
Table 1.1: The four clusters and corresponding villages co-managing MCNP with 
sampled villages in bold. 
Name of cluster Park villages 
1-Buea (Salaried 
workers) 
Upper Boando, Ekonjo, Mapanja, Likombe, Bwassa, Bokwango, 
Lykoko Membia, Buea village, Ewondo, Bova 1, Bova 2, 
Bonakanda, Woteva 
2-West-Coast 
(Fishing) 
Sanje, Bibunde, Njonji, Bakingili, Etome, Batoke, Lower 
Boando, 
3-Muyuka 
(Hunting) 
Mundame, Ekona Lelu, Liola-Buea, Masuma, Bavenga, Bafia, 
Lykoko, Mile 14, Liliale, Munyenge 
4-Bomboko 
(Timber) 
Bova Bomoko, Boviongo, Ebie, Bokoso, Mondongo, Munyange, 
Mueli, Kukekumbu, Efolofo, Kotto 1, Kotto 2, Bomana 
Households formed the basic sampling unit for this study. Only park villages with a 
population between 100 to 1000 inhabitants were included in the survey to improve 
population representativeness in the survey. Three park villages were randomly 
chosen within each cluster unit making sure they did not share a common boundary, 
and households within each chosen park village were randomly selected. 264 
households were randomly selected for questionnaire administration making sure that 
at least 15% of the households, 30% of each gender and 10% from each age group in 
each village served as respondents to give better representation of the participatory 
village. 
Purposeful sampling was used for focus group discussion to ensure relative 
homogeneity in customary representativeness and provide more confidence that 
conclusions adequately represent perception of village representatives in each cluster. 
This sampling technique was chosen based on the feasibility of data collection, goals, 
analysis and conceptual framework. The chief, councillors of each participatory park 
village and five community members chosen by the councillors, took part in the 
focus group discussion (Table 1.2). 
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1.6.1.1 Data collection 
To validate the survey, a pilot study was conducted within 33% of the future sample 
villages (one park village in each cluster) five months before actual field work 
(March/April 2013) with 64 respondents to test its validity, get feedback on format 
and possible answers. The pilot study helped to capture knowledge, attitude and 
behaviours/practices of local communities, identify gaps and field challenges, correct 
inconsistency and re-structure survey instruments. Experience on administering 
survey was gained and the need for tangible incentives was evident. The result of the 
pilot study was not included in final analysis, but falls in-line with final result. Final 
data were collected from October to December 2013. From each village, at least 17% 
of households, 34% of each gender, 10% of each age-group at various educational 
levels and marital statutes took part in the survey (Table 1.2) and this gave a total of 
259 respondents who participated in this questionnaire survey. 
Table 1.2: Demographic and statistical information from questionnaire survey. 
Demographic information Bomboko 
(%) 
Buea 
(%) 
Muyuka 
(%) 
West-
Coast (%) 
Total 
(%) 
N (households) 66(21.3) 68(24.5) 49(52.7) 76(17.0) 259 (23) 
Gender Male 42(63.6) 41(60.3) 29(59.2) 50(65.8) 162(62.5) 
Female 24(36.4) 27(39.7) 20(40.8) 26(34.2) 97(37.5) 
Educati
onal 
level 
No education 5(7.6) 3(4.4) 4(8.2) 0(0) 12(4.6) 
Primary school 41(62.1) 32(47.1) 26(53.1) 45(59.2) 144(55.6) 
Secondary school 16(24.2) 22(32.4) 17(34.7) 25(32.9) 80(30.9) 
High school 1(1.5) 8(11.8) 1(2.0) 4(5.3) 14(5.4) 
>High school 3(4.5) 3(4.4) 1(2.0) 2(2.6) 9(3.5) 
Head of 
family 
No 25(37.9) 28(41.2) 15 (30.6) 20 (26.3) 88(34) 
Yes 41(62.1) 40(58.8) 34(69.4) 56 (73.7) 171(66) 
Age 
group 
20 – 40yrs 39(59.1) 34(50) 21(42.9) 38 (50) 132(51.0) 
40 – 60yrs 20(29.4) 20(29.4) 22(44.9) 26 (34.2) 88(34) 
>60yrs 7(10.6) 14(20.6) 6(12.2) 12(15.8) 39(15.1) 
Marital 
statues 
Single 18(27.3) 23(33.8) 11(22.4) 13(17.1) 65(25.1) 
Married 37(56.1) 37(54.4) 29(59.2) 60(78.9) 163(62.9) 
Divorced 5(7.6) 4(5.9) 1(2.0) 1(1.3) 11(4.2) 
Widow(er) 6(9.1) 4(5.9) 8(16.3) 2(2.6) 20(7.7) 
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Questionnaire (appendix, section 11.4): The research questions relate to the goals 
and conceptual framework and help guide research (methods and logic). Most of the 
research questions (Table 1.4.) are based on respondents’ perceptions because the 
interest is on how respondents make sense of what is happening and how these 
perspectives of events influence their actions to engage in forest project. Variance 
questions (Is there? Does? How much?) deal with difference and correlations 
compared to process questions (How? Why?). The formulation of these questions 
follow an open-ended inductive approach to identify what villagers perceptions are 
and how these perceptions influence behaviours as well as how they are involved in 
the activities. The questionnaires were meant to provide data that contribute to 
answering the research questions. A contribution of Likert scale, multiple responses, 
ranking, filter, open-ended and close-ended questions were administered face to face 
to respondents to access their level of awareness, perceptions and involvement in 
REDD+ initiatives. Rank order questions were used to gather preference judgements 
and engage participants in activities. Open-ended questions were used to gather more 
in-depth information and variety of data (knowledge, preference, experiences). For 
closed-ended questions, choices of answers were randomised to reduced bias. Four 
field assistants from the four village clusters were trained to aid in data collection 
within their respective clusters, especially, in cases were the respondent understood 
only traditional dialect, and also to establish a more friendly and acceptable 
relationship between the research team with the community. Two other assistants 
helped with taking field photos and recording (tap and video). I personally collected 
approximately 94% of the data without aid, and coupled with my physical 
observations and psychological judgement of the respondents, my results could be 
92% trustworthy. Data from different questions were categorically organised 
according to relevance to the chapters (Table 1.3) and quantitatively analysed to 
generate results under different chapters. 
Focus group discussion (appendix, section 11.3): A focus-group discussion forum 
was set-up within each participatory village involving the chief, councillors and five 
community representatives. The discussions empowered participants to reveal self-
directed debates about their views, knowledge, values and practices (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009). The data were categorised and analysed to generate results for 
different chapters (Table 1.3). These results provided better understanding of 
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communities’ perceptions and helped to validate quantitative results. The principal 
investigator chaired the focus-group discussions while one assistant took down notes 
and another recorded the discussion to facilitate analysis of unclear statements. The 
focus group discussion was carried out before the household survey to enhance 
acquaintance and acceptance of the researcher and field assistants by the community. 
Table 1.3: Questionnaires and focus-group sections categorised and analysed to 
generate results for different chapters 
 Questionnaires Focus group discussion guideline 
Chapter 3 Section B2(a, b) & G5 Section C1 & E 
Chapter 4 Section B1, A7, A8, A9 & G5 Section B(1, 3, 4, 6, 7), E & C2  
Chapter 5 Section C, B2(c), G1(f) & G5 Section F & G (10,11,12,13) 
Chapter 6 Section D, A6 & G5 Section H 
Chapter 7 Section E & G5 Section H 
Chapter 8 Section F, D5(e), G1(b, c) & G5 Section B 
Chapter 9 Section G, B(a, b, d, e), D5(f) & G5 Section D 
Interviews: Interviews were conducted face to face with key proponents from Mount 
Cameroon Prunus Common Initiative Group (MOCAP-CIG), the German 
International Cooperation, the Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection and 
Sustainable Development (MINEPDED), Village Forest Management Committees 
(VFMC) and the Ministry of Forestry and Fauna (MINFOF) (Photo 1) to get an 
overview of the environmental situation, challenges faced in designing and 
implementing REDD+, and other relevant forest management strategies and relevant 
stakeholders involved in co-managing MCNP. These interviews were used to collect 
insight from the perception of different stakeholders and validate information from 
secondary sources like the literature review and consultations. All interviews were 
recorded, transcribed and analysed using NVivo. 
Consultations, field observation and socialisation: Data were consulted from 
COMIFAC, MINEPDED, MINFOF-SWR, UNFCCC and MOCAP-CIG (Photo 1) to 
better understand successful strategies and principles for effectiveness, efficiency 
and equity in REDD+ programmes. During consultation, the management plan, a 
range of technical notes and log-frame of the MCNP were also collected and 
analysed. 
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Photo 1: Some fieldwork photos at regional, national, sub-national levels and GIZ. 
Field observation and socialisation were carried out to attain familiarisation with 
members of communities and collection of data without affecting their feelings, 
attitudes and behaviour (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009), by participating in local 
activities like fishing, farming, story-telling at the village square, singing and 
dancing to traditional rhythms (Photo 2). Intensive and long term observation of 
participants provides richer and direct data, rather than inference (Becker & Geer, 
1957), eliminates misinterpretation, identification of discrepant data and explicit 
comparison. 
1.6.2 Data entry and treatment 
Quantitative data were entered into a Microsoft excel spreadsheet and later imported 
into SPSS statistic 2.2 for analysis. Qualitative data were entered into NVivo for 
processing and analysis. Data collected from primary and secondary sources were 
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adjusted to the objectives of the study. Data entered into the computer were checked 
for consistency by doubly entry and cross checking. 
 
Photo 2: Some fieldwork photos at MOCAP, GIZ and within local communities. 
1.6.3 Data analysis 
Here the principles of triangulation - where data are integrated from various methods 
and sources of information (Denzin, 1970), were used to reduce the risk of 
conclusion being based on systematic bias or limitations of specific methods and to 
gain a better assessment in validating and generalising casual explanation. Some data 
analysis were conducted during the survey as suggested by Coffey & Atkinson, 
(1996) to progressively focus the discussions, interviews, observations and test 
emerging conclusions. Data were analysed through a mixed-method approach which 
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integrates both quantitative and qualitative analysis to provide a better understanding 
of results (Bazeley, 2012). Statistical packages were used based on the adequacy of 
data collected from retrospective and prospective study. Quantitative data from 
focus-group discussions and questionnaires were coded, entered into excel and 
imported into SPSS for analysis. Descriptive statistics revealed demographic 
characteristics of respondents and also produced relevant frequency tables and charts. 
Cross tabulation and chi-square test of independence were used to establish 
relationship between dependent and independent variables; Mann-Whitney U test, t-
test, ANOVA and linear regression models were used to understand the contribution 
of predictors on independent variables; and independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test 
and Jonckheere-Terpstra trend test compared results between different clusters and 
established trends respectively. Data relationships were examined, information cross-
examined, relationships investigated and frameworks established to support projects. 
Categorised strategies were used for qualitative analysis (coding and thematic 
analysis). The coding ‘fractures’ the data, re-arranging it into categories to facilitate 
comparison of perceptions within the same theme making sure contextual 
relationships among different topics of data were not neglected (Maxwell & Miller, 
2008). Categorisation helps develop overall understanding of different topics being 
discussed, generate themes, concept and organise retrieval of data to support projects. 
Organisational categories help in sorting data; which are useful as chapters or 
sections (Chapter 3 to 9); for further analysis. While substantive categories are 
developed inductively through coding of data (Corbin & Strauss, 2007) to produce 
more insight to what is going on within each chapter from where claims are made to 
support project. 
Transcripts from interviews and field observations were analysed using thematic and 
issues based content analysis (QSR N-Vivo 9) and relevant information were 
incorporated into results from questionnaire survey. NVivo is a computer assisted 
qualitative data analysis software package, specially designed to analyse qualitative 
research which deals with multimedia and requires an in-depth level of analysis on 
larger volume of data. It creates a progressive dialogue between the researcher and 
his/her data (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012), compelling them to be more explicit and 
reflexive (Veal, 2005) and its increased transparency, coding, cross tabulation and its 
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text retrieval system, creates a significant and original contribution. It was a relevant 
tool in this research in organising and analysing unstructured data; allowing them to 
be classified, sorted, and arranged, and examining data relationships. A word 
frequency query (top 10-15 words) produced word clouds which help to enable 
visualisation of words mentioned by respondents, thereby, giving a clear 
comprehension of topic discussed with different font sizes indicating the frequency 
of words mentioned. The word clouds give an overview of participants’ response and 
help to establish themes for further discussion. These themes are further coded and 
types of comments or information sorted to establish clear interpretation of 
qualitative data (Braun & Clark, 2006), identify trends and cross-examine 
information with the use of query functions. In this study, negative comment refers to 
areas of concern while positive comment refers to opportunities, and mixed 
information refers to general or neutral information. Data from NVivo were later 
exported to an Excel spreadsheet for production of figures and tables. With NVivo, 
observations were made and body of evidence build up to support projects. While 
quantitative results showed difference in results between different clusters (Bomboko, 
Buea, Muyuka and West-Coast) as well as between local  participants and non-
participants (horizontal analysis), qualitative results cut through all levels of 
governance showing different perception between international, national, sub-
national, local forest groups and local communities (vertical analysis) involved in 
MCNP-REDD+ projects. 
1.6.4 Thesis logical framework 
This section provides a summary of logic framework that shows the objectives, 
hypothesis and methods that were used in realising the research objectives. 
Additionally, earlier expected results and assumptions are also offered. A matrix is 
presented to link research questions and methods used to collect data that answers 
these questions and helps deal with anticipated and unanticipated validity gaps, 
thereby, increasing the credibility of the conclusions (Table 1.4). Validity of research 
is the result of integrity because we cannot separate the researcher from the research. 
According to Hammersley & Atkinson (1995), we cannot eliminate the actual 
influence of the researcher, but we need to understand and use this influence 
productively to answer research questions. 
 Table 1.4: Logic framework showing a matrix linking research questions, hypothesis and methods used to realised research objectives 
Specific objectives Research questions Hypothesis  Methods  Expected results Assumptions 
To critically assess community forest 
relationships and how such relationships 
are influenced by REDD+ project. 
Does MCNP- project 
interfere with community 
forest relationship? 
Null: There is 
no significant 
correlation 
between local 
communities’ 
engagement in 
MCNP and 
improved 
REDD+ social 
safeguard 
outcomes. 
Literature review, 
focus group, 
questionnaires, 
interviews, 
consultation and 
physical 
observations. 
The different land tenure-
rights and overlaps will be 
identified. 
Tenure is insecure for 
local communities 
around MCNP. 
To evaluate how family farming systems 
intersects with MCNP in enhancing 
livelihood and food provision. 
How does MCNP project 
interact with family farming 
to enhance food production? 
Impact of MCNP on 
livelihood and food 
provision will be revealed. 
MCNP project impede 
local food production 
system. 
To assess effectiveness of national policies 
and institutional measures that ensure 
efficient, effective and equitable REDD+ 
scheme. 
Do national forest policies 
encourage local stakeholders 
to engage? 
National forest policies 
impede local engagement. 
There are strong policies 
‘on paper’ that are 
practically weak. 
To examine how effective communication 
is used to enhance local participation in 
MCNP  
What are the communication 
practices that empower 
communities to engage? 
The media, frequency of 
information and perception 
will be revealed. 
Inadequate forestry or 
REDD+ information 
within communities. 
To assess appropriateness of 
communication for environmental 
legitimacy in MCNP 
Are local voices influencing 
decisions within MCNP 
design? 
Level of influence 
accorded to local voices 
will be identified 
Local voices are not 
considered in final 
decision. 
To examine the effectiveness and equity in 
benefit-sharing mechanism within MCNP. 
How are forest revenue re-
distributed down to 
communities? 
Benefit-sharing 
mechanism will be 
identified. 
There is unequal 
distribution of revenue 
To evaluate if MCNP- project creates an 
opportunity to link conservation, 
sustainable resource management and 
development of communities. 
Does REDD+ create an 
opportunity for development 
to local stakeholders? 
REDD+ opportunity 
presented to communities 
will be identified 
Local stakeholders 
benefit little from 
engaging in REDD+ 
projects. 
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1.7 Thesis structure 
The first two chapters introduce the study and show the road map of REDD+ from 
Kyoto to local communities in Cameroon. Each of the next seven chapters presents a 
unique analysis, results and discussions corresponding to the seven main research 
questions. There are overlaps in methodology sections which are presented in section 
1.6 and referred to where relevant. A concluding chapter summarises the study, 
recommends strategies to address issues of concern and suggestion for further work. 
Chapter 1 presents the relevance of the thesis and its contribution to research. Here 
the importance of forest, trends and drivers of deforestation are presented and the 
relationships between forest and carbon for the payment for ecosystem services are 
elaborated alongside with a thorough background of the research problem, aims, 
objectives, methodology and its significance. 
Chapter 2 reveals the road map for the birth of REDD+ and how it transcends from 
the global level as a paradigm right down to implementation at the local communities. 
It briefly introduces REDD+ discussions within the African context and gives an 
insight of REDD+ management actors, institutions and processes within Cameroon. 
Chapter 3 assesses the community forest relationships to evaluate their relevance in 
achieving REDD+ objectives. It examines local community’s tenure systems and 
also assesses how they interact with MCNP-project. 
Chapter 4 evaluates how family farming system intersects with MCNP initiatives in 
enhancing livelihood and food provision. It also examines the challenges faced by 
family farmers in enhancing food production, identifies ways of resolving these 
challenges as well as identifies factors that are influencing income for improved 
livelihoods. 
Chapter 5 is a multi-scale analysis examining the effectiveness of institutional 
measures and national forest policies in Cameroon. Here, the extent to which 
Cameroon forest policies serve as a platform for community carbon forestry in the 
context of REDD+ is analysed. The capability of forest policy, land tenure, resource 
rights to effectively realised REDD+ objectives are examined. 
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Chapter 6 examines how effective communication is used to enhance community 
involvement in MCNP REDD+ projects design, implementation and monitoring 
within park villages. The alleged asymmetry between effective communication, 
capacity building and the effective and efficient implementation of REDD+ are 
explored. 
Chapter 7 examines the communication structures, negotiation and decision-making 
processes and how these affect environmental legitimacy of MCNP-REDD+ projects. 
It examines if local communities are accorded standing at decision-making process to 
influence contentious decision. 
Chapter 8 analyses the effectiveness of national policies that are meant to prevent 
marginalisation of local communities and enhance equitably distribution of revenue. 
The effectiveness of the present benefit-sharing mechanism is examined to quantify 
and legitimate benefits from MCNP-REDD+ initiative. 
Chapter 9 uses a multi-disciplinary approach to evaluate forest management system 
within MCNP. It examines links between policies, conservation, sustainable resource 
management and level of communities’ engagement in MCNP REDD+ activities. 
Challenges and/or opportunities faced by local communities during REDD+ 
activities are also assessed in the context of MCNP. 
Chapter 10 provides an overview of REDD+ and presents potential solutions to some 
of the gaps and/or problems emerging from the preceding chapters. It presents a 
synthesis of the research discussions on emerging issues of concern. In conclusion it 
evaluates if REDD+ is a threat to local communities or an opportunity for local 
development. Chapter 3 to 9 have been written for publication as stand-alone articles 
in the following journals: 
Chapters Proposed journals for publication 
Chapter 3 and 4 Forest, Tress and Livelihoods (Taylor and Francis) 
Chapter 5 Environmental Science and Policies for Sustainable Development 
Chapter 6 and 7 Environmental Sociology (Taylor and Francis) 
Chapter 8 Environmental Science and Policy (Elsevier) 
Chapter 9 The Journal of Environmental and Development (SAGE) 
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2 From Kyoto, REDD to REDD+ with local 
communities involvement 
Climate change threats have created a renewed hope to protect the values and services 
rendered by tropical forests. Reducing, and ultimately stopping deforestation, would be 
an important and vital step in limiting climate change. The exclusion of deforestation 
and land degradation policies during the 1997 Kyoto protocol led to the creation of the 
Coalition of Rainforest Nations which is headed by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea. 
This coalition met in 2005 to propose a mechanism, which could create incentives to 
protect forests - Reducing Emissions through avoided Deforestation and forest 
Degradation (REDD). In 2005, during the Eleventh Conference of Parties in Montreal, 
their proposal gained interest, despite some major challenges in measurement and risk of 
leakage. The issue was forwarded to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical 
Advise (SBSTA) to be examined. 
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated that 
approximately 17% of global GHG emissions were the result of deforestation and 
resulting land use changes, yet forestry was excluded from the Kyoto protocol. To 
ensure sustainable development, there was need to reduce emissions and keep global 
temperature increase below 4°C by enhancing on cooperative action to combat climate 
change. So the findings of IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report on climate change about 
global warming, melting of polar ice, rise in sea levels, loss of biodiversity and famine 
were all used in the Bali ‘Road Map’ under the United Nations Framework on Climate 
Change Convention (UNFCCC) in December 2007. At the Bali convention in Indonesia 
(COP-13), a consensus was arrived on two major issues; the Reduction of Emissions 
from Deforestation and Land Degradation in tropical countries which is causing 20-25% 
increase in greenhouse emissions and Adaptation Funds based on ‘polluter pays 
principle’ as incentives set-up to support tropical countries in dealing with impacts of 
climate change (UNFCCC, 2008). A comprehensive approach was formulated to include 
policy and incentives on REDD issues and the role of sustainable development, 
conservation, and carbon enhancement in developing countries. 
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This decision 1/CP.13 provides the basis of negotiating at the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) as well as negotiation on REDD+. The 
first paragraph of the Bali Action Plan states: “Decides to launch a comprehensive 
process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention 
through long term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012, in order to reach 
and agreed outcome and adopt a decision at its fifteenth session, by addressing , inter 
alia… (Fry, 2008), 1b(ii) National appropriate mitigation actions by developing country 
parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, 
financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner; 
1b(iii) Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the 
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest 
stocks in developing countries;” (UNFCCC, 2008). 
Decision 2/CP.13 on REDD in tropical countries’ (UNFCCC, 2008) approach to induce 
actions was also adopted at COP-13 in Bali. It encouraged technical assistance, 
technology transfer, capacity building, monitoring and reporting, exploration of action 
by Parties, mobilisation of resources, options identification, and application of Good 
Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry. It also requested the 
SBSTA to engage on methodological related issues, approaches to forest policy and 
meaningful REDD incentives (UNFCCC, 2008). An agreement on urgent meaningful 
action to REDD was also reached with the design of International REDD mechanism 
scheduled with deadline to be COP-15 in Copenhagen 2009. 
At the SBSTA 29 held in Poznan in December 2008, methodological guidance provided 
in annex II on REDD+ was recommended without prejudice on future COP decision as 
shown in paragraph 11 - decision 2/CP.13 on methodological issues. Parties were 
invited to submit country-specific information, experiences and their views on local 
communities’ involvement in design and implementation of methodologies. The 
progress of this work was aimed to be reported at COP-15 using guidance from the 
AWG-LCA to facilitate its progress (UNFCCC, 2009). At COP-14 in Pozna, the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forest resources and enhancement of carbon 
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stock were accorded equal status as deforestation and land degradation thereby 
upgrading REDD to REDD+ (Carbon Planet, 2009). The Plus incentivises countries 
with low emissions to keep them low and prevent mechanism that rewards only 
historical high emitters. It also enhances REDD’s potential in achieving co-benefits like 
alleviating poverty, enhancing governance, conservation of biodiversity and protection 
of ecosystem services (Campbell, 2009). 
Many countries gained much interest on REDD+ in 2009 on climate change 
negotiations despite some unresolved issues to be negotiated, such as the use of central 
fund or market-based approach, engagement of local communities, Measuring Reporting 
and Verification (MRV), baseline reference levels and if REDD+ should be considered 
on sub-national or national level (Joy, 2010). During the December 2009 UNFCCC in 
Copenhagen (COP-15), the Copenhagen Accord was drafted which states that 
(paragraph 8) “Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well 
as improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Convention, to enable and support enhanced action on 
mitigation, including substantial finance to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development and transfer and 
capacity- building, for enhanced implementation of the Convention. The collective 
commitment by developed countries is to provide new and additional resources, 
including forestry and investments through international institutions, approaching USD 
30 billion for the period 2010-2012…” (UNFCCC, 2010a). It also includes reference to 
mobilising $100 billion by the year 2020 from public, private, bilateral and 
multinational sources. Though noted, this accord was not adopted and it was unclear if 
the signatory countries will meet to these commitments. So there was no concrete 
agreement on reducing GHG emissions (words, but no real action). 
Nevertheless REDD+ is continuously being drafted under AWG-LCA which helped to 
expand negotiation from REDD to REDD+ at COP-15. Although COP-15 did not arrive 
at tangible agreement with AWG-LCA, it did extended AWG-LCA mandates, and 
adopted decision 4/CP.15 which provided guidance on REDD+ methodology based on 
SBSTA’s work which was adopted in Bali in 2007 (decision 2/CP.13) (Joy, 2010). The 
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AWG-LCA 8th report laid down principles for REDD+ initiative to contribute to 
UNFCCC objectives; both country driven and results-based, and promote participation 
of all stakeholders while supporting the enlisted ‘safeguards’ such as: effective and 
transparent forest governance structure; effective involvement of all stakeholders with 
the inclusion of local communities. SBSTA was also requested to examine land use and 
land use changes in forest activities in tropical countries with the necessary guidelines 
for REDD+ initiatives (UNFCCC, 2010a). Developing countries were to design a 
national strategic plan, baseline emission reference level and a monitory system while 
the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund was set-up as a financial mechanism operative unit. 
The Cancun agreement in 2010 (UNFCCC, 2010b) adopted a REDD+ operational 
mechanism in three-phases: 
 Preparation and readiness phase - development of REDD+ strategy at country 
level, building capacity, developing institution and demonstrating activities. 
 Early action phase consisting of piloting and testing of strategies, improving 
capacity, setting reference level, portfolio development of REDD+ projects, and 
building infrastructure for MRV. 
 Performance based payments - full implementation of REDD+ with quantifiable 
emissions reductions, certified emission reduction and equal benefit-sharing. 
In 2010, during the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference, an ‘Interim REDD+ 
Partnership Agreement’ to ‘fast-track’ REDD+ was formalised. Donor countries were 
committed to make available $4 billion to support developing countries in their effort in 
developing strategies, building capacities and participating actively to fight deforestation 
(OsloCFC, 2010). The REDD+ partnership document is a set of robust principles to 
make sure they all pull together with same development, humanitarian and 
environmental goals with total commitment to full transparency on actions, finances and 
results (public database) to enable effective coordination while ensuring that finances 
flow where it is likely to yield the greatest benefits. This enables speeding up actions on 
financing for REDD+ initiatives. 
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The AWG-LCA met in August 2012 in Bangkok for an in-depth discussion on financing 
results-based REDD+ initiatives: guidelines and procedures, private sector participation 
and financing framework for implementing results-based REDD+ (UNFCCC, 2012). 
One of the crucial issues of REDD+ has been MRV and monitoring of carbon stocks. At 
the UNFCCC 18th Conference of Parties held in November 26, 2012 to December 7, 
2012 in Doha, this point was deliberated upon (WRI, 2012). Discussions were 
suspended in Doha because Papua New Guinea and the Coalition of Rainforest Nations 
stood behind Brazil to object to an independent, international verification systems of 
deforestation related emission reduction as proposed by Norway - one of the 
international donors of REDD+. Brazil and its followers preferred to monitor their own 
emissions and called for the creation of a REDD+ Committee to coordinate discussion 
on mechanism and funding of REDD+. The issue of drivers of deforestation was also 
postponed to COP-19. Despite little financial progress, developing countries are not 
losing hope. 
The European Commission organised a two days EU-REDD+ project meeting on the 
3th and 4th of July 2012 to update EU funded REDD+ projects (by GIZ and Norway) 
and exchanged information and experiences in REDD+ implementation such as: how to 
measure REDD+ performance (MRV); stakeholder engagement and local 
communication, land tenure and planning processes; and how to finance sustainable land 
use in addressing deforestation and land degradation. This meeting helped in identifying 
challenges of REDD+ implementation, encouraging proactive projects that builds 
partnerships, shares information and experiences while EU delegates provide feedback 
to European Commission. 
In June 2013, the UNFCCC inter-sessional meeting held in Bonn negotiated under 
SBSTA and came-out with three draft decisions on how to address the drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation; national forest monitoring modalities; and 
frequency of presenting how social safeguards are respected and addressed (Lawrence & 
Denier, 2013). Private sectors were encouraged to reduce drivers of deforestation, 
though no concrete action was suggested and importance of tackling the root causes of 
deforestation was not highlighted (Davies, 2013). National forest monitoring systems 
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were to be guided by recent IPCC guidelines with transparent and consistent data 
suitable for MRV. Modalities for MRV were drafted alongside procedures for 
technically assessing reference levels. There was no concrete outcomes from financial 
discussion (market or non-market based payment). The role of agriculture was also 
highlighted. 
At the COP-19 held in Warsaw on Nov. 2013, the ‘Warsaw Framework for REDD+’ 
was adopted (Climate Law & Policy, 2014). These adopted decisions with those of 
previous COPs act like a rulebook to guide the full implementation of REDD+. Five 
decisions on REDD+ technical guidance were concluded by SBSTA; modalities on 
national forest monitoring systems (Decision 11/CP.19), safeguards information systems 
(Decision 12/CP.19), reference levels (Decision13/CP.19), MRV (Decision 14/CP.19), 
and drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (Decision 15/CP.19). A joint work 
programme was also concluded between SBSTA and SBI and Parties were encouraged 
to establish a ‘focal point’ to liaise between national REDD+ and UNFCCC (Decision 
10/CP.19). Decision 9/CP.19 completed the results-based payment by clarifying 
potential financial sources (private, public, bilateral and multilateral) and establishment 
of UNFCCC information hub with information on results and payments. 
Although the COP-20, held in Lima (2014), failed to address issues of non-carbon 
benefits (social, environmental and governance), non-market payments and further 
guidance on reporting mechanism of social safeguards; the main outcomes coming from 
the ‘Lima Call for Climate Action’ highlighted the need to limit global warming below 
2°C, reference to ensure net zero emissions by 2050, information submission procedure 
for combating climate change (to be adopted at COP-21) and outlined future agreement. 
The Standing Committee on Finance (decision 6/CP.20) laid down general forest 
activities’ modalities which highlighted forest financing from different policy 
approaches. Parties were encouraged to use domestic policies in reducing emissions and 
reports it’s Intended National Determined Contributions before COP-21 to the 
UNFCCC secretariat. In June 2015 at Bonn, progress was made with agreement on the 
UNFCCC REDD+ mechanism and a comprehensive negotiation text supported by all 
countries was structured. REDD+ has now become a pillar of climate change mitigation 
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as the SBSTA contact group for methodological guidelines finally agreed on decisions 
concerning safeguards, non-market-based approach and methodological issues related to 
non-carbon benefits of REDD+. 
2.1  REDD+ within the Africa context 
During the Addis Ababa African Union Summit in 2007, the Africa Declaration on 
Climate Change and Development was adopted by Environment and Climate Change 
African Conference of Ministers, promoting and encouraging African common position 
on REDD+ and this was also discussed at the Nov. 2008 climate change declaration in 
Algiers. In June 2008 in Johannesburg, a special session on climate change, reaffirmed 
to apply a detail framework of Africa climate change programmes at various levels 
amongst which was REDD with the inclusion of rewarding or motivating forest 
conservation, avoided deforestation and sustainable forestry through a market-based 
mechanisms (Joy, 2010). In May 2009, the African Environment Ministers adopted the 
Nairobi Declaration and concerns were raised on socio-economic and environmental 
impacts in Africa, as found in the fourth IPCC report which states “while Africa has 
contributed the least to the increasing concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, it is the most vulnerable continent to the impacts of climate change and has 
the least capacity to adapt,” (UNEP, 2009). With the above concern, main opportunities 
and challenges in climate change negotiations were highlighted while providing a 
platform for African countries to defend their stand at COP-15 held in Copenhagen, Dec. 
2009. The aims were for African countries to have a common climate change vision at 
COP-15; recognise the role of tropical forests in surviving communities, enhancing 
economies and stabilizing climate; and to massively support African countries in 
addressing emission reduction issues. 
According to Annex IV of the conceptual framework for African climate change 
programme, implementing programmes that will lead to sustainable development, 
alleviate poverty and also attain the Millennium Development Goals were a top priority. 
Adaptation and mitigation are the two major implementation areas which need to be 
enabled by building capacity, financial accountability and enhancing technology 
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because Africa is the most vulnerable with little adaptive capacity. This requires the 
participation of all stakeholders and partnership with civil society to improve its 
economic competition toward sustainable development. It was also agreed that the 
process of climate change discussion be based on laid-down principles of equality, 
different responsibilities and capacities. The need of a coherent financial architecture, 
equitable governance and simplified access procedures were also highlighted in the 
declaration. To support and enable the adaptation and mitigation of climate change, 
three measures were identified; technology development and transfer, capacity building 
and finance. 
In this declaration, ministers agreed to the common position of Africa as basis of 
negotiation, and climate change mitigation efforts and actions to reduce deforestation 
and land degradation, especially those played by African tropical forest regions. The 
Congo Basin was agreed to be considered for incentive mechanisms in reducing 
emissions. Other mitigation measures like those geared towards complementing the UN 
Collaborative Program on REDD+ in developing countries were to ensure full and 
effective involvement of African countries and all stakeholders including small land 
users. Adaptation measures were to be integrated into the national and regional 
development strategies and policies to ensure adequate adaptation while the Rio 
convention was urged to provide optimum synergies between deforestation, loss of 
biodiversity, climate change and emission reduction efforts. 
During the Kinshasa Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC) conference 
which took place in September 2009, the countries’ position on REDD+ in the 
negotiation of post-Kyoto climate regime based on the Bali Action Plan and a financing 
mechanism was harmonised, and ready for negotiation at Copenhagen. In Nairobi, 
November 2009, a ‘Workshop on REDD+ was held to inform African position on 
REDD+ at Copenhagen (UNEP, 2009). It was the first capacity building workshop for 
negotiators and stakeholders on REDD in developing countries. It helps improved 
African forest sector negotiators and stakeholders understanding on international 
REDD+ negotiations issue based on  climate change agreement; and also acts as a 
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platform for sharing lessons learned and experiences in REDD+ implementation in 
Africa and South-South cooperation (IISD, 2009). 
This workshop concluded on a holistic approach that takes into account negotiations in 
both REDD+ and other agricultural approaches such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDMs), National Appropriate Mitigation Actions amongst others. Forest 
law enforcement and governance were to be improved and co-benefits were to be 
captured in ways that does not create barriers to REDD+ with local communities 
benefiting such as poverty reduction, increase in biodiversity and ecosystem services. 
Methodologies, guidance and exploration of IPCC guidelines for REDD+ were to be 
improved and the need of funds, market mechanism and financing approaches were 
highlighted. While there is need to demonstrate projects on REDD+ at sub-national level, 
it was noted that the success of REDD+ depends on developed countries’ emission 
targets and their willingness to pay. The involvement of communities in REDD+ design 
were to be considered with inclusion of traditional knowledge. 
One of the benefactors was the `Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee, 
who received a budget of $69,246 to train 12 trainers to check how the Readiness 
Preparation Plans (R-PPs) can impact the local communities and to determine the role of 
local communities in REDD+. These 12 local community activists came from 
Cameroon, Gabon, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, DR Congo, Republic of Congo to South 
Africa (Training the trainer workshop), for a five-day study on REDD+; carbon cycle, 
sequestration and financing; mitigation and adaptation policy; more sustainable land 
tenure and protected areas practices (IISD, 2012). A REDD+ training kit was developed 
to improve knowledge, raise awareness and understanding of REDD+ and ways to better 
engage local communities in REDD+ design and implementation through a participatory 
approach. 
Supported by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NoRAD), the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) went into partnership with 
ASB-ICRAF in 2009 to build capacity for REDD+ stakeholders amongst countries with 
UN-REDD programmes in Africa and Asia. This was aimed at increasing the 
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understanding of the REDD+ negotiations and strengthen capacity while encouraging 
South-South information exchange on REDD+. This project was undertaken in three 
phases from 2009-2012 as detailed by McFatridge et al. (2012). Phase I (2009-2010) 
was made up of four workshops on capacity-building (two both in Vietnam and Kenya), 
with the November 2009 (Nairobi) workshop exploring the main REDD+ concerns in 
COP-15 and the March 2010 (Nairobi) discussing COP-15 outcomes and the ways to 
move ahead on international negotiation. Phase II (2010-2011) was made up of REDD+ 
Development Dividend Task Force meeting; a capacity-building workshop in Douala, 
Hanoi and Vietnam; development of two policies papers and supporting South-South 
information sharing on REDD+ by the launching of a web platform. Phase III (2011-
2012) seeks to develop and implement safeguards information systems as well as to 
foster private sectors involvement in the REDD+ value chain. The April 2012 Nairobi 
REDD+ meeting of experts sought to build policy capacity for negotiators and forest 
managers through information sharing and lessons learned. It was concluded that there 
was opportunity for REDD+ to build on existing architecture and the success of REDD+ 
would depend on private sector involvement and financial accountability. These projects 
helped in informing decision-making and strengthening tropical countries engagement 
in REDD+ principles and strategies development; improved understanding on 
international and national processes through exchange of lessons learned; improved 
knowledge to bridge gaps between international development and national design and 
implementation strategies; and sustained South-South interactions (McFatridge et al., 
2012). 
In an event carried out by the ‘Alternative Slash and Burn’ (ASB) partnership for 
Tropical Forest Margins which took place 10 November 2012 at the World Agroforestry 
Centre (ASB-ICRAF) and the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD), Tony la Niña, a REDD+ facilitator at UNFCCC COP-18, pointed out that a 
landscape approach has more potential to reduce ambiguity and uncertainties which 
threatens the implementation of REDD+. This only goes as far as to affirm emission 
reduction from all land uses which is being implemented by ASB-ICRAF. 
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2.2 REDD+ in Cameroon 
Since 2005, Cameroon has been involved in international REDD+ negotiations (Fig. 
2.1) and is among the pioneer countries to have supported the incentive mechanism 
strategy in tropical forests conservation (Bali Decision 2/CP.13) (Ngendakumana et al., 
2013). Its first REDD+ pilot project started in 2007 in Yaounde and Ebolowa and was 
established by the German company GAF-AG to estimate and monitor deforestation and 
degradation, estimate carbon stock and create the National Steering Committee. The 
government sees REDD+ activities as a viable option in providing the opportunity for 
her to meet its obligations of managing Cameroon’s forests in a sustainable way while 
responding to alleviate poverty, mitigate and adapt to climate change. A national 
REDD+ strategy has been developed to guide and coordinate implementation of forest 
policies, processes and activities geared towards sustainable human development. 
Cameroon belongs to the Central African Forest Commission and was engaged in 
preparing and communicating five Congo Basin country’s submissions to the United 
Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change. It supports a historical reference 
emission level and a two phase approach with funds and markets. Cameroon is also a 
member of the Rainforest Coalition, an intergovernmental organisation providing 
diplomatic leadership to address complexity of environmental sustainability in tropical 
rainforests through capacity building within nations (technical capacity, research, advice, 
policy development, coordination and implementation). Cameroon became a member of 
the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in July 2008 (FCPF, 2013), and is also 
involved in the fight against illegal logging after signing the Voluntary Partnership 
Agreement (VPA) in 2010 with EU FLEGT (The REDDDesk, 2014; Fig. 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1: Road map of REDD+ in Cameroon 
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The EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade programme (FLEGT) was 
initiated by EU in 2003 to enable tropical countries to improve governance and avoid 
illegal exploitation of timber through improved legal and sustainable forest management, 
governance and trade in legally harvested timber. REDD+ being an international 
mechanism to provide incentive to developing countries that restore forest carbon stock, 
can benefit from FLEGT since improving law enforcement and forest governance 
enhance forest degradation. VPA; a bilateral agreement between a producing or 
processing timber country and EU; is a strong market mechanism which enhances forest 
governance permitting exportation of only licensed timber underpinned by a Legality 
Assurance System which must be consistent with the environmental and social standards 
of EU states. FLEGT favours only timber imported from countries that have negotiated 
VPAs. 
There are similarities in negotiating VPAs, enhancing forest governance and 
strengthening institutions to REDD+ Readiness. They all are national level voluntary 
initiatives taken by a country in anticipation for strengthening forest governance and 
economic benefits. REDD+ is developed to increase carbon stocks and mitigate climate 
change, while VPAs ensures the legality of imported timber; and FLEGT is 
implemented by VPAs between tropical countries and EU. But they all enhance 
sustainable management of forest resources through improved forest governance.  
Simultaneous implementations increase transparency, enhance participation of local 
communities, and law enforcement, hence a major boost in tenure reforms. 
As reported by Emelyne & Maidell (2011) through the EU FAO FLEGT programme: 
“the significant advancement of FLEGT in Cameroon after the country  signed a VPA in 
2010 has provided stronger forest governance structures on which to build REDD+ 
readiness efforts. In turn, REDD+ has brought a renewed momentum to carry through 
the legal reforms necessary for the forest sector to engage in new initiatives, such as 
REDD+ and FLEGT”. The report of their findings from the Central Africa sub-region 
states show that VPA’s and REDD+ implementations are based on stakeholders 
engagement, tenure clarification, sensitisation, review of legal framework, capacity 
building and involvement of private sector which are all part of forest policies. So 
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sharing of information and lessons learned; and identification of common activities is 
vital in building synergies on FLEGT and REDD+ through a participatory approach, 
though one of the main challenges remain lack of information sharing across processes 
and actors. Therefore, national forest policies and laws should be revised to integrate 
VPA and REDD+ for sustainability of both initiatives. 
2.2.1 REDD+ management and consultation process in Cameroon 
In Cameroon the main stakeholders involved in REDD+ activities are the Ministry of 
Environment and Nature Protection - MINEP (in charge of climate change issues) and 
the Ministry of Forestry and Fauna - MINFOF (overseeing protected areas and forest), 
NGO’s (IUCN, WWF, GIZ) and it is only the sub-regional level that local communities 
are linked-up to co-manage the project (Fig. 2.2). Cameroon’s Readiness Plan Idea Note 
(R-PIN) was written by MINEP, Office National des Forêts Internationale and the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) with inadequate engagement of the civil society and local 
communities (Dkamela, 2011). Under the Central African Forest Commission are 21 
REDD+ projects in Cameroon. They are working on a wide range of activities from 
biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation in developing a national accounting 
system. The main objectives are to develop tools for REDD+ accounting, identify 
opportunities for efficient national incentives schemes, strengthen forest governance, 
legislations, land tenure rights, and facilitate exchange of information with international 
organisations providing both financial and technical support. 
COMIFAC oversees REDD+ initiatives in the Congo Basin (Fig. 2.2). In 2007, the 
German Cooperation (GAF, AG) initiated the first pilot prototype project for COMIFAC 
in Cameroon (Yaounde & Ebolowa) to estimate and monitor deforestation and 
degradation, carbon stock estimation and to establish a National Steering Committee. 
REDD+ Steering Committee is a REDD+ decision-making panel which was created on 
June 13, 2012 by order No. 103/CAB/PM and is responsible for the following: 
 Making policy and proposing REDD+ strategies; 
 Issuing reasonable opinions related to REDD+ implementation strategies; 
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 Developing criteria for selecting project for validation at the Ministry of 
Environment, Nature Protection and Sustainable Development (MINEPDED); 
 Evaluating and submitting project promoter’s ideas for approval by 
MINEPDED; 
 Promoting REDD+ activities; 
 Validating work and approving action plan of the Technical Secretariat (REDD+ 
process implementation body). 
 
Figure 2.2: Organisational chart of the REDD+ process management institutions in 
Cameroon showing the interaction between proponents revealing a top-down 
governance approach with local communities at the end of the chain (adapted from 
Cameroon R-PP, 2013). 
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The Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection (MINEP), now Ministry of 
Environment, Nature Protection and Sustainable Development (MINEPDED), deals 
with development of environmental policies, implementation and coordination of both 
international and regional environmental policy, sustainable management of natural 
resources,  sensitisation and awareness raising, and liaising with organisations that are 
engaged in natural resource exploitation (The REDDDesk, 2014). MINEPDED host the 
Ecological Monitoring and Control Unit and its climate change unit is the national 
UNFCCC focal point which is directly responsible for national level REDD+ activities. 
Therefore, MINEPDED acts as the technical and operational Ministry responsible in 
executing climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies. The UNFCCC Focal 
Point office at MINEPDED is responsible as a Designated National Authority (DNA) 
for climate change issues (Decision No. 00214/MINEF/CAF). Michealowa (2003) 
supports the idea of maintaining focal point as DNA in countries with few projects and 
to contract consultants only when there is increase in the number of projects. The Focal 
Point is therefore, the main link between Cameroon and the international REDD+ 
process and acts as a compliance point for the country’s projects. 
The Ministry of Forestry and Fauna (MINFOF) deals with the management and 
monitoring of permanent forest, inventory of all forest resources, usufruct rights and 
forest benefit issues. It liaises with all forest related organisations while maintaining all 
international state’s ratified conventions. The Consultation Circle of Partners of 
MINFOF/MINEPDED (CCPM) carried out coordination and consultation by bringing 
together donors and international organisation to support the environmental and forest 
related initiatives. Here the budget from MINFOF and MINEPDED is used to bring 
together international, technical and developmental partners and funding bodies. 
The international NGOs like Bio-Climate provides strategies for reducing poverty in 
tropical countries through capacity building and payments for ecosystem services 
generated by sound forest and land management activities to local communities. After 
Plan Vivo was reorganised in 2008, Bio-Climate redefined its role to focus on assisting 
organisations to make Plan Vivo programmes and projects happen. The WWF Central 
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Africa Region Programme Office focuses on the Congo Basin providing technical 
support to projects in Cameroon. 
The National NGOs like Planet survey puts Cameroon Forest and Environmental Sector 
Policy at a public platform, facilitating involvement of non-government actors with 
recent development in forest policy and implementation. This function was handed over 
to Planet survey in May 2011 by the Netherlands based development agency. The Africa 
Centre for Applied Forestry Research and Development (CARFAD) specialises in 
sustainable development and environment protection. The Common Initiative Group 
(CIG) such as the Mount Cameroon Prunus Common Initiative Group (MOCAP-CIG) 
is responsible for the organisation and monitoring of sustainable exploitation and 
management of Prunus africana at village level around MCNP. 
The Cameroon government is highly divided into different sectors. MINEPDED, 
MINFOF and the Ministry of Energy exist as different ministerial departments, so there 
is need for a strong participatory process through which decision and responsibility are 
taken. There exists a division of labour across different ministries that hamper 
coordination. While emission reduction activities in both permanent and non-permanent 
forest are carried out by the Ministry of Forest and Fauna, the Ministry of Environment 
and Nature Protection take a lead in monitoring, verification and reporting. The absence 
of other ministries like finance, agriculture, mining and budget in REDD+ discussions 
show inadequate REDD+ coordination in Cameroon. Also, the absence of the 
Parliamentarian Network which is a formal forum of discussion made up of members of 
parliament shows that Cameroon has no common position. All state actors should have 
the opportunity to vote draft legislation or implement state regulation instead of the 
observed divide and rule system. 
For community forests, the sub-directorate review and recommend approval to MINFOF 
and this is advantageous because other ministries at divisional and sub-divisional levels 
are involved (MINEP, 1998). The revised Readiness Preparatory Proposal (R-PP) offers 
a coordination structure within the ministries and other stakeholders such as donors, 
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private sectors and civil society and this coordination depends on the capacity (both 
technical and financial) and engagement of all stakeholders. 
2.3 Focus of the study - the state of Cameroon 
The Central African Congo Basin will play a vital role in the success of climate change 
policy because it comes second in forest area cover after the Amazon Basin. Its two 
million km² of humid tropical forest extend from West Atlantic coast to the Eastern 
Albert Rift mountains and contains between 25-30 billion tons of carbon (CIFOR, 2008). 
The Congo Basin forest also holds 70% of the total plant cover in Africa with Gabon 
(17.7%); the Republic of Congo (12.4%); Cameroon (11.8%); Central African Republic 
(3.4%); Equatorial Guinea (1.3%) and Democratic Republic of Congo (>50%) (CBFF, 
2006). 
Cameroon consists of six agro-ecological regions that range from its Southern humid 
dense tropical forest through different types of savannah to the northern Sahelian 
drought vegetation. The country is extremely rich ecologically and culturally, with more 
than 200 ethnic groups and a high flora and fauna biodiversity (WRI, 2001). More than 
40% of Cameroon is forest and homes to 40,000-50,000 indigenous people whose 
livelihood and wellbeing depends on the forest (Freudenthal, 2011). According to Earth 
Trends Country Data (2008), 37,182,000 ha of land in Cameroon is forested area which 
include Mount Cameroon. The 42% forest cover in Cameroon makes it a high potential 
target country for implementing REDD+ concept (Ngendakumana et al., 2013). 
Deforestation rate in Cameroon was 1% per annum between 2000 and 2005 with 
demand for wood estimated at 4.5million m³ hard-wood and 15 million m³ for fuel-
wood (CIFOR, 2008). This high reliance on wood contributes to 30% of non-oil export 
providing 20,000 livelihoods which causes conflict with state’s commitment to 
implement and enforce forest legislation (OneWorld, 2010).  
According to CIFOR (2008), there has been some reforms in the forest sector for the last 
decade as far as sustainable forest management is concerned, and forest and wildlife has 
also contributed to alleviate poverty and enhance economic development. In spite of this, 
continuation of corruption and illegal logging has led to degradation of the environment, 
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loss of state revenue and conflict. Building synergies between forest governance, 
equitable benefit-sharing mechanism and reducing emissions through sustainable forest 
management will yield a tangible reduction in deforestation; improve local communities’ 
livelihood and enhance carbon stocks in Cameroon. Therefore, forest and climate 
change decision-makers, local authorities, local communities’ enterprises, international 
investors, private sectors, financial institutions and carbon off-set brokers must be 
targeted. 
More reliable field data on carbon stock, emissions and trends is necessary to determine 
the baseline scenario for REDD+ as a start-off point for measurement and verifying 
emission reduction to clarify both cost and benefit-sharing. Cameroon has systems in 
place for remote sensing inventory, but lack field data due to limited financial and 
technical resources and remote and inaccessible forest areas. There is need to understand 
the land-use planning and drivers of deforestation among others to better formulate 
baseline scenarios and establish an accurate REDD+ monitoring systems to assess 
strategies. 
Cameroon relies on the Forest Stewardship Council to manage its monitoring activities 
and members of communities are not involved in the initial development of REDD+ 
programme. Ezzine et al. (2009) argue that effort to strengthen community ownership 
has instead resulted to more timber exploitation in remote forest. The market-based 
global timber model developed by Sohngen et al. (1999) accounts for both below and 
above vegetative carbon stock in quantifying potential emission reduction, and costs 
may be used to check the potential of avoided deforestation in reducing emission costs. 
With the help of the German International Corporation (GIZ) and the German 
Development Bank (KFW) the carbon stocks have been accessed and capacity training 
on GHG accounting carried out to establish a pre-operational carbon accounting system 
to support the readiness process of REDD+ initiative. The guideline for this activity is as 
recommended by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) and COP and was based on the IPCC guidelines for Good Practice. 
Deforestation mapping has been carried out to verify cost effective methods of 
monitoring forest cover using optical satellite (1990, 2000, and 2005). Using Landsat 
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TM/ETM and Disaster Monitoring Constellation (2005) satellite images, the cloud cover 
contamination for each of these epochs were detected on a minimum mapping unit of 
five hectares and crown cover threshold of 10% (Hansen, 2008). The changed areas 
were classed as: cropland, grassland, wetland, settlement and others, and this 
stratification helps in enhancing accuracy in carbon accounting with Cameroon’s Tier 1 
and Tier 2 data sets. Cameroon test area results showed that the rate of deforestation 
between 1990 and 2000 was 3.45 % and 3.44 % between 2000 and 2005 (Hirschmugl et 
al., 2014). 
The forest in Cameroon is occupied by two sets of communities, the minority Pygmies 
(hunter-gatherers) and the majority Bantu (agriculturalist) who lived as indigenous 
peoples with communal rights. Today the pygmies face a challenging transition to 
modernisation since wild resources alone are not enough to sustain large communities of 
hunter-gatherers because of scarcity of wild tubers (Survival International, 2013). With 
the need to cultivate these tubers, some pygmies work for agriculturalist while others are 
fast turning to agriculture to sustain their livelihoods. The Bantu are very knowledgeable 
about plant and animal resources and also clever hunters. Though the slash-and-burn 
agricultural lifestyle of the Bantu people has been claimed to destroy the forest, its 
shifting cultivations seeks to favour rotating regeneration (stimulate biodiversity) as 
farmers cut down only selected trees during farming. In this study, the Bakweri and 
Bomboko Bantu communities living in the tropical forest at the foot of MCNP REDD+ 
project serve as a case study. 
2.3.1 Mount Cameroon National Park 
Mount Cameroon is an active volcano, which erupts almost every two decades and lies 
in the Gulf of Guinea. The volcanic mass is 46 km long and 30 km wide running South 
West to North East with main peak at altitude 4,095 m. It covers a total surface area of 
58,178 ha and it is located within four sub-divisions (four management clusters): Buea 
(Buea), Muyuka (Muyuka), Mbonge (Bomboko) and Idenau (West-Coast) which is just 
two km from the sea in its Southern boundary (Map 1.1). The three protected areas close 
to the park are; the Mokoko Forest Reserve, the Meme River Forest Reserve and the 
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Forest Management Unit. To the South and South Eastern of the park are four 
community forests (CF); Woteva (1,865 ha), Etinde (4,976 ha), Bakingili (905 ha) and 
Bomboko (6000ha). State’s large scale rubber and palm plantations (Cameroon 
Development Cooperation) as well as privately owned plantations are also closed to the 
park. 
A study carried out by the Cameroon Mountain Forest Conservation Foundation in 2001 
to evaluate Cameroon Mountain potential for carbon programme showed that carbon 
sequestration is possible through re-growth and forest conservation on 4300 ha of forest 
area and the MCNP TREMA database is made up of geo-referenced forest inventory 
with 20,000 data sets from 300 samples with built in functions to derived indices of 
‘‘bio-quality’’ which can be modiﬁed for carbon management purposes (EcoSecurities, 
2002). This qualifies the Mount Cameroon National Park as a hot spot for REDD+ 
activities. The Mount Cameroon National Park REDD+ project (Map 1.1) has been 
chosen as a case study for the following reasons: 
 It is a humid forest with 5-10% of the forest areas managed as community forest; 
 It records highest deforestation (46.2%) between 1987 and 2010 in Cameroon; 
 There is clear focus on reduction of emission, carbon stock enhancement and 
sustainable management of natural resource in this area; 
 There are clear site boundaries; 
 It has a reasonable chance of REDD+ incentive implementation (Sunderlin et al., 
2008). 
2.3.1.1 Physical environment  
Topography, geology, soils and hydrography: Mt. Cameroon is an active Haiwan type 
of volcano erupting about every two decades. The volcanic eruptions recorded within 
the last century were in 1906, 1922, 1958, 1982 and 1999/2000. According to Payton 
(1993), Etinde, sometimes called Small Mount Cameroon (about 1715m), is 
geologically the oldest part of the mountain massif - a conspicuous subsidiary southwest 
flank of the mountain peak with much older tertiary lava, different in composition to the 
Holocene basalts of Mt Cameroon. Mt. Cameroon slopes are steep and rugged right 
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down two km from sea level, and are marked by lava flows of different ages. The soils 
around Mt. Cameroon are very fertile and are composed of sandy, clay, and loam soil 
types dominated by sand that originates from young volcanic rocks with poor water 
retention capacity. The hydrology is made up of seasonal and permanent streams, rivers, 
springs and crater lakes. 
Climate: The rainy seasons (April to October) and dry season (November to March) 
characterised the annual rainfall regime. The annual rainfall ranges from less than 2,000 
mm in the North-East (around Munyenge Metombe) to more than 10,000 mm at Cape 
Debundscha (Eben, 2011). Average annual rainfall decreases with altitude to 
approximately 4,000 mm at 1000m and to less than 3,000mm above 2,000m. The higher 
up the mountain, the colder it becomes. For each 100m ascent, the average temperature 
drops by about 0.6°C. The temperature at the top of Mt. Cameroon records a 4°C when 
in Limbe at the base it is 32°C. Payton (1993) points out that the humidity remains at 
around 75-85% due to the marine influence and the incidence of mist. 
Vegetation, flora and fauna: The Western slope of the mountain is the only area in 
both Central Africa and West Africa with unbroken vegetation gradient from low-land 
evergreen rainforest at sea level through its montane forest to the montane grassland and 
alpine grassland near its summit, thereby, making it the most diverse and richest area in 
flora. Six main vegetation types have been identified with their corresponding key 
characteristics from past survey (Table 2.1) (Thomas & Cheek, 1992). Mt. Cameroon 
contains more than 2,300 species of plants (800 genera, 210 families) of which more 
than 49 are strictly endemic and 50 are near endemic species (Cable & Cheek, 1998; 
Cheek et al., 1996; Beentje et al., 1994) which may be due to the fact that the mountain 
is part of an important Pleistocene refuge. It is due to this uniqueness in rich and diverse 
vegetation, that Mt. Cameroon has been recommended for a Centre of Plant Diversity 
(Beentje et al., 1994). Mt. Cameroon harbours more than 85 species of mammals, 363 
species of birds (including eight threatened species and two strictly endemic species - 
Francolinus camerunensis and Speirops melanocephalus), 130 species of butterfly 
(including three endemic species), 76 species of dragon flies and one third of the 
reptilian fauna (86 species) in Cameroon (Beentje et al., 1994). Due to hunting and 
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deforestation (loss of habitat), the population of chimpanzees, drills and elephants have 
been fast decreasing. 
Table 2.1: Vegetation types of Mount Cameroon and their main characteristics (Thomas 
& Cheeks, 1992). 
Vegetation Altitude  Main characteristics 
Lowland 
Rainforest 
0 - 800m Species-rich, evergreen forest with tall continuous 
canopy (25-35m) and large emergent trees, rich in 
lianas, and non-woody climbers.  Buttressing and 
cauliflory are common. 
Lower 
montane (or 
sub-montane) 
rain forest 
800 - 
1,600m 
Species-rich, evergreen forest with closed or 
discontinuous canopy (20-25m), frequently cloud 
covered, very rich in bryophytes, ferns and vascular 
epiphytes.  With patches of meadows and scrubland 
dominated by tall Acantaceae, tall herbs with 
scattered shrubby trees and tree ferns. 
Upper 
montane rain 
forest 
1,600 - 
1,800m 
Species-poor, open forest with fairly discontinuous 
canopy of medium sized trees (up to 20m high), large 
stranglers, dense epiphytes cover and few climbers. 
Sub-alpine 
rain forest or 
Montane scrub 
1,800 - 
2,400 
Species-poor, poorly developed open forest with 
discontinuous canopy of small sized trees (1-15m), 
and open layer of small shrubs, herbs, climbers and 
ferns underneath in fire protected hollows. 
Montane 
Grassland 
2,000 - 
3,000m 
Species-poor, rich in temperate genera, dominated by 
tall tussock grasses, with scatted stunted and dwarf 
shrubby fire resistant trees. 
Sub-alpine 
Grassland 
3,000 - 
4,095m 
Species poor, dominated by short tussock grasses, 
with isolated patches of dwarf and gnarled shrubby 
trees. 
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2.3.1.2 Socio-economic context 
There are about 350,000 people living around MCNP most of whom live in peri-urban 
areas and villages. The village communities are made up of mainly Bomboko and 
Bakweri tribes deriving their livelihood mainly from the mountain. There has been an 
increased population due to immigration from outsiders who are attracted to fertile soil 
for agriculture. Predominant activities carried out in this area are farming, hunting, 
timber, trading and fishing along the Atlantic coast. The Cameroon Development 
Cooperation and Pamol agro-plantation in this area have also attracted workers who are 
employed to work in the plantation. At retirement most of them remain settled in nearby 
villages with their families, keeping-up with subsistence farming and trading. The most 
important source of livelihood is food-crop farming with farm sizes ranging from 0.25ha 
to more than 10ha. Agriculture employs about 95% of the population while some carried 
out timber exploitation, hunting, animal-husbandry and trading. The surrounding forest 
provides timber and firewood for household use. Illegal timber and firewood 
exploitation are rampant in the reserve and orchestrated by outsiders from nearby towns 
of Buea, Limbe and Muyuka. 
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3 Community forest relationships and how they are 
influenced by the Mt. Cameroon National Park 
REDD+ projects 
 Keywords: Land tenure, Local communities, Customary rights, Social safeguards, 
Natural resource management. 
Abstract: “No forest without trees and no trees without tenure.” An effective REDD+ 
scheme should intersect with local socio-economic and land tenure system to avoid 
marginalisation of local communities and enhance local engagement. But few studies 
have been done to investigate the level of REDD+’s interaction with community forest 
relationship. This study examines community forest relationship and how it is 
influenced by REDD+. Cluster multi-stage random sampling was used to collect data 
from 259 respondents that were analysed using Chi-square, descriptive analysis and 
NVivo. This study shows that the government has overall ownership and control over 
forest and these have led to tenure insecurity which is significantly influencing 
participation in MCNP-activities. The absence of recognition of traditional rights to own 
land and restricted access to forest resources have resulted to land scarcity, conflict and 
decline in production of forest products and these may hinder the effectiveness of 
MCNP-project. The social and livelihood expectations of REDD+ may be threatened if 
land tenure reforms which are pre-condition of carbon payment and community 
engagement are not fulfilled during planning and implementation of REDD+. REDD+ 
could play a potential role in tenure reforms which need to be consistent with customary 
systems where local communities’ rights and access to use natural resources are 
respected. 
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3.1  Introduction 
The main aim of REDD+ is to conditionally reward carbon sequestration and 
compensate lost opportunities. However, there is fear that unclear tenure system may 
result to exclusion of indigenous people and land grabbing, prohibiting forest users from 
accessing forest resources for their livelihood. For REDD+ to be effective, insecure 
tenure, contestation and ambiguity must be addressed early (Stern, 2006; Westholm et 
al., 2011), otherwise, REDD+ proponents will keep intervening on tenure, which at 
present is not yet systematically documented (Sunderlin et al., 2014). The Cancun 
agreement also spelt out the importance of tenure in community safeguards. REDD+ 
may help protect forest ecosystems, goods and services with high expectation of positive 
social and livelihood outcomes; and land tenure reforms are seen as preconditions for 
REDD+ payment (Karsenty, 2011), equity in benefit-sharing and a way of decentralising 
forest resource management (Awono et al., 2014). 
Tenure is very important to forest dwellers because it is local communities that are going 
to practically implement REDD+ and the methods of implementation will either benefit 
or impact them greatly. Africa’s state laws in comparison with international treaties 
show that there is absence of customary institutions and rights to resources, land and 
forest in Sub-Sahara Africa (Awono et al., 2014) and 75-85% of tropical forest is still 
formally owned and controlled by formal government (Agrawal, 2008). Secure tenure is 
a determinant of who uses what resources, under what conditions and time frame (FAO, 
2010); else the effectiveness, efficiency and equity in REDD+ will be undermined. 
Insecure tenure will result to limitation in policy, unequal benefit-sharing, make local 
users feel discriminated and increase conflict (Sunderlin et al., 2010). Secure tenure 
renders local communities to become effective conservation agents (Chhatre & Agrawal, 
2009) and clear resource rights encouraged sustainable use of natural resources 
empowering forest users to claim ownership and prevent illegal exploitation by outsiders 
(Lawlor et al., 2010). Sunderlin et al. (2014), identify four reasons crucial for addressing 
tenure before the commencement of REDD+ projects: 
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 Identification of the right holder - since those who enhance the carbon 
sequestration of forest are to be rewarded, the right holder or benefactors need to 
be identified beforehand. 
 Identification of the responsible party - REDD+ incentives are paid on condition 
that the right holder is held accountable if he/she fails in his/her obligation. 
 Prevention of resource rush - clear and legitimate responsibility and rights in 
REDD+ in fair allocation to benefit stream to avoid resource rush when REDD+ 
finally gives value to carbon stored in trees. 
 Protection of rights and livelihoods - restriction in use of forest resources should 
not summarily violate the pre-existing rights and the livelihoods of local 
communities. 
Sunderlin (2014) goes further to argue that to assure efficiency, effectiveness and 
equitability of REDD+ projects, three tenure related actions must be undertaken: 
tenure clarification, local people participation at decision-making and strong national 
policies and measures to secure tenure. These will help identify tenure challenges, those 
involved in implementation and benefits stream, clarify forest carbon tenure and help 
exclude competing land uses which are crucial for REDD+ to achieve its goals 
(Wunder, 2005). The source of tenure insecurity rest in the national processes, 
strategies and policies that cannot be resolved at local level, so local activities and 
intervention should be embedded in national effort to address tenure issues. 
Cameroon land tenure is under-pinned by the Indicative Land Use Framework, the 
1974 Land Ordinance and the Local Cultural and Traditional Land tenure systems. 
According to the 1974 Land Ordinance, all uninhabited forestland without land title 
is owned by the state and is conceptualised with the notion of collective ownership. 
The Indicative Land Use Framework categorised forest into non-permanent and 
permanent forest. The non-permanent forest estates are further subjected to local 
customary rights and this poses a great concern of overlaps in both rights and 
entitlements. Forest tenure condition therefore, tends to be insecure, overlapping and 
contested (Sunderlin et al., 2008). Ellsworth & White (2004) further state that “lack 
of local control over forest use and management decisions is a lasting legacy of state 
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appropriation”. Chiefs have got both political and ritual powers to claim 
sovereignty over land in the non-permanent forest according to local traditional 
regimes. The traditional ownership of these lands can be by virtue of first occupation 
for original family lineage; by birth, marriage or local access through family lineage, 
elders, traditional councillors; migrants or non-natives can pay tribute to chiefs to grant 
them usufruct. This makes it common for strangers to think that state ownership 
implies getting access to these areas without local level approval. It is this duality 
between national and local levels and the overlaps of rights and entitlements that pose 
risks to forest project development and management. Some local communities have 
got customary claims over forest land that are under state ownership and these 
overlapping claims are seen between government and private investors, private owners 
and local communities as well as within local communities (Holland et al., 2014); 
thereby, leaving communities in a state of dilemma when government contracts are 
signed without Free Prior-Informed Consent of the local indigenous communities. 
While local communities cannot legally sue the government in a court of law for 
matters concerning community forest (Vabi et al., 2000), the minister reserve the right 
to halt or stop any 25-year communities’ forest management contract if the 
management plan is not respected. So the Ministry of Forestry and Fauna (MINFOF) 
has discretional power over forest and lack of clarity on earnings from forest 
ecosystem services and inadequate benefit-sharing mechanism to re-distribute forest 
revenue right down to local communities (Minang et al., 2007), obstruct 
implementation of sustainable forest projects that are geared toward poverty alleviation 
and improved livelihood of indigenous people for local development. According to 
Freudenthal et al. (2011), “REDD+ readiness planning activities in Cameroon 
disregard issues of land tenure, customary rights and benefit-sharing.” 
Forest is defined by the 1994 forestry law of Cameroon as “any land covered by 
vegetation with a predominance of trees, shrubs and other species capable of 
providing products other than agricultural products”, without any parameter of 
minimum area of land, height of tree or crown cover. According to Minang et al., 
(2007), “the forest deﬁnition issue requires careful data analysis of the carbon 
sequestration potential of various agro-ecological regions in the country, as well as 
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comparative cost implications for various threshold crown cover values”. In 
Cameroon, forest reforms (revision of 1981 forest law) which started in 1988 led to the 
development of Tropical Forest Action Plan with five national forest policy strategies 
and objectives (The Government of Cameroon, 1996) meant to: 
 Safeguard and protect the biodiversity, forest heritage and environment; 
 Strengthen community engagement in conservation and forest management, so 
as to link conservation efforts to income generation and improved livelihoods; 
 Improve production of forest resources and their contribution to Cameroon GDP 
while preserving some species; 
 Regenerate natural forest resources to enhance its potential; and 
 Set-up institutional framework to revamp the forest sector. 
The new 1994 forest law was enacted and the Prime Minister later signed its 
implementation decree in 1995 (Decree no. 95-531-pm, 08/1995) which laid out a new 
classification of forest, logging rights, norms and conditions of forest management. It 
was based on these rules, conditions and norms laid out by the 1994 law that the 
Indicative Land Use Framework was enacted in 1995 (Plan de zonage no. 95- 678-pm of 
18/12/1995) to plan the various forest types, though as of 2008, only 30% has been 
zoned. One important aspect of the 1994 Forest law is the division of forest into 
Permanent Forest and Non-Permanent Forest Estates (Dkamela, 2011) (Table 3.1). 
There are regulatory weaknesses with respect to entitlements to carbon benefits, due to 
inadequate definition of forest products. The 1994 Forestry Law deﬁnes forest products 
as: ‘‘mainly wood and non-wood products as well as wildlife and ﬁshery resources 
derived from the forest. Certain forest products such as ebony, ivory, wild animal horns, 
as well as certain animal, plant and medicinal species or those, which are of interest, 
shall be classiﬁed as special. The list of special products shall be ﬁxed, as and when 
necessary, by the competent ministry’’ (Section 9:1-2). If carbon services are included 
into the list of special products, then local communities cannot sue the government on 
carbon. Even when local communities have got statutory rights over forest, they are not 
likely to be enforced nor respected (RRI, 2012a).The importance of resolving tenure 
ambiguity and assuring local community engagement has now been recognised 
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(Westholm et al., 2011). This study examines community forest relationships and how 
they are influenced by MCNP-REDD+ project. 
Table 3.1: Summary of forest types and conditions in Cameroon (Minang et al., 2007). 
Category Forest type 
A Permanent Forests or classiﬁed forests: Forests set aside for long-term 
use and should constitute at least 30% of total forest area in the country 
I State Forests: Comprise protected areas including national parks, forest 
reserves and sanctuaries with conservation as primary objective. 
Management plans required 
Ia Production forest reserves: To enable sustainable lumber production. 
Forest concessions can be granted for an area of up to 200,000 ha to 
licensed timber operators in these areas. Management plans required 
Ib Council Forests: Planted or natural forests managed by municipalities in 
their area. 
Planned logging and restoration/afforestation activities are allowed in these 
forests. 
B Non-permanent Forests: Includes all unclassiﬁed forests that could be 
converted temporarily or permanently to purposes other than forestry. 
I Private Forests: Planted forests belonging to individuals in which logging, 
tree planting and management activities are allowed. 
Management plan required. 
II Communal Forests: This is a residual class of forests including all forests 
not included in permanent or private forest estates. 
IIa Community Forests: Forest area within the communal forest estate, which 
is the object of an agreement between community and state. Maximum area 
is 5000 ha per forest. Management contracts run for 25 years renewable. It 
is the only forest estate communities own and is fully entitled to revenue 
from natural forest products. Communities may open their community 
forests to a sale of standing volume and other activities, provided they are 
agreed upon and included in the management plan. 
IIb Sale of standing volume: An area of not more than 2500 ha for which 
logging rights have been granted to a Licensed Timber Operator. 
No management plan is required. 
NB: Communities have usufruct rights to all forest types in the country (Minang et al., 2007) 
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3.2 Methodology (See 1.6) 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Land tenure - ownership and control of forest 
The local communities see the government as having overall ownership (Fig. 3.1a) and 
control (Fig. 3.1b) over forest leading to tenure insecurity. Participation is highest 
among forest dwellers that have the perception that local communities own the forest 
(Fig. 3.1c) and control the forest (Fig. 3.1d). Results show a significant relationship 
between participation in MCNP-activities and local communities’ ownership statute 
(χ²=4.853, p=.028) as well as control (χ²=7.385, p=.007) of forest. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Percentages of perception of forest ownership (a), control (b) and 
relationships between participation and perception of ownership (c) and control (d) over 
forest within MCNP-initiative 
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The Most Important Products (MIPs) from the forest were: 
Firewood or charcoal  Firewood (100%) 
Timber or other wood  Timber (Mahogany/Iroko) (100%) 
Food from the forest  Plantains (100%) 
Medicine from the forest  Prunus africana (100%) 
Firewood is harvested in private, open access and community forests; timber is 
harvested in both state and open access forests, plantains in community and private 
forests while Prunus africana is harvested in state, community and private forests (Fig. 
3.2a). Fig. 3.2b shows that firewood is harvested in both managed, plantation and 
agroforestry types of forests while timber and Prunus both come from reserved and 
managed forests. Plantains are cultivated in managed forest, agroforestry and crop land. 
A 
 
B 
 
Figure 3.2: Percentages of ownership statutes (a) and forest types (b) for most 
important forest products. 
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3.3.2 Influence of REDD+ on community forest relationships 
Results show that all respondents have experienced a decrease in MIPs due to 
government restriction on reserve, large scale projects such as plantation and 
infrastructure, increasing market potentials for forest products and outsiders attracted by 
fertile land that buy land and restrict access (Fig. 3.3a). The main reasons for the decline 
in firewood are large scale forest projects and government restrictions for accessing 
forest products within the park. The decline in the use/production of timber is due to 
government restriction and increased marketing potentials. While the decline in 
plantains production is blamed on large scale projects and increased market potentials, 
the decline in use/benefit of Prunus africana is as the result of government restriction. 
To increase benefits in use or cash from MIPs, local communities seek to invest in 
planting trees/forest products, gain better access (more use rights) to forest/ MIPs, better 
access to market and reduce price risk, better access to credit/capital and 
equipment/technology, better protection (avoid overuse) of forest/MIPs and better 
skills/knowledge on how to collect/use MIPs (Fig. 3.3b).  
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Figure 3.3: Percentages of reasons for decline in most important forest products (a) and 
ways to increase benefits from these products (b) in MCNP. 
Firewood: The production of firewood which is the basic fuel source in local 
communities is also reducing due to emergence of large scale projects such as plantation 
and new settlement, government restrictions for forest conservation, and influx of 
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There are large scale projects going on in Buea, West-Coast and Muyuka clusters and 
government restriction in Bomboko, Buea and Muyuka, while outsiders are buying land 
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Local communities seek to increase planting of trees, improve skills and knowledge on 
how to collect/use firewood and have better access to forest and more use rights (Fig. 
3.4b). Muyuka respondents wish to improve their skills and knowledge on how to 
collect/use firewood and planting more trees while Bomboko cluster seeks to invest in 
tree planting and avoid over-use of firewood. The Buea cluster wants better access to 
firewood as well as better skills to collect/use firewood, while West-Coast seeks to 
invest in tree planting, better access to market for firewood and better access to capital 
and technology in tree planting. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Percentages of reasons for the decline in firewood (a) and ways to increase 
benefits from firewood (b) within MCNP-clusters. 
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Timber: In all clusters, government restriction and increased market potentials are the 
main reasons in the decline of timber production. Large scale project in Buea, West- 
Coast and Muyuka, increased use by outsiders in the West-Coast, and timber harvesting 
in Bomboko and Muyuka has resulted to a decline in timber production (Fig. 3.5a). 
Investing in tree planting, avoiding over harvesting/use and better access to forest are 
needed to increase production and benefits of timber (Fig. 3.5b). While Buea, Bomboko 
and Muyuka seek more usage rights/access to timber, Bomkoko, Muyuka and West-
Coast seek better access to market, and Bomboko and Buea seek better skills and 
knowledge in harvesting/usage to enhance benefits from timber. 
 
  
Figure 3.5: Percentages of reasons for the decline in timber (a) and ways to increase 
benefits from timber (b) within MCNP-clusters. 
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Prunus: The decline of the commercially most important medicine -  Prunus africana 
is solely due to government restrictions for forest conservation (Fig 3.6a). Investing in 
planting Pygeum is seen as the main action needed to enhance benefits in use/cash from 
Prunus africana (Fig. 3.6b). Better access (more use-rights) to forest, better 
skills/knowledge on sustainable harvesting and better access to capital/credit and 
equipment/technology were recorded as ways to enhance production/benefits from 
Prunus a fricana. All clusters seek to invest in planting Prunus and better access to 
forest. Buea, Bomboko, and Muyuka seek better skills/knowledge to harvest/use and 
to avoid overuse while West-Coast seeks better access to market and reduced price risk. 
It should be noted that in all three MIPs (firewood, timber and Prunus), West-Coast 
seeks for improve access to market as a way to increase benefits from products. 
 
  
Figure 3.6: Percentages of reasons for the decline in Prunus (a) and ways to increase 
benefits from Prunus (b) within MCNP-clusters.  
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3.3.3 Qualitative results 
The word clouds shows that respondents talked mostly about forest, community, farms, 
trees, activities and permission (allowed) (Fig. 3.7a), from where four themes were 
established: Cameroon forestry law (A), community forest conservation activities (B), 
park encroachment (C), and farm crops (D). Table 3.2 and Figure 3.7b further show the 
types of comments from different levels of stakeholders. 
A 
 
B 
 
Figure 3.7: Word clouds showing most mentioned words from the interview (a) and 
types of comments provided by different levels of stakeholders (b) on tenure issues 
around MCNP. 
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3.3.3.1 Cameroon forestry law 
While GIZ-respondent confirmed the complexity of Cameroon forestry law and the lack 
of understanding at local setting, members of local communities were concerned about 
state ownership of forest. 
GIZ: “There is not much understanding of the Cameroon forestry laws in the 
communities… NTFP users are also sometimes very confused with what is allowed and 
what is not allowed. What they can collect and what not. This is what we are trying to 
achieve through this conservation development agreement and defining roles and 
responsibilities”. 
LC: “We don’t have community forest; the government owns the forest…” 
3.3.3.2  Community’s forest conservation activities 
National stakeholders think they are trying to enhance communities’ involvement while 
GIZ feels that members of local communities have the ability to fight for what they want 
if they are interested. But members of communities believe they are the ones preserving 
the forest though they are faced with livelihood challenges as a result of restricted access 
to the park and population increase. 
National: “We try to involve local community in identifying the key drivers of 
deforestation and land degradation.” 
GIZ: “When the MCNP was created, the community fought for 6000 hectares of land all 
the way to the prime minister for their own use. So if there is something really of interest, 
they actively fight for it.” 
LC: “These communities are the ones preserving the forest… If we have to rate 
ourselves in the involvement of forest activity we would get 4/5.” 
LC: “There are some areas with medicinal plants so nobody farm there again. The area 
is being conserved and preserved…” 
LC: “We practice forest management.” 
LC: “About 100 people have moved here as strangers (per year) and the population has 
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increased.” 
LC: “The forest is our only source of survival, but now that we have been restricted 
from using the forest, the people restricting us have to provide us with other means of 
living or give us jobs.” 
LC: “At first, we used traps for hunting, and then sell the meat so we can buy other 
things, but now nothing.” 
LC: “So I don’t see any magic that will stop us from harvesting from the forest because 
that is the only activity and source of survival that we have, except we have alternatives.” 
3.3.3.3 Park encroachment 
The major threats around MCNP remain encroachment for agriculture and poaching 
which are carried out mostly by outsiders. GIZ and local communities’ respondents were 
all concerned about these issues. 
GIZ: ‘The main threats in the park are encroachment for farming, timber exploitation 
and hunting. I think the biggest threat at the moment is farm encroachment.” 
GIZ: “Efolofo have a lot of conflicts about encroachment. They are saying that chiefs 
are selling lands.” 
GIZ:  “In Bomboko you really have pressures from outsiders trying to take land. 
Recently we had two elephants killed at Bomana and there is a lot of encroachment in 
the area here.” 
GIZ: “The area around is on a very high pressure zone. Not even the indigenous 
community are encroaching in the park. It is only people from outside coming and 
looking for land. We have a lot of migration from areas like the North-West and South-
West coming here to settle down because the soil is very fertile here. And in this area 
land is very scarce, so this is also a challenge to the community.” 
LC: “There are heady people who encroaches the forest and cut down any tree even the 
Mahogany, whether it is big or small they just cut it and that is not good. So when they 
brought up the idea to create a community forest, we agreed to that because if we cut 
down all the trees, the next generation will not meet the trees. I personally helped my 
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husband to build this house with wood from mahogany, but now only premature 
mahogany is available because all the strong and mature ones have been cut down.” 
3.3.3.4 Farm crops 
Local communities’ respondents expressed concerns about shortage of food since the 
establishment of MCNP in 2009 due to state land grab and climate change. 
LC: “…food has reduced in the past five years because MCNP has taken most part of 
our land.” 
LC: “The most important products from the forest are fire-wood and food, but they are 
reducing because of climate change. The crops are not doing well.” 
3.4 Discussion 
The right to land and territories to local communities is an element of the right to 
property applicable to REDD+. According to UNDRIP, “Indigenous peoples have the 
right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, 
occupied or otherwise used or acquired” (Wiessner & Historical, 2009). One of the 
key challenges perceived by the Forest People Programme and the United Nation 
REDD+ Programme is tenure reforms because state control and ownership of forest 
result into tenure insecurity and disregarding customary claims create uncertainty in 
terms of meeting up with the requirement of REDD+ social safeguards (Larson et al., 
2010a; 2010b; 2010c). 
The 1994 Forestry law regulates ownership of land in Cameroon, “the state, local 
councils, village communities and private individuals may exercise on their forest and 
aqua-cultural establishments all the rights that result from ownership subject to 
restrictions laid down in the regulations governing land tenure and state lands and by-
laws”. Until 2009, the government had not adequately taken care of Mount Cameroon 
reserve area for about 30 years and this encouraged people to gradually encroach 
and extend their agricultural practices (Awono et al., 2014). This land which was once 
regarded as being under the control of the chiefs and local communities now poses 
threat of tenure insecurity for forest dwellers. 2009 saw the birth of MCNP, and the 
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boundary demarcation of this park has led to land rights claims from villagers and some 
of these lands claims are located right inside the national park. The total area of MCNP 
is 58,154 ha out of which 24,000 ha lies on the encroachment belt and risk being 
converted into agro-forestry (Awono et al., 2014). The land categorised around 
MCNP are reserve forest, managed forest, plantation, agro-forestry and pasture; 
practising four tenure systems: state, community, private and open access. All reserves 
are managed by the state. 
3.4.1 Land tenure - ownership and control of forest 
Local communities follow traditional/customary laws which are not included in legal 
state laws (Larson et al., 2012a; 2012b; 2012c) and this has made land tenure systems 
insecure. The Cameroon Land Tenure Ordinance determined land ownership. Article 1, 
Decree No: 76/165 states that “Land certificate shall be the official certificate of real 
property rights.” Local communities cannot claim ownership of land without a land 
certificate no matter how long they have lived and/or used the land. The Land Tenure 
Ordinance do not recognise customary title to land, thereby, creating uncertainty in land 
ownership and tenure rights. Section 17 ironically gives rights to occupy and use land 
that have been occupied/used since August 1974, but they still need to apply for a land 
certificate. Customary community ownership rights are not aligned with requirement 
of obtaining land certificate and the process is even expensive, complicated with 
corrupt procedures. These make most local communities unable to afford private or 
community land certificate. The government have overall ownership and control 
over forest and these have led to low participation in the project. When local 
communities claim ownership of project they fully engage in realising it. The low 
female participation rate in MCNP-activities may be linked to cultural practices that 
deprive them from ownership to land. Communities do not require state full ownership 
recognition to facilitate sustainable use of resources (Ostrom, 2010), but if accorded 
long term harvesting rights on some species, they would most probably engage in 
monitoring forest activities (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). Prunus africana is the only 
NTFP sustainably harvested by Mount Cameroon Prunus Common Initiative Group 
(involving 33 of the 41 park villages as of now). 
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According to the 1994 Forestry law, all natural resources belong to the state. The 
1998 Water Law gives exclusive rights of all fresh water within its national territory 
to the state while the Mining Code of 2001 (section 2) gives ownership of all mining 
resources to the state except where there exist private land certificate. Government 
ownership of forest often results to insecure tenure, disregarding customary claims and 
thereby, creates uncertainties in fulfilment of REDD+ social safeguards (Larson, 
2010b). So land tenure is key in determining ownership of natural resources. The 1994 
Forest law stipulates that all natural resources found in state or communal forest are 
owned by the states, those of council forest belongs to the council, while those found 
in private forest are privately own as stipulated by section 39(1) and the 1974 Land 
Tenure Ordinance, but private ownership is limited by section 39(5) which gives the 
state right over all forest products found on private natural forest land. Since the state 
has full ownership of MCNP-REDD+ project, it is evident that the benefits will be only 
for the state, thereby excluding community out of the benefits stream. 
3.4.2 Community resource tenure challenges 
Securing tenure and enhancing local engagement is critical for increasing local 
communities’ resilience or adaptive capacity to climate change (Somorin, 2012; Chatre 
& Agrawal, 2009; Lawlor et al., 2010). For forest to be considered a sustainable natural 
productive assets for communities, tenure needs to be secure with clear rights and 
responsibility, land properly conserved, managed, enriched and improved for provision 
of constant flow of benefits and products providing added value (Barry et al., 2003). 
Tenure rights are insecure at MCNP REDD+ project because of human settlement 
around the park boundaries without rights to harvest timber, medicine, food nor NTFP 
for their livelihoods. Abandoning their traditional activities requires adequate 
compensation, but there is doubt if REDD+ mechanism can provide such compensation. 
Time will tell of what will happen to the 6000 ha of cocoa plantation and other crops 
that have been carved out of the MCNP to Bomboko cluster. Local communities are 
involved in crop harvesting, hunting and timber exploitation for survival. Restricting 
access to forest resources has caused a decline in MIP which is affecting their 
livelihoods. To increase the benefits (in use/income) from MIPs, local communities are 
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seeking for better access to forest resources and more usage rights; better protection of 
forest products through avoiding overuse of resources; better access to markets and 
reduction in price risk and above all to fully engage in planting forest products. 
There is no clear regulation on carbon ownership in Cameroon and the legal carbon 
seller has not been identified (Sama & Tawa, 2011). The legal system does not make any 
distinction between carbons stored in trees and trees itself. By deduction, the owner of 
the resources that stored the carbon should own the carbon and subsequently the carbon 
credit. The uncertainty in land tenure system poses a problem in determining carbon 
ownership. Although local communities have claimed customary rights over land within 
their territorial boundaries for centuries, most forested areas still belong to the 
government because of no land certification title. Therefore, it is likely that most carbon 
credits will go to the government. Forest dwellers are direct custodian of the forest 
where they have lived for centuries and derived their livelihood. Cameroon is a 
signatory of the Convention of Biological Diversity and therefore, has a duty to protect 
local knowledge, and customary use of forest and its resources. Strict land-tenure law 
enforcement may deprive local communities from engaging in MCNP-REDD+ activities. 
Fobissie et al. (2012) state that the Cameroon government is slowly, but surely 
increasing local control over forest land through strengthening of local and customary 
rights and encouraging private and collective ownership through community forestry. 
With the financial incentives potential of REDD+, the government of Cameroon may 
centralise forest and land tenure ownership (Phelp et al., 2010) that will help define 
carbon ownership in future REDD+ initiatives or implement REDD+ within its current 
legislation aimed at strengthening communities’ right. Local communities around 
MCNP have no official rights to resources within the protected area. Those indigenes 
that have farmlands within the park could become frontline guardians if the government 
could map out these areas from the park and give it back to customary rightful owner on 
condition that there is no further encroachment. Local communities derive their 
livelihood from forest resources, although they have no statutory rights, their customary 
rights should be taken into account to preserve their carbon rights because they see 
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REDD+ as an opportunity to conserve forest and generate income. Improved agricultural 
techniques are needed to improve yield to meet up with population growth. 
Lack of carbon rights may make forest dwellers to question the efficiency of REDD+ in 
improving livelihood through forest conservation (Somorin et al., 2012). Though 
mitigating climate change is important, improving livelihoods and forest conservation 
improve adaptive capacity of forest-dwellers to climate change. REDD+ success 
depends on integrating the adaptive needs and priorities of forest dwellers in its 
implementation, of which food production is one of them. Securing tenure rights and 
effective engagement in decision-making at cluster platforms are essential in realising 
MCNP-REDD+ objectives and community adaptive capacity to climate change. Tenure 
reforms should be consistent with customary systems where communal ownership 
should be recognised rather than private or state ownership (Brown et al., 2001), but 
local ownership rights should involve capacity to manage. Cameroon has not yet defined 
property rights to carbon (Awono et al., 2014). 
According to local communities, they have rights over forest land they have managed 
for livelihood provision and leaving their farmlands simply jeopardises their livelihood 
(Awono et al., 2014). Though members of MCNP-clusters have claims over the 
farmland within the park, they seem to be flexible because they are aware of the fact that 
they were not supposed to encroach into the reserve. Fertile soil for food and cash crops 
has led to the influx of migrants and population growth to farm on fertile agricultural 
soil to meet-up with livelihood challenges. Scarcity of farmland combined with state 
laxity and livelihood challenges are some of the factors that caused them to establish 
plantations and farmlands on reserve area at an acceptable risk. It would be better if 
communities are financially compensated for investment already made which was partly 
due to state laxity to control forest reserve. While the indigenous people are observing 
transformation of ‘their’ land into national park, settlers and/or outsiders are challenging 
the decision and keep encroaching the forest for farmland which is unfair to indigenes 
that cannot stop settlers and/or outsiders from encroaching into the park. Migrants hold 
that the park belongs to the state and only the state can stop encroachment not indigenes. 
Indigenes have lost their traditional rights over the park. Local communities are seeking 
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better access to forest products. Apart from government controls over the park, the 
Cameroon Development Corporation also extends plantations into villagers’ farmland 
with financial compensation without alternative land for them to farm on. This has 
resulted to conflict as land becomes scarce. 
3.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
For REDD+ to succeed, forest dwellers need to be able to appreciate its importance and 
the Land Tenure law need to be revised to include appropriate incentives, opportunities 
and customary rights to local communities. Indigenous people have customary rights 
over the land they have cultivated over a long time for their livelihood demands, and 
leaving their farmland would jeopardise their livelihood. Insecure tenure will put them 
out of REDD+ benefits because power disparity lead to inequality in benefit-sharing 
among stakeholders (Sikor & Nguyen, 2007; Schreckenberg & Luttrell, 2009). Local 
communities considered REDD+ as having the opportunity to conserve forest as well as 
generate income. They have been users of land and forest resources for centuries. 
Although they lack statutory rights to land, it is possible to build on customary rights 
and recognise local rights to own carbon. The social safeguards specification of REDD+ 
might provide better incentives for local community engagement. 
Strict REDD+ obligations are not yet defined within MCNP project because it is still in 
its early stage and carbon has not yet been sold or bought. There is still much uncertainty 
over communities’ access to natural resources, rights and land ownership. The 1994 
forest law allows local communities to apply for and obtain community forest through 
stringent conditions; like developing management plan, annual report writing, and 
recording inventories; which are cumbersome and hard for local communities to comply. 
This has been one of the major constraints to land ownership and carbon ownership 
rights to local communities. Though forest dwellers sometimes lack adequate capacity to 
implement sustainable forest management and development strategies (Njamnshi et al., 
2008), western forest management strategies may not suit customary lifestyle. There is 
therefore, need to build capacity to enhance community leadership to defend their rights, 
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interest and lifestyle. Capacity building and training on REDD+ support both 
conservation and millennium development goals. 
The Government of Cameroon officially recognises traditional rulers and authorities, 
and this has helped to use chiefs and their councillors in liaising between the 
government and the members of the community during forest projects. The 
strengthening of customary rights over forest through community or private land title 
should be continued. Organisation and leadership of local community will enable them 
stand-up for themselves and have a say at discussion table. Customary rights of local 
communities need to be protected and better developed. Adequate measures need to be 
taken to ensure full and effective engagement of all stakeholders and most especially 
forest dwellers for effectiveness and efficiency in REDD+. For REDD+ to achieve its 
objectives, forest dwellers should be allowed access to natural resources as well as the 
customary rights to ownership. 
To meet-up with the REDD+ requirement for social-safeguards, states may grant permit 
for community forest to park villages. Community forestry has the potential of achieving 
biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration and supporting local development 
(Smith & Scherr, 2003), therefore, it has the potential for effective REDD+ scheme. The 
institutional establishment of community forest is recognised by the 1994 Cameroonian 
forest law though; there is still contradiction between the law and social safeguard short-
circuiting tenure complexity (Wily, 2011). The management of community forest is 
characterised by sustainable resource use and socio-economic factor. Therefore, a legal 
community forest which is managed by local communities following state laws will be a 
better option. The right holders will be the MCNP villagers, responsible person will be 
the chiefs, benefactors will be communities, there will be no resource rush since they are 
the original custodians, local livelihoods and rights will be protected, thereby, balancing 
the benefit of REDD+ to the needs of local people. 
The zoning plan should be reviewed with clear mechanism of land sharing. Zoning and 
land-use-planning help to avoid conflicts among different natural resource users, be it 
conservation, agriculture, or forestry concessions. Local communities may also engage 
in planning and implementing the zoning process. Co-management of MCNP should 
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allow local communities to have access to protected areas and carry-out their decade-old 
traditional lifestyle (hunting and gathering), else the government could map-out part of 
the permanent forest areas and allocate it to local activities. Local communities’ usufruct 
rights should be respected. Formal law limits local use rights leading to conflict between 
customary and state law and the link between communities and forest cannot be formally 
made without recognising customary claims. 
3.6 References 
Agrawal, A., Chhatre, A., & Hardin, R. (2008). Changing governance of the world’s 
forests. Science 320 (16), 1460-1462. 
Awono, A., Somorin, O., Eba’a Atyi, R., & Levang, P. (2014). Tenure and participation 
in local REDD+ projects: Insights from southern Cameroon. Environmental 
Science & Policy 35, 76-86. 
Barry, D., Campbell, J., Fahn, J., Mallee, H., & Pradhan, U. (2003). Achieving 
significant impact at scale: Reflections on the challenge for global community 
forestry. In CIFOR Conference on ‘Rural Livelihoods, Forests & Biodiversity, 
CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia. 
Brown, D., & Schreckenberg, K. (2001). Community forestry: facing up to the challenge 
in Cameroon. Rural Development Forestry Network, Overseas Development 
Institute, 1-19. 
Chhatre, A., & Agrawal, A. (2009). Trade-offs and synergies between carbon storage 
and livelihood benefits from forest commons. Proceedings of the national 
Academy of sciences, 106(42), 17667-17670. 
Dkamela, G.P. (2011). The context of REDD+ in Cameroon: drivers, agents and 
institutions. CIFOR Occasional Paper, (57). 
Ellsworth, L., & White, A. (2004). Deeper roots: Strengthening community tenure 
security and community livelihoods. Ford Foundation. 
Fobissie, B., Essomba, E., Sonne, N., Ndobé, S., & Retana, V. (2012). Social safeguards 
and the rights of indigenous peoples in the REDD+ process of Cameroon. 
Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), (2010). Global Forest 
Resources Assessment 2010. Rome: FAO. 
111 
Freudenthal, E., Nnah, S., & Kenrick, J. (2011). REDD and Rights in Cameroon: A 
Review of the Treatment of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in 
Policies and Projects. Forest Peoples Programme. 
Holland, M.B., De Koning, F., Morales, M., Naughton-Treves, L., Robinson, B.E., & 
Suárez, L. (2014). Complex tenure and deforestation: Implications for 
conservation incentives in the Ecuadorian Amazon. World Development, 55, 21- 
36. 
Karsenty, A. (2011). Combining conservation incentives with investment. Perspective, 
Environmental Policies 7. 
Larson, A., Barry, D., & Dahal, G. (2010a). Tenure change in the global south. In: 
Larson, A., Barry, D., Dahal, G., & Colfer, C. (Eds.), Forests for People: 
Community Rights and Forest Tenure Reform. Earthscan, London, 3-18. 
Larson, A., Barry, D., & Dahal, G. (2010b). New rights for forest based communities: 
understanding processes of forest tenure reform. International Forestry Review 
12 (1), 78-96. 
Larson, A., Marfo, E., Cronkleton, P., & Pulhin, J. (2010c). Authority relations under 
new forest tenure arrangements. In: Larson, A.M., Barry, D., Dahal, G.R., Colfer, 
C.J.P. (Eds.), Forests for People: Community Rights and Forest Tenure Reform. 
Earthscan, London, 93-115. 
Lawlor, K., Weinthal, E., & Olander, L. (2010). Institutions and policies to protect rural 
livelihoods in REDD regimes. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Global Environmental Politics 10 (4), 1-11. 
Minang, P., Bressers, H., Skutsch, M., & McCall, M. (2007). National forest policy as a 
platform for biosphere carbon management: the case of community forestry in 
Cameroon. Environmental science & policy, 10(3), 204-218. 
Njamnshi, A., Nchunu, J., Galega, P., & Chili, P. (2008). Environmental democracy in 
Cameroon: An assessment of access to information, participation in decision 
making, and access to justice in environmental matters. Report for The Access 
Initiative Cameroon (TAI), Yaoundé. 
112 
Ostrom, E. (2010). The potential role of communities in sustaining forest resources. In: 
Plenary Address to be given at the XXIII IUFRO World Congress, Seoul, South 
Korea. 
Phelps, J., Webb, E., & Agrawal, A. (2010). Does REDD+ threaten to recentralize forest 
governance. Science, 328(5976), 312-313. 
RRI, (2012a). What rights? A comparative analysis of developing countries’ national 
legislation on community and indigenous peoples’ forest tenure rights. Rights 
and Resources Initiative, Washington DC, USA (2012). 
Sama, N.J., & Tawah, E.B. (2009). Case study: Cameroon. Legal frameworks for 
REDD: design and implementation at the national level, 139-150. 
Schlager, E., & Ostrom, E. (1992). Property rights regimes and natural resources: a 
conceptual analysis. Land Economics 68 (3), 249-262. 
Schreckenberg, K., & Luttrell, C. (2009). Participatory forest management: a route to 
poverty reduction? International Forestry Review, 11(2), 221-238. 
Sikor, T., & Nguyen, T. (2007). Why may forest devolution not benefit the rural poor? 
Forest entitlements in Vietnam’s Central Highlands. World Development 35, 
2010-2025. 
Smith, J., & Scherr, S. (2003). Capturing the value of forest carbon for local livelihoods. 
World Development, 31(12), 2143-2160. 
Somorin, O., Brown, H., Visseren-Hamakers, I., Sonwa, D., Arts, B., & Nkem, J. (2012). 
The Congo Basin forest in a changing climate: policy discourses on adaptation 
and mitigation (REDD+). Global Environmental Change 22, 288-298. 
Stern, N., (2006). The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Sunderlin, W., Hatcher, J., & Liddle, M. (2008). From exclusion to ownership? 
Challenges and opportunities in advancing forest tenure reform. Rights & 
Resources Initiative. 
Sunderlin, W., Larson, A., Duchelle, A., Sills, E., Luttrell, C., Jagger, P., Pattanayak, S., 
Cronkleton, P., & Ekaputri, A. (2010). Technical Guidelines for Research on 
REDD+ Project Sites. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia. 
113 
Sunderlin, W.D, Larson, A., Duchelle, A., Resosudarmo, I., Huynh, T., Awono, A., & 
Dokken, T. (2014). How are REDD+ proponents addressing tenure problems? 
Evidence from Brazil, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia, and Vietnam. World 
Development, 55, 37-52. 
The Government of Cameroon, (1996). Cameroon Framework Law on Environmental 
Management; Loi n° 96/12 du 5 aout 1996 portant loi-cadre relative a la gestion 
de l’environnement. http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=179740 
(Dec., 2013). 
Vabi, M., Ngwasiri, C., Galega, P., & Oyono, R. (2000). The devolution of forest 
management responsibilities to local communities: context and implementation 
hurdles in Cameroon. World Wide Fund for Nature, Cameroon Programme 
Office, Yaoundé, Cameroon. 36. 
Westholm, L., Biddulph, R., Hellmark, I., & Ekbom, A. (2011). REDD+ and Tenure: A 
review of the latest developments in research, implementation and debate. Focali 
report 2011, 2. 
Wiessner, S., & Historical, I. (2009). United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. United Nations Audio-visual Library of International Law, 
1-7. 
Wily, L. (2011). Whose Land is it? The Status of Customary Land Tenure in Cameroon. 
Centre for Environment and Development. 
Wunder, S. (2005). Payments for environmental services: some nuts and bolts (Vol. 42, 
1-32). Jakarta, Indonesia: CIFOR. 
114 
4 Assessing the interaction of REDD+ with family 
farming around Mt. Cameroon National Park 
Keywords: Food production, Local communities, Improved livelihood, social safeguards, 
Family farmers. 
Abstract - Family farming systems play a major role in climate change mitigation, 
though, family farmers are often overlooked in government policies. Therefore, 
improved food security and adaptation capacity should accompany mitigation, but few 
studies have been done to examine how REDD+ project intersects with family farming 
in enhancing local livelihood in Cameroon. This study examines how participating in 
Mount Cameroon National Park (MCNP) projects relates to food production and 
livelihood of family farmers and also identifies constraints faced by family farmers in 
enhancing food production within MCNP-clusters. Cluster multi-stage random sampling 
was used to collect data from 259 respondents that were analysed using Chi-square, 
Mann-Whitney, t-test, Kruskal-Wallis, Jonckheere-Terpstra tests and NVivo. This study 
shows that all respondents are cultivating on croplands with 81% of respondents 
predominantly practising family farming. The main crops cultivated/harvested are 
plantains, cocoyams, vegetables, oil palms, cocoa, bush-pepper, njansanga and bush-
mango with cash-crops production being the main form of income generation. The study 
found a significant relationship between participation in MCNP-activities and 
livelihoods in animal husbandry, plantation-worker; cultivation of groundnuts, egusi, 
maize, beans, vegetables, sugar-cane, tea and harvesting of kola-nuts. A decline in food 
production over the last five years is due to large scale projects and increase in market 
potentials. To increase benefits from products, local communities mainly seek to invest 
in planting food products, gain better access to markets, credit/capital and 
equipment/technology. The number of landholdings directly correlates with participation 
in MCNP activities and annual income also shows a direct relationship with landholding 
and labour force. Family farmers play a significant role in sustainable development and 
sustainability of MCNP-REDD+ initiatives that depend on the sustainability of crop 
production should be tackled conjointly to avoid leakage. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) is considered as 
having the potential to mitigate climate change and improve livelihood of local 
communities in forest ecosystems (Mustalahti et al., 2012; Minang & van Noordwijk, 
2013), but there is fear that it will result to land grabbing and marginalisation of local 
communities as forest gets further commodified. It is assumed that local communities 
are keys to forest management and improving tenure security is crucial for carbon 
sequestration potential of a forest. Some REDD+ projects restrict access of forest 
dwellers to project area which are sources of carbon additionality and revenue, so 
conditional performance based compensation is applied as incentives to local 
communities. 
Africans depend mostly on natural resources from forest and non-forest ecosystems. 
According to FAO (2009), 80% of all farms in Africa are managed by family farmers 
making a total of 33 million farms, on less than two hectares of land. The economic 
decision to convert forest into agriculture for improvement of livelihood might be a 
rational one; therefore, mitigation should be linked to rural development which aimed at 
sustaining life and at the same time reducing carbon emissions. The link between 
poverty, deforestation and reduction in CO2 emissions is very critical to strike a balance 
between mitigating climate change, providing food security and improving livelihood. 
According to Ngendakumana et al. (2013), conversion of land for agriculture is a 
survival strategy which is also a source of carbon emissions (Neerly & Leeuw, 2012). 
Sunderlin (2014) also argues that one of the institutional levers for early tenure concern, 
is in “response to a broad donor consensus predating REDD+” which is important in 
assessing development and environmental target like poverty alleviation, local or 
regional economic growth and landowners resource and land investment strategies. 
Forest dwellers manage a greater portion of the world’s forest and therefore, should play 
a significant role in climate change mitigation and poverty alleviation strategies. 
The basis of African food systems are family farmers providing food security and 
protecting natural resources and they have proven to be great innovators, developing 
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technologies controlled by them to benefit them (Goïta et al., 2013). Family farming 
plays a major role in sustainably managing natural resources, conserving/protecting 
ecosystems, providing food security, alleviating poverty, enhancing livelihood which are 
all geared toward sustainable development. This makes family farming to be at the 
centre of agricultural, environmental and socio-economic policies. Its activities include 
agriculture, forestry, fishery, animal husbandry and aquaculture which are owned, 
operated and managed by a family (men, women and children). It is the main form of 
agriculture in Cameroon, and rural communities have developed out of family farming. 
Family farming occupies 97% of the agricultural workforce and account for 95% of 
food products in Cameroon (Zechariah, 2014). Agriculture and forestry also contribute 
to 20% of GDP and employ 62% of the active population (Massarenti, 2014). Thus, 
tenure needs to be addressed to enhance the capacity of family farmers in increasing 
food production in order to meet up with livelihood challenges and the millennium 
development goals. Family farmers contribute to climate change mitigation, therefore, 
improved food security and adaptation capacity should accompany mitigation 
(Wollenberg et al., 2012). Although they are major contributors to local livelihoods and 
wellbeing, family farmers are often overlooked in government policies. When family 
farmers control resources, it gives them an autonomy and resilience which is a necessity 
for sustaining family system of food provision. Thus, tenure needs to be addressed to 
enhance the capacity of family farmers in increasing food production to meet livelihood 
challenges and international commitments such as the Millennium Development Goals 
and the developing Sustainable Development Goals. 
This study assesses how MCNP-REDD+ project intersect with family farming and food 
production around Mount Cameroon National Park villages by: 
 Examining how livelihoods, food-crops, cash-crops and non-timber forest 
products produced within family farming systems all relate to participation in 
MCNP-activities; 
 Examining the challenges faced by family farmers in increasing food 
production around MCNP; 
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 Identifying ways of increasing benefits from food production within family 
forestry; 
 Investigating how size of landholding relates with participation in MCNP 
activities; and 
 Identifying the factors influencing income/livelihood of family farmers. 
4.2 Methodology (See 1.6) 
4.3 Results 
The family farming system around MCNP is made up of household, cropping, animal, 
soil and non-agricultural components which are all inter-related and influenced by 
external biophysical and socio-economic components such as size of landholding, 
labour, tenure systems, financial credit availability, farm-to-market roads, large scale 
project and increased market potentials. Family farmlands within MCNP are of three 
types: home gardens, cash-crop plantations and farm-land (shifting cultivation food-crop 
field). Swamps and bottom of valleys (Lamba) are also used during the dry season for 
off-season production. 
Ten major food-crops may be grown in association in the food-crops fields while cash-
crops are grown mostly in plantations and NTFP are harvested from the forest. The main 
food-crops are planted in both home gardens and as farm land; cash crops are cultivated 
mostly in plantations while NTFP are mostly from the permanent or managed forest. 
Home gardens are easily accessible as being close to home and are often composed of 
domesticated forest trees like kola-nuts, fruits (plums, mangoes, oranges, grapes and 
guavas,), food-crops (cassava, banana, plantains and cocoyams) and domestic animals 
(goats, pigs, chicken, dogs and cats). Harvesting within family farms is done manually. 
Most of the harvests are for family consumption while surpluses are sold and the rest are 
kept as seeds for the next planting session. Processing of local food is also done 
manually, though cost efficient, it consumes much time and lacks effective method for 
preservation. 
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4.3.1 Relationship between participation and livelihoods 
This study shows that all respondents are practising family farming - cultivating food-
crops on croplands. While 81% of park-villagers are predominantly practising family 
farming, 11% are involved in business selling mostly farm products, 4% work as civil 
servants and 4% as plantation workers (Fig. 4.1a). Cash-crop production is the major 
source of livelihood followed by harvesting of NTFP, business, timber, fishing and 
animal husbandry. While Bomboko and Muyuka derive their livelihood from mainly 
cash-crops, West-Coast takes a lead in NTFP, animal husbandry, fishing and plantation 
workers. Hunting is predominantly carried out in Muyuka, and Bomboko is highly 
involved in timber harvesting while the Buea cluster is also predominant with civil-
servants and businessmen. The study shows that those effectively participating (>50%) 
in MCNP are those carrying out animal husbandry, plantation workers and civil-servants 
(Fig. 4.1b). Result shows significant direct relationships between participation in 
MCNP-activities and main livelihood in animal-husbandry (χ²=5.054, p=.025) and as 
plantation-worker (χ²=3.920, p=.048). A significant direct relationship is also registered 
in West-Coast for plantation-workers (χ²=5.953, p=.015), while a significant inverse 
relationship is recorded for business-men (χ²=4.580, p=.032) in Bomboko. 
119 
A 
 
B 
 
Figure 4.1: Percentages of main livelihoods within MCNP-clusters (a) and relationships 
between livelihoods and participation in MCNP-activities (b). 
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The seven main food crops (Fig. 4.2a) cultivated in MCNP villages include plantains, 
cocoyams, vegetables, cassava, banana, yams and maize. Plantains, groundnuts and 
egusi are predominantly produced in Muyuka; while cocoyams and banana are highly 
cultivated in Buea. Bomboko takes a lead in vegetable and potatoes production while 
production of maize, fruits, cassava, yams and beans are high in West-Coast. Results 
shows that participation in MCNP-activities was significantly related to cultivation of 
groundnut (χ²=39.951, p<.0001), egusi (χ²=24.601, p<.0001), beans (χ²=12.178, 
p<.0001), maize (χ²=4.457, p=.035) and vegetables (χ²=5.519, p=.019) (Fig. 4.2b). 
Results show significant direct relationships between participation in MCNP-activities 
in Bomboko for cultivation of vegetables (χ²=7.327, p=.007) and egusi (χ²=6.491, 
p=.011); in Buea for cultivation of maize (χ²=6.721, p=.010), groundnut (χ²=12.599, 
p<.0001) and beans (χ²=7.592, p=.006); in Muyuka for cultivation of groundnuts 
(χ²=8.199, p=.004) and egusi (χ²=6.533, p=.011); and in West-Coast for cultivation of 
groundnut (χ²=14.804, p<.0001) and egusi (χ²=15.358, p<.0001). The study also 
registered significant inverse relationships between participation in MCNP-activities in 
Buea for cultivation of plantains (χ²=6.969, p=.008) and in West-Coast for cultivation of 
cassava (χ²=5.913, p=.015) and banana (χ²=8.00, p=.005). All other relationships were 
non-significant.  
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Figure 4.2: Percentages of main food crops cultivated within MCNP-clusters (a) and 
how these relate to participation in MCNP-activities (b). 
Figure 4.3a shows that oil palms and cocoa are the main cash crops cultivated within 
MCNP-clusters. Sugar-cane is also cultivated in Bomboko, Buea and West-Coast while 
tea, coffee and rubber are cultivated in Buea. The study shows a direct relationship 
between participation in MCNP-activities and cultivation of sugar-cane (χ²=12.441, 
p<.0001) and tea (χ²=4.228, p=.040), but an inverse relationship with cocoa cultivation 
(χ²=4.328, p=.038) within all clusters (Fig. 4.3b). In West-Coast, participation is also 
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directly related to sugar-cane cultivation (χ²=7.270, p=.007). In Buea, participation 
directly correlates with sugar-cane (χ²=7.839, p=.005) and tea (χ²=5.868, p=.015) 
cultivation, but inversely related to palms cultivation (χ²=7.728, p=.005). 
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Figure 4.3: Percentages of main cash-crops cultivated within MCNP-clusters (a) and 
how these relate to participation in MCNP-activities (b). 
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(χ²=5.168, p=.023) and West-Coast (χ²=10.681, p=.001). The study also reveals an 
inverse relationship for participation in MCNP-activities and cultivation of bush-mango 
in Buea (χ²=4.961, p=.026) (Fig. 4.4b). All other relationships are non-significant. 
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Figure 4.4: Percentages of main NTFPs harvested within MCNP-clusters (a) and how 
these relate to participation in MCNP-activities. 
4.3.2 Livelihood challenges faced by family farmers 
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increase in large scale projects such as infrastructure and plantations; increased market 
potentials due to population growth and outsiders, whose land purchase for exploitation 
further restricts access to local communities (Fig. 4.5a). In the West-Coast, both large 
scale projects and influx of outsiders buying land contribute to overall decrease in 
production. Result shows an increased use by non-settlers, increased use by local people 
and government restriction on land in Buea. 
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The three main actions needed to increase the benefits from food-crops includes increase 
cultivation of products, better access to credit/capital and equipment technology to 
increase yield and better access to market and reduced price risk in MCNP-clusters as 
well as in each cluster (Fig. 4.5b). Bomboko seeks better protection/avoid overuse of 
products while Buea wishes a better access to the forest for agriculture and development 
of forest users group for collective harvesting of products. 
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Figure 4.5: Percentages of reasons for the decrease in food production (a) and ways to 
increase benefits from food (b) within MCNP-clusters. 
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Other challenges faced by family farmers in enhancing food production include energy 
availability to process and store food, formal/informal credit/capital to invest in 
equipment technology and improve farm-to-market roads (Fig 4.6). The study shows 
that only West-Coast members have access to formal credit. The participatory villages 
in Muyuka have neither electricity nor formal/informal credit to invest in food 
production with poor roads-to-market. The average distance to the nearest district 
market where farm products are sold are 34km (Bomboko), 6km (Buea), 10km 
(Muyuka) and 26km (West-Coast). 
 Figure 4.6: Challenges faced by family farmers in enhancing food production within 
MCNP-clusters. 
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Figure 4.7: Kruskal-Wallis plot showing variance in landholding within clusters (a), t-
test plots showing relationship between number of landholding and participation in 
MCNP (b) and within different clusters (c). 
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A kruskal-wallis test shows a significant difference between landholding in different 
clusters H(3)=24.106, p<.0001 (Fig. 4.7a) with a non-significant trends J=12174, p=.633. 
Follow-up pairwise comparison shows significant differences between West-Coast and 
Buea (H=38.162, p=.009, r=.266), West-Coast and Muyuka (H=54.09, p<.0001, r=.369), 
Bomboko and Buea (H=-33.035, p=.046, r=-.231), and Bomboko and Muyuka (H=-
48.962, p=.002, r=-.058). 
Landholding is not normally distributed (p<.05) (Table 4.2a). A Mann-Whitney U test 
shows that participation in MCNP activities is significantly related to number of 
landholding (p=.001, r=.30) as well as in Bomboko (p=.019, r=.289), Buea (p=.017, 
r=.289), Muyuka (p=.023, r=.325) and West Coast (p=.001, r=.336). The t-test shows a 
significant difference in landholding between non-participants and participants in 
MCNP activities’ groups (Fig. 4.7b, Fig. 4.7c). Result reveals a significant correlation 
between participation and number of landholding (T=-5.507, df=257, p<.001, 95% BCa 
CI (-.944, -.447) as well as in Buea, Bomboko, Muyuka and West-Coast (Table 4.2b) 
A regression analysis model (Table 4.3) to investigate how size of landholdings (L) 
influences participation (P) shows a direct correlation between landholding and 
participation in all clusters and also within each cluster. These models are explained by 
the following significant regression analysis equations: 
 Overall: P=.981 + .325(L) 
 Bomboko: P=.928 + .294(L) 
 Buea:  P=1.001 + .308(L) 
 Muyuka:  P=.854 + .354(L) 
 West-Coast:  P=.953 + .385(L) 
Where P=Participation and L=Size of landholdings 
The study also shows a significant direct relationship between size of landholding and 
livelihood as cash-crops cultivators (χ²(4)=60.308, p<.0001), civil servant  
(χ²(4)=17.981, p=.001), NTFP-harvester (χ²(4)=13.346, p=.010) and plantation-worker 
(χ²(4)=9.750, p=.045); cultivation of food-crops like vegetables (χ²(4)=11.387,  p=.023), 
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cash-crops like tea (χ²(4)=24.813, p<.0001) and NTFP like kola-nuts (χ²(4)=11.959, 
p=.018). All other relationships are non-significant. 
Annual income significantly relates to landholding (χ² (16) =83.635, p<.0001) and 
labour (χ² (20) =36.715, p=.013). The linear regression models show that annual income 
is dependent on number of landholding and labour (F=29.926, p<.0001) within MCNP- 
clusters with a small fit of 18% (Table 4.4). Also in Bomboko (F=10.179, p<.0001), 
Buea (F=9.046, p<.0001), Muyuka (F=9.179, p=.004) and West-Coast (F=3.691, 
p=.030) with a small fit of 22%, 19%, 15%, and 7% respectively. The regression models 
show that size of landholding (L) has the highest predictor impact on annual income 
(AI) and the models are explained by the following significant equations; 
 Overall:  AI=.9 + .394(L) + .106(l) 
 Bomboko:  AI=.661 + .474(L) + .059(l) 
 Muyuka:  AI=1.094 + .404(l) 
 West-Coast:  AI=1.697 + .207(L) + .154(l) 
Where AI=Annual income, L=Size of landholdings and l=labour 
Results also show significant direct relationships between annual income and main 
livelihood as civil-servants (χ²(4)=28.191, p<.0001), food-crops like egusi (χ²(4)=12.541, 
p=.014), maize (χ²(4)=17.076, p=.002) and vegetables (χ²(4)=9.764, p=.045); cash-crops 
like sugar-cane (χ²(4)=10.384, p=.034); and NTFP like njansanga (χ²(4)=14.717, 
p=.005) and honey (χ²(4)=19.889, p=.001) harvesters.  
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4.3.4 Qualitative results 
Interviewees talked mostly about forest, farm and crops (Fig. 4.8a) from where three 
themes were been deduced: Cameroon forestry law (A), community forest activities (B) 
and farms food-crops (C). Table 4.1 and figure 4.8b further show the types of comments 
across different levels of stakeholders. 
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Figure 4.8: Word clouds showing most mentioned words from the interviewees (a) and 
types of comments provided by different levels of stakeholders (b) on family farming 
issues around MCNP. 
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4.3.4.1 Cameroon forestry law 
Though GIZ tries to improve understanding of forestry law within local communities, 
they are still concern with the complex nature of this forestry law, which is practically 
impossible to implement. Family farmers are also concerned with the restriction aspects 
of the law. 
GIZ: “We are trying to sensitise the community (about forestry law) through every 
activity that we had.” 
GIZ: “The Cameroon Forestry Law is so complex and complicated and not feasible in 
the field. It is not practically feasible. So sometimes, it does not encourage the people to 
follow it because it is impossible.” 
LC: “Before the Mount Cameroon project we used to hunt right up to the forest, but 
now the law is restricting us…” 
4.3.4.2 Community forest activities 
While the GIZ respondent thinks that members of West-Coast are not planting trees, 
communities are concerned about the need of permit to carry out their family farming 
activities in the forest. 
GIZ: “West-Coast is more of a fishing community and is not planting (trees).” 
LC: “We need a permit to conduct any activity in the forest…” 
LC: “We are planting trees and also cutting down trees.” 
4.3.4.3 Farms and food crops 
The GIZ respondent blames encroachment to lack of livelihoods alternatives while local 
communities raise concerns about destruction of farms crops by animals from the park, 
long distance to markets and reduction in provision of forest products. 
GIZ: “Most of them lack alternatives for food provision….” 
131 
LC: “They ask us not to kill animals in this mountain, but these animals are destroying a 
lot. Chimpanzees and elephants are destroying all our crops.” 
LC: “We sell our crops in Buea and Muea market which is very far from here.” 
LC: “We plant crops like cassava, potatoes, cocoyams… in our farms and we harvest 
njangsanga, eru, ogwono (bush mango)… from the forest.”  
LC: “We have only private farms where we farm….”  
LC: “We need food, firewood and timber from the forest.” 
LC: “The most important product from the forest is fire-wood and food, but they are 
reducing because of climate change.” 
LC: “The crops are not doing well because we have more raining season than dry 
season.” 
4.4 Discussion 
Climate change without potential for adaptation, negatively impact food production for a 
local temperature rise of 2°C, and decline in crop production in Africa affects livelihood 
and food security (IPCC, 2014). Therefore, there is need for access to credit and 
production resources for family farmers, institutional support for sustainable agriculture, 
agronomic and technological adaptation and livelihood diversification to reduce 
vulnerability. Africa registers the highest proportion of people facing food insecurity in 
the world (FAO, 2010). To meet-up with the challenges of poverty and environmental 
sustainability, foreign technologies innovations have resulted to short term gains in 
yields at the expense of long-term degradation of soil, water, biodiversity and non- 
cultivated land, so there is need to redirect research towards enhancing adaptive capacity 
by integrated participatory approach across stakeholders, scales and disciplines (Sayer & 
Campbell, 2003). The Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Consultative 
Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) research centre argue that 
family farming system is more sustainable and resilient in confronting climate change 
challenges, though, there are concerns of meeting the Millennium Development Goals 
with 70% of Africa’s population relying on subsistence farming (Sayer, 2010).  
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4.4.1 Main livelihood and food production systems 
The role of sustainable family farming is crucial in creating jobs and enhancing local 
economies while providing ecosystem services for improved livelihood. Family farming 
supports livelihood and wellbeing of communities through production of food for 
households, sale of surpluses and value addition. It is oriented to sustainably maximise 
value and maintain natural resources. It should be noted that even businesses within 
MCNP deals with sales of farm products, thereby, creating jobs for youth. The mixed 
cropping practises within MCNP is beneficial in maximising production in small area of 
land, ecological interaction, risk management, plant nutrition, and human nutrition 
(Christine, 2013). Home gardens also play an important role in diversifying food-crops 
and conserving useful plant species threatened by forest exploitation. Although crops 
destruction by domestic animals remain a major threat to home gardens, it continuous 
supply of food to families makes this farming system indispensable. In Tanzania, 
agricultural activities carried out at the bottom of valleys (Lamba) contribute to 15% of 
food provision and 55-95% of annual household income, thereby, significantly 
enhancing livelihoods, food security and biodiversity (Munishi et al., 2011). Therefore, 
crop cultivation in swamps and Lambas should be encouraged. 
Food insecurity is one of the greatest challenges within the MCNP-clusters and is 
resulting in conflict between state and family farmers as well as between private owners 
and family farmers. Forest and customary farming systems play an essential role in food 
provision, improved livelihood and wellbeing of local communities, and above all 
sustainable development. There is need to provide alternatives to climate change like 
training in animal husbandry and providing jobs in civil service or agro-forestry for 
provision of alternative livelihoods. 
4.4.2 Livelihood challenges faced by family farmers 
Access to land, water, energy, seeds and agricultural biodiversity within local territorial 
control are fundamental for family farmers (Goïta et al., 2013). Insecure land tenure 
systems have resulted to land grabbing for large scale projects; like the MCNP REDD+ 
projects and the Cameroon Development Cooperation (plantation); which has led to 
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steady decline in food production. Other contributing factors include increased market 
potential of products as a result of population increase and increased use by outsiders. 
According to Green et al. (2012), population pressure is a better variable than 
anthropogenic pressure for predicting protected area management costs and should be 
used in scenarios of population growth and migration areas like MCNP.  The native 
animals and crops species that are preserved by family farmers form a rich diversified 
productive resource. Though access to energy (electricity) is low within MCNP-clusters, 
access to alternative sustainable energy sources could enhance their livelihoods. There is 
need for local energy provision like small-scale solar projects and improved cooking 
stoves to improve livelihoods and local food system. 
"Coming together in forest and farm producer organisations can help overcome their 
isolation as well as other very real constraints such as lack of secure forest tenure and 
financial and business development instruments", said FAO Forestry Officer, Jeffrey 
Campbell. "They must compete with large-scale businesses that often receive 
preferential treatment, access to markets, financing and resources" (EC, 2010). Forest 
enterprises and forest users groups can be a viable option in influencing policymakers 
and support at discussion tables while alleviating poverty and improving forest- 
dependent livelihood. Family farmers need to have control over financial resources 
generated by them, but tenure clarification is key to equitable benefit-sharing. The lack 
of access to formal and/or informal credit (especially women) to family farmers can 
exploit and trap them into debt. There is need for family farmers to be organised into 
associations to produce, process and market their products and enhance their ability to 
access credit/funds thereby, reducing individual competition with large scale farmers. 
Lack of farm-to-market roads hinders farmers’ ability to market their surplus production. 
Family farmers, especially women still struggle on narrow path to and from the farms, 
carrying about 35kg of cassava, yams or cocoyams basket on their backs or heads. 
Though increasing market potential of products has resulted from food shortages within 
the park villages, some crops get abandoned in the farms due to lack of transport 
facilities. To avoid this risk, some farmers even sell their crops on the farms, but when 
transformed and safely stored, it makes a huge difference in profit. Demand and supply 
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is the backbone of any economy. Market infrastructures and facilities need to be 
developed. Park villagers are seeking for better access to market and reduce price risk of 
products. Better education/skills, infrastructure and access to market enable agricultural 
strategies that best fit their needs and enhance family farmers’ adaptive capacity to 
climate change. Farmers will be able to deal with bad cropping seasons if they can 
accumulate capital in good times (Walker et al., 2010). 
Large scale projects are mostly operated by outsiders some of whom buy large areas of 
land and restrict access. These factors accompanied by increased use of products by 
outsiders have resulted in food scarcity. Around 1960, chiefs welcome settlers to settle 
in their territory providing labour force in cultivating large area of land, with the scarcity 
of land, migrants are no longer welcome. Migration is due to population growth and 
livelihood challenges (Grimault, 2010) which now attract people to fertile land for 
cultivation. The state might have failed in predicting demographic changes. Population 
growth exerts pressure on communities making food security a priority, so agricultural 
techniques should be enhanced. There is need to check the implementation cost of forest 
conversion aimed at addressing the problems of leakage, by enhancing agricultural yield 
on already existing cropland (Fisher et al., 2011), therefore, innovative technological 
improvement for enhance crops production should be encouraged. There is need for 
improved agricultural skills and technology to enhance production and feed the growing 
population. Communities are seeking more access to forest especially in Buea, for 
harvesting of food products. 
Better skills and knowledge to harvest products and process foods are needed to ensure 
sustainability of family farmers. The Buea community hopes to establish enterprises or 
forest users groups with training on sustainable agro-forestry centred on building of 
sustainable production/harvesting systems that meets the growing demand of products. 
We need to radically shift from the corporate top-down control systems to approaches 
that allow more responsibility and decision-making powers to local farmers, and 
research should be based on specialist and local knowledge which enhance autonomous 
learning and actions which give more transparent oversight (Michel, 2007). A 
combination of indigenous knowledge on agriculture and modern agro-forestry, 
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livestock rearing and fishing techniques have the potential to substantially increase 
productivity on small pieces of land. 
4.4.3 Annual income’s relationship with landholding and labour 
From the regression analysis, size of landholding significantly correlates to participation 
in MCNP-activities (p<.05). Therefore, securing farmland for food cultivation instead 
enhances participation. Family farmers turn to support REDD+ initiatives when there is 
food security and local livelihoods are not impaired. There is need to balance human 
livelihood needs and conservation for sustainability of MCNP-projects. Annual income 
also directly correlates to number of landholding and labour force (household size). For 
conservation to succeed, the livelihood of the local population who depend on natural 
resources should be a main priority in REDD+ strategies. 
This study shows that providing alternatives to climate change like training in animal 
husbandry and jobs in agro-forestry/civil-service will enhance participation in MCNP- 
activities. While cultivation of groundnut, egusi, maize, beans, vegetables, sugar-cane, 
tea and harvesting of kola-nuts enhances participation in MCNP-activities; cultivation of 
cassava, plantains, banana, palms, cocoa and bush-mango harvesting discourage 
involvement in MCNP-activities because they do better in newly established farms. 
Civil-servants, plantation-workers, kola-nuts harvesters and cultivators of vegetables 
and tea have larger size of landholding and more involvement in MCNP-activities while 
civil- servants and cultivators of egusi, maize, vegetables and sugar-cane also earn high 
annual income with significant involvement in MCNP-activities, therefore, these 
activities enhance livelihood as well as engagement in MCNP-activities. 
4.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
Family farming enhances food production, socio-environmental sustainability and 
safeguards livelihood for many communities. Therefore, it plays a significant role in the 
sustainability of the REDD+ initiative which depend on sustainability of crop 
production and should be tackled jointly to avoid shifting cultivation. Forest 
management strategies need to be ecologically sound, socially acceptable, technically 
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feasible and economically viable to improve livelihood and well-being which are all 
geared toward sustainable development. Though the government failed to predict 
demographic pattern during the creation of the National Park, migration trends, 
population growth, restricted access to park, large scale projects and land grabbing may 
lead to expansion of agricultural land in other areas (leakage). 
Increase in market potential of products, population growth and large scale 
infrastructure have significantly influenced agricultural pressure on forest land. 
Therefore, sustainability of crop production should be carefully evaluated before 
carrying out REDD+ activities. Restricted access to large scale project areas and 
extension of state owned plantation and Cameroon Development Cooperation which is 
also giving a one-off financial compensation to forest dwellers, have left family farmers 
with less land for agriculture. There is need to reposition and embed the role of family 
farming into national socio-economic policies by identifying gaps and opportunities to 
enhance equity in development. Knowledge sharing on agricultural techniques as well as 
inclusion of forest users group in forest policies may enhance food production within 
MCNP. Incentives should be given to support family forestry and facilitate networking 
between farm enterprises. Family forest and farm enterprises should have access to 
financial credit to improve agricultural techniques and negotiate fair market prices while 
states should improve farm-to-market roads. 
Food security should be linked to climate change and poverty reduction initiative, such 
as REDD+, because forest and farm products provide basic livelihood for forest 
dwellers and enhance sustainable use of natural resources, allowing family farmers to 
collect, process and market a variety of products. This provides a climate-smart 
alternative to improve the resilience of forest dwellers to climate change while 
decreasing vulnerability of forest dwellers to climate change. Family farmers play a 
significant role in sustainable development because they sustainably use natural 
resources; develop production techniques that are adapted to their limited resources to 
produce enough to feed their families and sell surpluses to cities; provide jobs and 
maintain youth in villages through transportation and wholesales marketing of food 
products to cities; use of environmentally friendly tools with less devastating effect to 
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fauna and flora; deliberately protecting some tree species in home gardens; provide 
social peace by resolving land conflict (since family farms are handed over from one 
generation to another); extend friendly social relationship between families through 
‘Njangi (working in each other farms in turns); and above all support and participate in 
MCNP-REDD+ projects. Sustainable forestry projects like the MCNP conservation 
projects should support ecological, adaptive, bio-diverse, and resilient models of 
agriculture that value family farmers, improve livelihoods and build on local knowledge 
and skills. A holistic approach is required to mitigate and adapt to climate change; and 
critical understanding of the socio-economic relation with forest cover loss and the role 
of family farmers will enhance the fulfilment of REDD+ social safeguards and social 
disconnect in Cameroon. 
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5 Examining forest governance policies and 
regulations enforcement within Mt. Cameroon 
National Park REDD+ projects 
Keywords: Forest legislation, Mount Cameroon, Local communities, Customary Law, 
Social safeguards, REDD+ 
Abstract 
Knowledge of Cameroon’s forest policies regulations and effectiveness of law 
enforcement are necessary to assess local involvement, evaluate effectiveness of 
schemes aiming for reduction in emissions and quantification of carbon stock, but few 
studies have been done to examine the extent to which local communities interact with 
forest legislation. This study identifies how local communities’ level of involvement in 
policy-making affects engagement in MCNP-projects. It further evaluates the 
effectiveness of law enforcement within MCNP and examines the contribution of land-
rights to participation. Cluster multi-stage random sampling was used to collect data 
from 259 respondents that were analysed using Chi-square, Mann-Whitney, t-test, 
ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis, Jonckheere-Terpstra tests and NVivo. Results show that the 
government decides forest policies, but local communities’ engagement in deciding 
policies would enhance local participation in MCNP-activities. There are state rules and 
customary rules regulating exploitation and use of timber and Prunus, which are both 
enforced and respected with requisite permission for exploitation. The memorandum of 
understanding is also respected, except within the West-Coast cluster. Result shows a 
direct correlation between perceptions of enhanced land-rights and participation in 
MCNP-activities. Sustainability of the MCNP-REDD+ projects requires state and 
customary rules/regulations with enhanced governance framework that recognises local 
communities’ rights over land, enhances local capacity to engage in deciding forest 
policies, claims ownership of project and enhances local engagement in conservation 
projects.  
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5.1 Introduction 
“Even if REDD+ doesn’t bring the money, let it bring good governance” (Augustine 
2013). We just cannot talk about rights and effective tenure without governance because 
tenure is conditioned by and relies on it. Supportive policy and institutional systems in 
support of wise forest management without forest use rights may be wasted and so too, 
rights without effective sanctions is insufficient. Securing tenure, traditional rights, 
community access to and control of natural resources are keys to rural poverty reduction. 
Local communities require effective sanction and disempowerment of forest defaulters 
plus ability to develop enterprises and self-determination to be able to defend their rights. 
The old classic conservation strategies favouring ecological and economical dimensions 
have had little social impact on local settlements (Minang & van Noordwijk, 2013) 
because it undermines societal norms, values and cultural differences that might have 
influence on biodiversity of protected areas. While local communities are being blamed 
by government for deforestation, the same government is also accused of establishing a 
top-down policy which depletes the forest. To solve these issues, there is need to merge 
both conservation strategies and policies involving full participation of indigenous 
people, thereby, creating a better tenure security and benefit-sharing amongst all 
stakeholders (Hoang et al., 2013). 
According to Foundjem-Tita et al. (2013), most state policies in Cameroon address agro- 
forestry and tree planting, but strategic legislation that are formulated to enforce policies 
often contradicts poverty reduction goals. The result of their studies showed that some 
conservation measures aimed at protecting forest products from being exploited instead 
discouraged farmers from planting trees. Thus, policies are now working in a zigzag 
manner, especially when the farmers are not responding to legislation with expected 
behaviour, resulting in the government getting unexpected results (Parker et al., 2014). 
The state needs to learn from these issues and re-develop appropriate national REDD+ 
policies and these policies should be adapted to local needs. But linking up local 
information and state data requires state willingness to transform governance with 
enhanced equity and transparency (Sikor et al., 2010; Doherty & Schroeder, 2011). 
REDD+ provides a framework for improved community forest governance, 
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management, livelihood and forest enterprise activities as well as equitable benefit-
sharing to meet communities’ developmental needs. 
According to Enchaw (2011), one of the greatest reasons that indigenous people do not 
participate in sustainable forest management in Cameroon is ‘monism’ of tenure; and 
that mistaken policies are to be blamed for aggravated depletion of forests. Cameroon 
forest have a public utility statute and the present tenure system has eschewed the 
traditional tenure system and failed in recognising land rights and forest resource rights 
of local communities. Additionally conservation framework has not integrated the 
positive traditional tenure system and conservation strategies. Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC) is a human phenomenon, so that non-integration of local communities 
in conservation process dissuades them from participating. 
Although the local communities are paying the price of conservation, international 
institutions, states and NGOs still consider climate change/forest conservation as issues 
that need only technical and regulatory solutions originating outside indigenous peoples 
(Enchaw, 2011). Solutions that bring with them radical and fundamental changes in 
socio-political structure, technology, economic systems and methods of regulations that 
do not always conform to indigenous peoples and local communities. These solutions 
can cause a distortion in the socio-economic structures, cultural and spiritual values in 
the communities, thereby, destroying the harmonious relationship between the 
indigenous people and their forest land or territories. Whereas, it is this same 
relationship that had been helping to conserve, preserve and manage the forest, and 
enhancing carbon stocks before REDD+ programmes were even proposed. According to 
Evely et al. (2011), high level of participation in conservation projects increases 
sustainability and adaptability because they build capacity of participants to learn and 
better manage projects and also stakeholders’ participation in developing policy. 
Implementing them encourages, both ownership and responsibility of environmental 
problems. 
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5.1.1 Legal policy framework 
After the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, which was followed by the development 
of Tropical Action Plans, the integrated forest management model was born which 
became the basis of the Cameroon forest legislation enacted in 1994 (Nguinguiri, 1999). 
The 1994 Forestry Law and the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) laws, regulate 
natural resource management while the 1996 Framework Law on Environmental 
Management, regulates environmental management (WIPO, 2004). The 1998 water law, 
the 1998 tourism law and the 2001 mining code are some specific resource laws 
regulating, both environmental and forestry management while the land tenure law 
governs the national and state lands. Article 45 of the 1996 constitutions stipulates that 
international agreements and ratified treaties shall override any national laws; therefore, 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol amongst other multilateral treaties/agreements 
apply to Cameroon. According to the 1994 Forestry and Wildlife Law, which was 
developed under the auspices of the World Bank, local communities are allowed to 
acquire community forest in non-permanent forest, but this process remains ineffective 
due to little political will to devolve from management by the state, vertical policy 
instrument emanation and top to bottom ruling without FPIC of indigenous people. 
Conservationist used legal flaws to victimise indigenous peoples in justifying demands 
for conservation funds, thereby, alleviating their state of poverty. The outcome of this 
existing law is characterised by vertical and horizontal conflicts (AFDB, 2009; REPAR, 
2009) which aggravated deforestation and divestment of local communities with 
exacerbation of poverty. 
The World Conservation Union defines protected areas (Park or Reserve) as “an area of 
land or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological 
diversity, natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or 
other effective means” (IUCN, 1994). As REDD+ goes to a fast-track implementation 
state in Cameroon, there is doubt as to how the forestry policy framework will 
effectively deal with the drivers of deforestation through total engagement of local 
communities that render REDD+ socio-ecologically successful. Alien social changes 
within local communities that develop as a result of imposed modern laws in 
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biodiversity conservation, prevent full engagement of local communities in the 
management of parks/protected areas. As cited by Ngbo-Ngbangbo et al. (2010), 
protected areas have existed in different forms within different culture as far back as 
pre-agrarian societies and sacred forest existed before in which extractive use of natural 
resources was prohibited. Royalty set aside land for game hunting which served as 
reserve that excluded commoners. The rise of colonialism brought about ecological 
changes which increased the creation of protected areas and conservation activities 
therefore, local communities should be considered in all forest projects where their 
rights to ownership are not infringed. Community rights, social safeguards and equity in 
benefit-sharing from REDD+ incentives should be seen to enhance health, biodiversity 
amongst other co-benefits. 
In Cameroon, logging is allowed outside the reserves or protected areas, and most often, 
taxes are paid to the government by companies that exploit timber. Corruption and 
violation of rules have led to ecological concerns over logging and poaching, and 
indigenous people are left out of the compensation process because they are considered 
as low class in society. The 1994 Forest law states that “The instrument classifying a 
state forest shall take into account the social environment of the local population, who 
shall maintain their logging rights” and section 26(2) entitled local communities to 
compensation if their logging rights are deprived for the interest of the project. As 
pointed out in section 30(2), the classified forest shall have defined boundaries and 
management objectives as well as maintained local communities logging rights. 
Therefore, local logging rights and accessibility to natural resources for livelihood 
should be preserved in any forest type subject to REDD+ activities. 
Based on policy and laws on paper, Cameroon has strong local tenure, but a weak local 
tenure, based on evidence from available literature ‘in practice’ (Sunderlin et al., 2014). 
The institutional establishment of community forest is recognised by the 1994 
Cameroonian forest law, but there is still contradiction between the law and social 
safeguard short-circuiting tenure complexity. There exist dual realities of community 
forestry in Cameroon. A customary reality, where local communities use and manage 
forest resources in their own way within their territory, and state reality, where the state 
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allocates a piece of land to a local community or a group of local communities with 
fixed boundaries legally called ‘community forest’ and is managed by association 
(Common Initiative Group or cooperative) whose creation is voluntary and requires 
registration. The statutory system depends on government laws which are enforced by 
the government, while the customary system is determined by verbal agreement at local 
level that is passed down from generation to generations (Sunderlin et al., 2008). 
Modern law disregards customary systems and it usage in conservation projects often 
imposes social changes on communities and deters them from engaging in conservation 
initiatives. During the demarcation of MCNP boundary in 2010, some farmlands were 
included in the park resulting into villagers claiming land rights. Though the local 
communities recognise the fact that they had no legal rights on reserve forest, they still 
expected some form of compensation from the government. The delegation of the 
Ministry of Forestry and Fauna and the Competent Centre for Climate and Energy (GFA 
Envest) collaborated and focused on law enforcement. 
One of the challenges identified during the National Dialogue on REDD+ Governance 
meeting held in Yaounde, January 2013, was how to build REDD+ on existing laws and 
policies (Costenbader, 2009). It was noted that Cameroon forest laws and policies need 
revision and Cameroon’s Readiness Preparatory Plan proposed to design legislation on 
stakeholder engagement, carbon right and benefit-sharing (Crystal & Lauren, 2011) 
amongst others. The main causes of deforestation and land degradation often lies outside 
the forest sector, therefore, REDD+ national policies and measures are crucial in carbon 
sequestration (Wertz-Kanounnokoff & Kongphan-apirak, 2009). Corruption and 
illegality which are the main motivation behind large scale forest clearance (Alley, 
2011), pose a major threat in implementing REDD+ (Barr, 2011) hence; it is compelling 
to work within local and national scale of governance (Doherty & Schroeder, 2011; 
Sikor et al., 2010). Drawing from present literature, it is evident that REDD+ policies 
and programmes might fail in the absence of adequate tenure incentives to local 
communities. From legal context, REDD+ mechanism will need to consider social 
fairness like community interests and smallholder potential benefits. Nevertheless, there 
is an on-going consultation to revise Cameroon forestry law since 2009. 
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Cameroon policy strategies deliberation has been interested to various actors such as 
WWF and the World Bank. Krajer (2004) argues that governance has finally become a 
key concept in public administration and political sciences with increased scientific 
attention. It entails the formation of institutional structure that establishes environmental 
goals, creates values, defines rules that influence actions, defines processes and finally 
produces policy outcomes that are geared towards resolving environmental issues (Vatn, 
2010). The fundamental elements of governance are the types of actors involved, with 
define capacity, competencies and responsibilities; and institutions which define rules 
that facilitate interactions and coordination between actors (Vatn & Vedeld, 2011). 
Implementation of REDD+ presents many challenges which; even in countries with 
available donor support, better forest policies, laws, regulations and enhanced local 
forest management practices; often need to be resolve through well-coordinated 
partnerships between government, NGOs and local agencies (Burgess et al., 2010). 
Therefore, REDD+ strategies require full collaboration amongst all stakeholders and 
institutions that show interest in enhancing carbon, biodiversity and livelihood (Agrawal 
et al., 2011). Somorin et al. (2014) argue that, though REDD+ actors are polarised 
around priorities and issues, there is still an increase in roles and responsibility 
distribution among themselves which define strategies of engagement, mechanisms for 
expanding coordination, national safeguards standard and how to build on existing forest 
governance. This study examines the REDD+ governance policies, legislation and law 
enforcement strategies to better understand the effectiveness of MCNP-projects in 
mitigating deforestation by: 
 Identifying forest policies makers and how this affects local communities’ 
participation in MCNP-activities; 
  Examining effectiveness of institutional  policies, rules and regulation within 
MCNP; 
 Examining effectiveness of Memorandum of Understanding within MCNP; 
 Investigating contribution of perception of land-rights enhancement on 
participation in MCNP-activities. 
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5.2 Methodology (See 1.6) 
5.3 Results  
5.3.1 Influence of forest policies makers on participation. 
The local communities see the government as having overall decision over forest (Fig. 
5.1a), but participation is highest among forest dwellers who have the perception that 
they are deciding forest policies (Fig. 5.1b). The study found a significant relationship 
between participation in MCNP-activities and the perception that local communities are 
deciding forest policies (χ²=7.298, p=.007). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Percentages of who decides forest policies (a) and how this relates to 
participation (b) in MCNP-activities. 
5.3.2 Rules, regulations, permission and law enforcement within MCNP 
There are both state rules and customary rules regulating the exploitation and use of 
timber and Prunus (Fig. 5.2a), and these rules are both enforced and respected by 
members of the community (Fig. 5.2b). Permission is required for exploitation and 
exploiters need to pay to a forest officer who issues the permit granting exploitation 
rights. There are no customary laws regulating the use of firewood and plantains, nor 
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permission needed to exploit them, but there exist vague government rules regulating 
harvesting of firewood which are neither clearly enforced, nor respected. 
A 
 
B 
 
Figure 5.2: Rules for harvesting most important forest products and permission to 
harvest (a), indicating if rules are enforced or permissions are paid before permit are 
granted (b). 
The memorandum of understanding which is signed between MCNP-villages and park 
services is sometimes violated by local communities’ members. Result shows a 
significant difference in violating the MoU between cluster (χ² (6) =110.825, p<.0001). 
Most respondents in West-Coast know that the MoU has been violated, followed by 
Buea and Bomboko, while no knowledge of violation exists in Muyuka (Fig. 5.3a). 
Result shows that all defaulters had penalty levied on them and executed accordingly. In 
Bomboko, the products were all returned while in Buea most defaulters paid fees (cash). 
In West-Coast, most defaulters’ equipment like engine-saw were confiscated (Fig. 5.3b). 
Amongst those unaware of any defaulters, the main reason why no one has been caught 
in Muyuka, Buea and Bomboko is the absence of defaulters while in West- Coast most 
respondents did not know why defaulters have not been caught (Fig. 5.3c). 
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Figure 5.3: Violation of MoU within clusters (a), sanctions faced by defaulters (b) and 
reasons why no culprit has been caught (for those not aware of defaulters) (c). 
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Despite disparity in penalty levied on defaulters in West-Coast, results shows that 
participants in MCNP-activities are more aware of defaulters and that seizure of 
equipment is the main penalty levied on violators of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(Fig. 5. 4). 
 
Figure 5.4: The nature of penalty between participants and non-participants of MCNP-
activities’ group for the West-Coast cluster. 
5.3.3 Relationship between perception of land-right enhancement and 
participation in MCNP-activities 
A Kruskal-Wallis test shows a significant difference in the perception that MCNP- 
projects will enhance community land rights (H (3) =3.896, p<.0001) as one of the 
reasons why local communities are participating in different clusters (Fig. 5.5a). 
Pairwise comparison shows a significant difference between the following clusters: 
Buea-West-Coast (H=-53.030, p<.0001; r=-.380), Muyuka-West-Coast (H=-43.337, 
p=.001, r=-.309) and Bomboko-West-Coast (H=-37.015, p=.009, r=-.0673). 
Jonckheere-Terpstra test shows a significant trend between cluster (J=13,326, p=.001, 
r=.210) from Buea<Muyuka<Bomboko<West-Coast. 
151 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
Figure 5.5: A Kruskal-Wallis plot showing perception of MCNP enhancing community 
land right between clusters (a), t-test showing relationship with participation in MCNP-
activities in all clusters (b) and within clusters (c). 
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Mann-Whitney U Test shows that participation is significantly affected by perception 
that land rights will be enhanced (U=10,6770, p<.0001) with an effect-size (r) of 45.2% 
in MCNP-clusters. Bomboko registers an effect-size of 63.9%, followed by West-Coast 
(50.3%), Muyuka (41.2%) and Buea (27.4%) (Table 5.2a). 
The t-test shows a significant difference in perception that land-rights will be enhanced 
between non-participants and participants in MCNP-activities’ groups (Table 5.2b). The 
study shows a significant correlation between participation and enhancement of land- 
rights (T=-7.714, df=245, p<.0001) in MCNP-clusters as well as within each cluster 
(p<.05). Significant linear regression relationships in Buea, Muyuka and West-Coast as 
well as in MCNP-clusters, present how perception of land-rights enhancement 
contributes to participation (Table 5.2c). The relationships are explained by the 
following equations:- 
 Overall: P = .585 +.442LR 
 Buea:  P = .841 + .334LR 
 Muyuka: P = .555 + .585LR 
 West-Coast: P = .635 + .342LR 
Where P=Participation and LR= Land-right enhancement 
5.3.4 Qualitative results 
It is evident from the word clouds that, interviewees talked mostly about community, 
park, forest, involvement, activity and management (Fig. 5.6a). Themes established 
from word clouds were; Cameroon forestry law (A), community involvement in Park 
activities (B), national and/or local committee (C), and REDD+ management (D). 
Figure 5.6b and table 5.1 further show the types of comments across different levels of 
stakeholders. 
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Figure 5.6: Word clouds showing most mentioned words from the interview (a) and 
types of comments provided by different levels of stakeholders (b) on governance issues 
around MCNP.  
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5.3.4.1 Cameroon forestry law complexity 
GIZ respondent raises concerns about the complex and unsatisfactory nature of the 
forestry law, and the unfair nature of benefits allocation to local communities, while, 
MINFOF-SWR respondent shows scepticism over adequacy of forest management 
policies. But local communities’ respondents express concerns about restricted forest 
access for livelihood provision. 
GIZ: “The Cameroon forestry law sometimes has not really satisfied the communities. 
The law is so complex and complicated and not feasible in the field. It is not practically 
feasible. So sometimes it does not encourage the people to follow it because it is 
impossible.” 
GIZ: “Villagers keep asking questions: “Am I not allowed cutting down my own tree in 
my farm to build my house?” If you have to cut a tree in your own farm, you have to ask 
the chief of forestry to come and look at the tree and the person is usually 10 villages 
away. So it is not really practical.” 
GIZ: “I sometimes feel sorry for members of local communities because the 
administration is not very fair. It sometimes takes long for them to expect (get) benefits, 
or for something to happen on the side of the government (allocate benefits).” 
Sub-national: “With this 41 villages and a population of more than 100,000, there is no 
appropriate policy that we can put in place for the resources to be well managed.” 
LC: “Before the Mount Cameroon projects, we used to hunt right up to the forest, but 
now the law is restricting us and we need permit from them before we carry out any 
activity on the mountain.” 
5.3.4.2 Community involvement in Park activities 
GIZ blames the community for not taking adequate initiatives to stand up for themselves. 
The local communities argue that, they have been respecting the government while 
outsiders encroached the forest. They also blamed the state for corrupt practices and for 
not giving them rights to intercept violators. 
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GIZ: “They don’t take initiative to do things...” 
LC: “The villagers are also respecting the government, they need a permit to conduct 
any activity in the forest.” 
LC: “We have a programme that teaches us how to manage a forest and we do that 
following the government and local laws.” 
LC: “When people in this village are found guilty of doing any illegal activity in the 
forest, the village heads punish them first then hand them over to the government 
authority. The punishment is usually in the form of fine (money) and anything that has 
been harvested is confiscated. Most of the crime is committed by the youths from 
outside.” 
LC: We are the ones preserving the forest. We caught some boys in the forest and called 
the park services, but when they came, they did not even check anything. The boys gave 
them some money and they allowed the boys to leave, making us look like enemies to the 
boys.” 
LC: “We have asked them to give us the local people the authority to catch violators of 
Memorandum of Understanding, but they refused and said, they themselves will catch 
them. So how will they know when they are not living here?” 
5.3.4.3 National and local committees 
Both the national and sub-national respondents perceive local communities as being 
highly engaged in REDD+ discussions at both national and sub-national levels, but 
description of local delegates’ functions at sub-national level prove that, committee 
members only help to harmonise engagement of local communities in following 
instructions set-out by park-services and report illegal activities. No tangible 
contribution. 
National: “Actually the R-PP has been validated and we have a national committee 
which has been put up by the Prime Minister in which indigenous people are members 
of that committee. It is the ministry and the civil society that are members of the national 
committee.” 
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Sub-national: “According to the law, the members of these committees are eight in each 
village community and they cut across the strata of every community. There are different 
strata with representatives, the president, the representative of the youth and the 
representative of women, the internal and external headlines. Internal headline is the 
chief. All the strata are outlined because they have to give their contributions to the 
management of the park. The committee has been put in place according to the law, and 
to bring them to really participate in the park management activities means we have to 
reorganise them again.” 
Sub-national: “40 out of the 41 villages have a village sanction committee. One village 
because of chieftaincy problem has not been able to put in place its committee. These 
are local committees that are sanctioned by the forestry law. They are supposed to be 
the protocol to harmonise the intervention of the community in management of protected 
area. There is a discretional committee stating the roles and responsibilities of this 
committee. There are about five of them. This committee is supposed to be collecting 
data and elaborating the management plan for the park. They also participate in 
implementing the park management measures that are deemed necessary by the park 
service. They are supposed to participate in patrols to make sure that things are put 
under control, so three of them are supposed to give us information on illegal activities.” 
5.3.4.4 REDD+ management 
GIZ perceives REDD+ as not yet operational, but national respondents hail the 
communities’ involvement in REDD+ design and implementation. 
International: “This has not been implemented in Cameroon to the best of my knowledge. 
REDD+ is still something building up in Cameroon, it has not yet been implemented.” 
National: “REDD+ is a process in which local population have mostly been carrying 
out in Cameroon. It is original. I have never seen a process where the population is so 
involved.” 
National: “REDD+ is not yet an effective idea because all activities of such 
deforestation and degradation are barely basic.” 
National: “There are NGO in Cameroon where local communities are involved in 
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carbon sequestration like CED.” 
National: “There is a national team working on REDD+ and we work together with 
local communities… we organise one meeting after three months, where we talk about 
REDD issues.” 
National: “The big challenge with the REDD+ issue is still at the high level with the 
government and ministries because we have to see how we can improve the involvement 
of the local community.” 
5.4 Discussion 
REDD+ is a multi-level stakeholder governance process requiring specific interest and 
activities that involve many sources of informal and formal powers and authority 
influencing each other to arrive at a desirable outcome. It frames solutions to climate 
change that validate and legitimise certain strategies, stakeholders and solutions while 
marginalising some stakeholders (Thompson et al., 2011). Resource management 
problems are due to failure in governance (Pahl-Wostl, 2009), therefore, the success of 
REDD+ depends on effective governance. Presently, there is no international agreement 
on REDD+ thus, national REDD+ governance is seen as a constellations of informal and 
formal rules, regulations, norms and institutions that are relevant to REDD+ policy. As 
stated by Pahl-Wostl (2009), any governance regime depends on the relative strength of 
both informal and formal institutions. 
Reducing deforestation while simultaneously enhancing socio-economic benefits 
through sustainable forest management is key in forest reforms where forest governance 
is at the centre of forest and environmental policies. Governance challenges like laxity 
in law enforcement, inadequate coordinated governance, lack of transparency and 
participation in decision-making processes all need to be addressed in achieving 
REDD+ goals (William, 2013). Governance initiatives like establishment of community 
forest (decentralisation), Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) and 
forest products certification schemes, are all geared toward enhancing sustainable forest 
management and reducing illegal exploitation (Dkamela, 2011). The Cameroon 
innovative forestry legal framework, such as 1994 Forest Law and 1995 Forest Decree, 
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put her at the forefront of Congo Basin countries in promoting sustainable management 
of natural resources through both conservation and resource production (Somorin et al., 
2014). Cameroon is presently negotiating its REDD+ policy strategies and there is no 
formal law and regulations specified for REDD+. This study is therefore skewed toward 
existing rules, regulations and enforcement to examine their effectiveness within local 
communities. REDD+ policy strategies could build on existing institutions like 
certification schemes, FLEGT, voluntary partnership agreement, community forest and 
forest taxation schemes. 
5.4.1 Forest policies, rules, regulations, permission and law enforcement within 
MCNP 
Lineages have a strong management authority over the forest within their territories 
which do have defined boundaries. Acquisition of land, resource management and 
control are complex combination of family lineage and community rights interferences. 
Local communities claim to have authority over the forest in their jurisdiction, though, 
some do sell their resources at the expense of other members of the community. And 
some individuals do sell timber in their private land without consulting the chiefs. This 
has made the collective resource management through customary reality ineffective and 
mainly dependent on the claimed dynamics of fluid boundaries which may even go 
beyond community forest limits as lineages claiming land rights may even spread in 
several villages (Pierre et al., 2000). Local communities would not likely engage in 
forest projects whose policies are decided by the state alone. This study shows that 
increasing local communities' perception of engaging in decision-making around forest 
policies also enhances their participation/involvement in MCNP-REDD+ projects. 
Land and forest are classified as state property and procedures for registering private 
lands and obtaining land titles have put indigenous people out of the stream (social 
exclusion), whereas, they depend on forest and land for daily livelihood and wellbeing. 
Allocation of forest concession is spelt out in Decree No: 95/531-PM which determines 
conditions of implementation of forestry regulations. In Cameroon, forest concessions 
are granted only to person who reside in Cameroon or big companies with known 
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shareholders and registered offices within the national territories. After a public call for 
tenders, the bidders are pre-selected and classified for consideration with minimum limit 
which is set by the Minister of Forestry (not established in any law) depending on 
envisaged investment, financial, professional and technical capacity. Good performance 
guarantees the success determined by a committee that also takes into accord previous 
contract experience. The successful bidder, after payment of requisite fee into the state 
treasury, signs a provisional exploitation contract with the Minister. Under technical 
control, the concession owner develops all inventories of resources and schedules a five 
year management plan which enables the forestry service to issue a conformity 
certificate specifying the provisional exploitation contract. After this provisional 
contract, the owner can go further to request for a permanent exploitation contract which 
is valid for 15 years, renewable and gradable like any other forest concession contract 
granted by the Prime Minister’s decree. The inter-ministerial committee that grants 
permit allocating harvesting of NTFP on a yearly basis, also discriminates against rural 
dwellers who often lack the resources, but favours financially-fit operators who can 
easily pay for permit and official quotas from selling their forest products; thereby, 
leaving the poor with no other choice than illegal activities (Ndoye & Awono, 2009). 
The process is orientated towards expert knowledge, with time and cost being a bone of 
contention that put local communities out of main streams leading to socio-economic 
exclusion in allocation of permit, which, at the same time enhances illegal exploitation. 
Despite all these, some of the legal provisions that are clear and give access rights and 
ownership rights to local communities are never applied (Springate-Baginski & 
Wollenberg, 2010), thus, rendering the implementation of the 1994 Forestry and 
Wildlife Law difficult. Despite the lacunas, contradictions and omissions in the law, 
some provisions are still good, but lacked adequate enforcement and inadequate benefit-
sharing mechanism (REPAR, 2009). Even when the state has the political will to act, 
external influence like the World Bank still frustrates its ambitions, for example, the 
1994 Forestry and Wildlife Law has a lot of incoherence with the new Forestry Policy of 
1995, but effort to mitigate the situation by adopting the Environmental code in 1996 
could not be fruitful because of the conditionality given by its funding body the World 
Bank, therefore, weakening its bargaining power. The state therefore had no other way, 
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but to adopt legal instrument heavily laden with lacunas, incomprehensive clauses and 
full of contradictions with the interest and aspiration of local communities which does 
not suit climate change mitigation through forestry (Ngwasiri, 2000; Nguiffo & 
Djeukam, 2008). 
In Cameroon, lack of clarity of ownership, overlapping claims, conflict between 
customary and state rights, weak law enforcement among others, have led to securing 
rights for dominating actors, elite capture and imposition of fines on members of local 
communities for deforestation which are caused by outsiders (Larson et al., 2013). This 
study shows strong law enforcement within MCNP-clusters where penalties are imposed 
on defaulters within local communities, but defaulters from outside communities go 
free. Timber harvesting in Cameroon is very profitable and meet-up with domestic 
demands at a competitive price, but also increases informal logging. One of the major 
concerns in Cameroon is illegal logging and practices from the issuance of fake 
concession permits to illegal exportation of timber which are always not in conformity 
to legal annual exploitation limit. With the establishment of Resource Extraction 
Monitoring Unit, which is aimed at monitoring forest exploitation activities in 
Cameroon, cases of illegal logging are now quarterly publicised with small proportion 
of purgative fines paid, which are often negotiated down to 70-80% of original amount 
(Dkamela, 2011). While defaulters of West-Coast had their equipment sized (most 
defaulters were outsiders), cash-fee were paid in Buea (salaried and rich cluster) and 
defaulters in Bomboko (poorest cluster) returned products to the village head (Fig. 
5.3b). This disparity in penalties tallies with the fact that penalties are negotiable 
depending on socio-economic setting. 
The MCNP-REDD+ initiative helps avoid further encroachment and does rehabilitate 
degraded forest areas, thereby, preserving biodiversity and increasing carbon stock. The 
MCNP-REDD+ initiative is established within a permanent (reserve) forest domain 
which is legally owned by the state. It is aimed at replacing forest conversion through 
conservation, by avoiding encroachment and increasing the carbon stock through forest 
rehabilitation. At the local community level are government actors, local communities 
claiming rights over land, immigrants who are attracted by fertile soil for agriculture, 
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and outsiders from neighbouring villages. Village agreements have been reached 
through participatory meetings and villagers who have invested in protected areas are 
advised to seek alternatives elsewhere. The local communities demarcated boundaries of 
the park, and are gradually participating in the MCNP-projects, though predominantly 
on reporting illegal activities. The high awareness of defaulters in the West-Coast 
cluster tallies with the high rate of immigrants and outsiders harvesting forest products 
in the West-Coast cluster. Respondents who were not aware of defaulters were asked to 
give reasons why there is no apprehension of defaulters. While most respondents in 
Bomboko, Buea and Muyuka responded that there has not been any culprit, more 
respondents in West-Coast said they did not know. This implies that, it is not because 
they have not been any culprit, but they did not know why the defaulters are not being 
caught, therefore, validating the results that the MoU has been violated in West-Coast 
by outsiders, immigrants or indigenes. 
Indigenes complaint that forest policies does not grant rights or authority to catch or 
penalise defaulters from outside communities. Once outside defaulters are identified, 
they can only be reported to the park service which lies some 35km away and by the 
time the forest guards are sent to get the culprit, perpetrators must have exploited the 
forest and transported their goods away. This has left local communities frustrated and 
powerless to enforce law. Sensitisation and awareness are needed to educate and build 
capacity of forest dwellers to engage in decision-making during policy reforms in 
sustainable resource management, otherwise, they may likely resist REDD+ projects, 
fearing that their land rights could be violated, and thereby, threatening local agricultural 
practices, cultural values and traditional lifestyles and livelihoods. Currently, Cameroon 
is designing rules for informal engagement through stakeholder’s platforms; a rule-
making system to govern national REDD+ strategy; that would hopefully structure 
engagement of all stakeholders (especially local actors) with various interest and roles 
across different aspects of REDD+ (Somorin et al., 2014). 
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5.4.2 Perception of community land-rights 
Clear resource rights enhance sustainable usage of forest resources and also empower 
forest dwellers with legal authority to stop outsiders from illegal forest exploitation 
(Lawlor et al., 2010). While the indigenous people are observing government decision to 
transform their land, the immigrants and outsiders challenge this decision and are 
encroaching into the land for agricultural activities and exploitation of forest products 
resulting to conflict. The outsiders claim that only the state has rights to evict 
encroachers and stop illegal exploitation, but members of local communities think it is 
their rights to protect their land, though, legally the park belongs to the state and its 
policies are decided by the state. Securing local communities land-rights directly relates 
to participation in conservation initiatives. 
5.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
In Cameroon, a feasible effective REDD+ policy is desirable. The Cameroon 
government stakeholders need to involve the public in knowledge sharing, enhancing 
collaboration, networking, building on traditional experiences and moving towards 
national REDD+ strategy. Though they may confront challenges like inadequate 
institutional capacity, enforcement and monitoring systems. While Cameroon is still 
developing institutional framework, REDD+ planning process should integrate local 
institution and build local capacity to carry out REDD+ task. REDD+ has helped in 
generating increased political will and financial support to address socio-economic and 
institutional concerns that are contributing to deforestation. The customary law and land 
ownership should be recognised to facilitate lineage access to land. A Legal Act 
recognising local communities’ right over land with a legal title may serve as land rights 
(property rights) certificate which can be used during conflict resolution as evidence of 
land ownership. Procedures for acquiring land certificate should also be simplified and 
the imposed taxes rate should be drastically reduced. This law should protect the interest 
of local communities and officials involve in corrupt practices during this procedure 
should be sanctioned and/or suspended alongside with those violating the rights of local 
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communities. Facilitating community land title procedure for local communities will 
enable them to secure space for their own generation and communities’ activities. 
Cameroon is currently designing a stakeholders’ platform focusing on governance, 
benefit-sharing, effective communication, rights, capacity building, MVR, education, 
research, and national safeguard standards, that structure local engagement access to 
forest resources and tenure arrangement under REDD+. This policy strategy accentuates 
both informal and formal norms that are regulative in nature and constraining all 
stakeholders’ activities. Cameroon has recognised the need for compatibility of present 
forest laws and policies with REDD+ and these forest laws and policies are undergoing 
reforms. Desirable outcomes require state rules and regulations with enhance legal and 
institutional framework. Mount Cameroon conservation initiative has successfully 
moved into a REDD+ projects, but customary tenure reforms need to be incorporated 
into the structure of REDD+ governance. 
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6 Effective communication as a tool for enhancing 
local participation in Mt. Cameroon National Park 
Keywords: Participation, Social safeguards, Awareness, Cameroon, Forest 
conservation, Deforestation 
Abstract: - For forest projects to be effective, they need to fit the dynamic of local 
socio-economic systems, agro-forestry livelihoods and be sensitive to land use 
constraints. Deforestation and land degradation have been blamed for instigating 
inappropriate agro-forestry methods, but few studies have identified the factors that 
determine forest dwellers’ awareness of or attitude towards agro-forestry. The decision 
to get involved in forestry projects is determined by communities’ attitude, which in turn, 
is shaped by information received from within and outside the local community. This 
study examines how communication can be used to enhance local community 
participation for effective, efficient and equity in REDD+ projects around Mount 
Cameroon National Park (MCNP). Cluster multi-stage random sampling was used to 
collect data from 259 respondents that were analysed using Chi-square, Mann-Whitney, 
t-test, Kruskal-Wallis, Jonckheere-Terpstra tests and NVivo. This study shows that the 
level of local participation in MCNP-REDD+ projects directly relates to frequency of 
information received, level of education and perception of being able to protect forest. 
The perception from the community of having the ability to protect the forest also 
directly correlates to frequency of information. Although tribal meetings is the medium 
most used (and preferred), public hearings are also preferred because they include 
settlers. Planned and continuous communication are recommended to trigger local 
communities to change their attitudes, opinions, behaviours, perceptions and enhance 
appropriate actions and collective participation for effectiveness, efficiency and equity 
in REDD+ projects. Awareness and appreciation can encourage full engagement in 
natural resource management, and participation in local community forestry has been 
recognised as a means of strengthening communities. 
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6.1 Introduction and background 
Communication is a process by which people interact to create, maintain and manage 
meaning (Conrad & Poole, 2011). Colin Fraser & Jonathan Vill (1995) quote “The 
planned use of communication techniques, activities and media give people powerful 
tools both to experience change and actually to guide it. An intensified exchange of 
ideas among all sectors of society can lead to the greater involvement of people in a 
common course. This is a fundamental requirement for appropriate and sustainable 
development” (Servaes & Patchanee, 2008). Participation and communication are two 
sides of a coin (Ramirez & Quarry, 2004), but effective communication may also be 
considered as a switch-on point for full and effective participation in natural resource 
management (Figure 6.1). 
 
Figure 6.1: Effective communication as a switch-on point for full and effective 
participation in natural resource management. 
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In tropical countries, deforestation and land degradation account for almost 25% of the 
total greenhouse gas emissions and about 80% of deforestation is believed to be as a 
result of smallholder slash-and-burn agriculture and fire-wood harvesting 
(Ngendakumana et al., 2013), though these are seen as secondary effects of timber 
exploitation which degrades forest leading to decline in biodiversity. This makes 
members of local communities to be at the centre of debate, as human activities are 
central to deforestation and land degradation debates, thereby, making communication 
inevitable. 
Since the inception of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and land Degradation plus 
conservation and sustainable resource management (REDD+) in 2005 at the eleventh 
Conference of Parties in Montreal (UNFCCC, 2005), one of the main challenges has 
been how to develop strategies to enhance community rights, actors’ consents, collective 
participation and implementation (Ngendakumana et al., 2013). The full and effective 
engagement of relevant stakeholders has become a requirement for REDD+ under the 
Cancun agreements (Lang, 2010) following the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP-
16) in 2010. The Cancun agreement also calls for recognition of indigenous knowledge, 
respect of rights of indigenous people and local stakeholders (UN-REDD, 2009). This 
implementation included obligations, social and environmental safeguards needed by 
parties to comply with, such as, respect for human rights, addressing issues related to 
land tenure, forest governance, and stakeholders’ engagement with effective 
involvement of women and local stakeholders, and all these cannot be achieved without 
effective communication. 
“REDD+ readiness planning activities in Cameroon, including activities involving the 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), lack effective actions to ensure the 
participation of indigenous peoples and local communities” (Freudenthal et al., 2011) 
“lack transparency, meaningful participation or Free Prior Informed Concern (FPIC) 
and disregard issues of land tenure, customary rights and benefit sharing” (The 
REDDDesk, 2013). Social safeguards, effective participation and stakeholders 
engagement with civil society and local communities during the design, implementation 
and monitoring of forest projects linked with natural resource management can be 
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realised through effective communication. Effective communication is vital for 
knowledge and information transfer which are essential for the public to respond to 
challenges of climate change. However, useful information and knowledge depend on 
clarity in communication - without misunderstanding and ambiguities (Manda, 2007). 
It is argued that cultural and forest management strategies of local communities are not 
readily accommodated in conventional resource management planning because of 
inadequate communication, and consultation among forest managers and local 
communities (Stevenson & Webb, 2003). Büscher & Dressler (2007) also argue that 
inadequate human socio-economic and socio-political institutions meant to shape human 
behaviours have led to failure in achieving sustainable natural resource management 
objectives. Park villages rely on proponents for REDD+ information and the key 
challenges for local REDD+ projects include communication to villages on how REDD+ 
projects works, opportunities and risks, rights and responsibility as well as engagement 
of local communities in the design and implementation of REDD+ projects 
(Resosudarmo et al., 2012). 
“If you want development to be rooted in the human beings who have to become the 
agents of it as well as beneficiaries, then you have got to communicate with them… if 
you don’t do that you will continue to have weak and failing development programmes” 
(Erskine, 2004). Despite many approaches used to improve participation on forestry 
projects in developing countries, the impact of effective communication systems, skills 
and media to attain project objectives, have seldom been critically evaluated and lack of 
participation has been linked to failure to communicate with local communities (Crider 
& Anaya, 1996). Public participation is essential in conservation because it is the only 
way through which local stakeholders voices can be heard in the process (Costenbader, 
2009; Sama & Tawah, 2009). The 1992 Rio Declaration (Principle-10) states that access 
to environmental information, participating in decision-making and access to justice are 
vital to natural resource management (UN Doc, 1992). 
To ensure effective, efficient and equity in REDD+, there is need for collaborative 
decision-making between forest managers and local communities (Wells et al., 2004) 
like adaptive collaborative management (Colfer, 2010), co-management and community 
172 
based natural resource management models (Cox et al., 2010). These models stress on 
full participation and engagement within and between communities from the design, 
implementation, monitoring, evaluating and decision-making phases, thereby, enabling 
communities to invest, engage and support projects within local communities (Boissiere 
et al., 2009). A bottom-up approach will ensure that the needs and concerns of 
communities are addressed, understood and looked into (Blom et al., 2010). Free Prior-
Informed Concern (FPIC) has become a popular standard in ensuring community 
participation and engagement (Colchester & Ferrari, 2009). Awareness and appreciation 
encourage collective participation in forest management and participation in community 
forestry has been recognised as a means of strengthening communities (Curry, 2001). 
Developing strategies for maintaining social safeguards like community rights and FPIC 
in land use policy has been one of the major challenges of REDD+ and interaction of 
property rights and carbon rights could interact to create additional complexity because 
it requires more clarity and procedural justice (Galudra et al., 2011). 
In Yaounde, during the 2013 National Dialogue on REDD+ Governance meeting, one of 
the major challenges identified was how to strengthen a two-way information flow as 
part of the REDD+ process. Transparency and access to information in Cameroon is 
well documented (Forest Transparency, 2012) showing poor legal rights to FPIC. It was 
noted that during the development of the R-PP, efforts to share information were neither 
well organised, nor tailored to target audiences. For this reason, the government of 
Cameroon is now developing communication strategies to address this challenges (FCPF, 
2013) such as establishment of community radio programmes to facilitate 
communication on REDD+ (Ngalame, 2013). Information centres have also been 
created to enable local stakeholders access information about REDD+ process, forest 
and land use issues such as forest use contracts, revenue owed to government (Morrison 
et al., 2009) and projects with socio-environmental impact (Federic, 2012) have been 
proposed. According to William (2013), the civil society stakeholders agree on what 
needs to be improved with less clarification on how to do it. 
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6.1.1 Communication theory 
Communication theory simply provides a complex understanding of the communication 
process (Miller, 2014) that moves far from description of an event to providing ways 
through which all those events can be understood, therefore, it is a systematic summary 
of a communication process (Fig. 6.2). Environmental communication scholarship on 
the public participation process is essential in linking knowledge to action. Competence 
in communication is achieved by successfully balancing effectiveness and 
appropriateness in communication. Effectiveness is the extent of achieving your 
objectives in an interaction while appropriateness depends on fulfilling social 
expectations for a particular situation. For example, if local communities are promised 
developmental projects (like roads, electricity and schools) on condition that they sign 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with park managers and no developmental 
project are carried out after signing the MoU; the communication decision is effective, 
but how appropriate is this deceit? Therefore, a competent communicator should be both 
effective and appropriate for environmental legitimacy, whose concept depends on 
communities’ beliefs and perceptions. Legitimacy is a social assessment (appraisal of 
acceptance) of appropriate and desired outcomes (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). 
Credibility plays a crucial role in managing impression and the credibility of the 
message perceived depends on the “perceptions of source competence, of actual or 
expected bias behaviour and the characteristics of the message itself” (Aerts & Cormier, 
2009). This study considers the practical theories of communication which describe the 
context in which individuals operate, rather than, the universal law as in nomothetic 
theory. 
6.1.2 Practical theory of communication 
The practical theory of communication is a system of connected ideas that allow 
individual to reason and reflect through situation and make informed decisions about 
appropriate actions to take. It captures differences among situations and provides a set of 
understanding that allows people into weighing alternative courses of action to achieve 
their objectives. It is aimed at improving life in a concrete way by accomplishing goals 
in various ways. Actions are voluntary from knowledge created socially in a given era or 
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cultural setting, to affect the reality of the situation (Littlejohn & Foss, 2010). In 
practical theory, problems and challenges, techniques and strategies, and consequence of 
practice are identified. It provides opportunity to reflect on issue of concern/challenges 
and the principles that have been employed by competent communicators in different 
scenarios. It recommends new constructive ways of interpreting different situation that 
helps in transforming old patterns and creating novel understanding and appropriate 
actions that are more effective. 
The practical theory of communication assumes that people take active role in creating 
knowledge, so perception and interpretation processes are very important because 
individual are goal-directed agents creating meanings, building intentions, making 
choices, and acting deliberately in different situation. It is value conscious showing how 
people interpret and act in different socio-cultural setting - a more evaluating theory that 
makes judgment about common cultural understanding and actions. Its concept of 
coordination holds that people respond differently in different situations and the words 
and actions used to express understanding also differ with time. So these concepts are 
used as an organising framework to classify communities’ interpretation and actions in 
forest projects. Practical theories enable members of community to understand what is 
happening so as to reflect, make choices to address problems/challenges and act 
appropriately. Its principles are guided by reflection and action enabling communicators 
to build a tentative, revisable and needed normative framework which is relevant to 
practical situation (Craig & Tracy, 1995). Practical theories become more powerful 
when it enables competent communicators to address problems/obstacles by using 
general principles, ideas, and values to reflect on actual practice. Its characteristics 
include comprehensiveness, inclusiveness, appropriateness, validity, parsimony and 
openness to other possibilities. 
Competent communicators follow social norms to enable community’s members to 
think through the situation and select appropriate actions. Therefore, a competent 
communicator needs to define goals and state how stakeholders can achieve them; know 
how to communicate to achieve those goals; and define the principles used in reflecting 
and making decision on what actions to take. Practical theory, therefore, enables 
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stakeholders to focus on real situation at hand, explores the uniqueness of the issue of 
concern, considers the strength and limitation of possible actions, takes actions that 
achieve outcomes as well as improves livelihood, learns from actual experiences and 
helps in managing new challenges. 
6.1.3 Communication process 
Communication may be compare to a type of symbolic action, which is our language or 
other methods used to convey purpose and meaning that affect our inner consciousness, 
shape or change our perceptions and motivate appropriate actions (Fig. 6.2); thereby, our 
beliefs and behaviours towards nature are mediated on or are influenced by what is 
communicated, and the public sphere finally emerges to form a discursive space where 
competing voices engage us on environmental issues (Littlejohn & Foss, 2010). 
Environmental communication is a pragmatic (educate, persuade, alerts and addresses 
issues of concern) and constitutive vehicle (create consciousness, shapes perception, and 
evokes appropriate action) for understanding the environment as well as relationship 
between human and environment; a medium in constructing environmental problems as 
well as addressing or negotiating communities’ different response to them (Lindenfeld et 
al., 2012). 
In every communication, a message (shapes, words, smell, symbols, loudness, actions, 
movement or colour) is being passed on through a medium (telephone, radio, books, 
television, posters and newspapers), from the communicator to the receiver, who 
interprets it and responds to it, positively or negatively, depending on his/her culture and 
environment (Fig. 6.2). Communication can promote or disrupt progress depending on 
what, when, how, why and to whom you communicate. There is need for concise, 
conventional and clear communication because what is said, or written, is modified by 
beliefs and personality, and the message reception depends on the audience. The purpose 
and audiences are very important in every communication process because 
communication is stimulated by several motivations, and no matter how hard you try to 
give a clear message, the complete interpretation and understanding rest more on your 
audience. The extent, to which words/ideas reach the audience with the same meaning 
intended by the sender, constitutes clarity in communication (Davis et al., 2013). 
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Figure 6.2: Communication process and observable effects for appropriate action within 
MCNP 
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Communication also depends on an individual personality which is often shaped by 
his/her environment and culture. Anything being communicated goes out from the 
sender into a social context and can be clarified into a meaningful message or led into 
confusion. So what is being communicated is modified by beliefs and individual 
personality and its reception depends on the audience and other elements in the semantic 
environment in which the message is being delivered. Thus, the culture, life style, belief, 
societal values and environment of the indigenous people must be considered in any 
REDD+ activities at all levels, if REDD+ is not to be considered as a sort of socio-
economic marginalisation. This study seeks to; 
 Identify the media used in information dissemination within MCNP; 
 Assess the level of knowledge and perception on local communities on 
environment, climate change and forest issues; 
 Examine how frequency of information received impacts participation; 
 Assess how perception of being able to protect forest influence participation; 
 Examine the influence of education on participation; and 
 Examine the relationship between frequency of information receive and 
perception of being able to protect the forest. 
6.2 Methodology (See 1.6) 
6.3 Results 
Only 1.9% of respondents have heard of REDD+ and only 1.5% know its objectives. 
Result shows that participation significantly correlates with having heard of REDD+ 
(τ=.133, p=.032), and knowledge of REDD+’s objective (τ=.132, p=.033). Having heard 
of REDD+ also strongly correlates to knowledge of REDD+ objectives τ= .998, 95% 
BCa CI (.997 - 1.00), p<.0001 (Table 6.2). 
6.3.1 Frequency of information, media used and most preferred medium 
Figure 6.3a shows that 48% of respondents receive information quarterly, followed by 
monthly (26%), yearly (16%) and weekly (2%) while 8% of respondents do not get any 
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information. Tribal meeting is mostly used (42.0%), second by public hearing (22.2%), 
then focus group discussion (18.1%) (Fig. 6.3b). Though the most preferred media used 
is within a tribal meeting (38.6%), there is a shift of preference in receiving information 
to public hearing as shown by an increase of +12%. 
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Figure 6.3: Percentages of frequency of information (a), media used and most preferred 
medium (b) within MCNP-villages. 
Results show a direct relationship between frequency of information received and active 
participation in MCNP activities χ²(4)=39.276, p<.0001, as well as within each cluster 
(Fig. 6.4). 
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Figure 6.4: Relationship between participation and frequency of information received 
within MCNP (a) and within each cluster (b). 
6.3.2 Capacity building - knowledge, education and training 
Respondents disagree on felling down trees and burning bushes; slightly disagree on the 
use of fertilizer, but slightly agree on decreasing traffic as ways to achieve pollution-free 
air (Fig. 6.5a). Though respondents agree to limit emissions, plant trees and compost 
manure, they strongly agree on participatory action in achieving pollution-free air. 
Figure 6.5b shows a strong agreement of forest as maintaining fertility, worth protecting 
and on agreement on forest as a source of rain and supplementation of income. 
Respondents disagree on forest usage for mining, but agree on forest as a source for 
wood, hard wood, agriculture, medicine, bush meat, edible, fuelwood and fibres.
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Figure 6.5: The knowledge of local people on achieving pollution-free air (a) and forest 
perceptions and usage (b) within MCNP. 
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Level of education also showed a direct relationship with involvement in MCNP 
activities χ²(4)=29.355, p<.0001 (Fig. 6.6). 
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Figure 6.6: Relationship between participation and level of education in MCNP (a) and 
within each cluster (b). 
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6.3.3 Perceptions towards forest 
Figure 6.7 shows respondents perception toward forest as declining within the past five 
years; the decline affecting livelihood; forest dwellers having the ability to protect 
forest; sustainable forest management, payment for ecosystem services, conservation 
and MCNP as being necessary to sustain forest, but a slight agreement of forest 
management system having the potentials to resolve conflict. 
 
Figure 6.7: A Kruskal-Wallis plot showing variance in forest perception within clusters 
especially in local ability to protect forest. 
A Kruskal-Wallis test shows a significant difference between clusters for perception of 
‘local people have the ability to protect forest’ (Fig. 6.8a), and this significantly relates 
to participation χ²(6)=31.217, p<.0001 (Fig. 6.8b) in MCNP and within each cluster (Fig. 
6.8c). 
4 5 6 7
Forest  decline past 5yrs
Livelihood  affected by decline
Local people can protect forest
SFM  sustains  forest
PES  sustains forest
Strict  zone improve  conservation
SFM solves conflict
MCNP  sustains  forest
West-Coast Muyuka Buea Bomboko Overall
1-Strongly disagree Strongly agree
183 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
Figure 6.8: A Kruskal-Wallis plot showing variance of perception within clusters (a), t-
test showing direct-relationship between participation and perception of local ability to 
protect forest in MCNP (b) and within each cluster (c).  
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Test of normality shows p-values<.05 and the variance are unequal (p-values<.005). 
Mann- Whitney U tests show that participation is significantly affected by level of 
education (U=93870, p=.001, r=.33), perception of having the ability to protect forest 
(U=10532, p<.0001, r=.088) and frequency of information (U=10734, p<.0001, r=.362) 
(Table 6.3a). The study found a significant correlation between participation and 
education (T=-4.169, df=130.45, p=.001), perception to protect forest (T=-5.984, 
df=256.04, p<.0001) and frequency of information received (T=-7.016, df=223.22, 
p<.0001) (Table 6.3b). A significant linear regression (Table 6.3c,) presents how 
frequency of information (A) and perception of local ability to protect forest (B) 
contribute to participation and it is explained by the equations: 
Overall:  P=.522 + .306(A) + .192(B) 
Where P=participation, A=Frequency of information and B=Ability to protect forest 
Mann-Whitney U test shows that participation in Bomboko is only significantly affected 
by frequency of information (U=603, p=.002, r=.190) and the t-test shows T=- 3.117, 
df=4, p=.003. In Buea, Muyuka and West-Coast, both Mann-Whitney test and t-test 
show significant correlations between participation and frequency of information, 
perception of having the ability to protect forest and level of education. Summary of 
results are found in table 6.4. Significant linear regression models (Table 6.5) show how 
frequency of information received (A), perception of local ability to protect forest (B) 
and level of education (C) contribute to participation within clusters and they are 
explained by the following significant linear regression equations: 
 Bomboko: P=.656 + .363(A) 
 Buea:  P=.716 + .225(A) +.252(B) 
 Muyuka:  P=.591 + .276(A) 
 West-Coast: P=.661 + .189(A) + .098(C) 
Where P=Participation; A=Frequency of information received; B=Perception of local 
ability to protect forest; and C=Level of education. 
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6.3.4 Influence of frequency of information on perception 
Perception of local ability to protect forest significantly relates to frequency of 
information received χ²(24)=68.699, p<.0001 in MCNP (Fig. 6.9a), and within each 
cluster (Fig. 6.9b).The perception of having the ability to protect forest is also 
significantly different between different clusters H(3)=14.5, p=.002 and a follow-up 
pairwise-comparison shows a significant difference between Buea and Bomboko 
(H=46.95, p=.001) with a medium size effect of 33%. The perception of having the 
ability to protect the forest also significantly relates to the frequency of information 
received (H(4)=37.33, p<.0001), and the trend shows an effect size of 35% (from never 
< yearly < monthly < quarterly < weekly). A pairwise-comparison shows medium effect 
sizes on never-quarterly (40%), yearly-monthly (34%), yearly-weekly (48%) and large 
effect sizes on never-monthly (55%) and never-weekly (89%). Within Bomboko a 
significant relationship occurs at H(3)=11.34, p=.01 and the trend has an effect size of 
34%; Significant pairwise-comparison occurs at never-quarterly (43%), never-monthly 
(75%). In Buea and Muyuka, the relationships are significant at H(4)=11.00, p=.027 and 
H(4)=10.04, p=.040 respectively, with both trends having effect sizes of 33% and 44%. 
In West-Coast the relationship was also significant at H(4)=14.25, p=.007, the trend 
(J=1419.5, p<.0001, r=.423) has effect size of 42.3%. A Significant pairwise comparison 
occurs at never-monthly with a large effect size of 52%. Summary of results are found in 
table 6.6.
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Figure 6.9: Kruskal-Wallis plots revealing direct-relationship between perception of 
local ability to protect forest and frequency of information received within MCNP (a) 
and each cluster (b). 
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The significant linear regression models (Table 6.7) show how perception of local ability 
to protect forest (Perception) relates to frequency of information (A) received on forest 
issues within each cluster and these are explained by the following significant linear 
regression equations: 
 Overall:  Perception=3.902 + .363(A.) 
 Bomboko: Perception=5.174 + .425(A) 
 Buea:  Perception=2.411 + .402(A) 
 Muyuka: Perception=1.951 + .485(A 
 West-Coast):  Perception=4.992 + .426(A) 
Where A= Frequency of information received. 
The model has a fit of 16.3% (overall), 16.8% (Bomboko), 14.9% (Buea), 21.9% 
(Muyuka), and 17.1% (West-Coast) respectively. 
6.3.5 Qualitative results 
Result shows that respondents talked mostly about forest, sensitisation, village and 
understanding (Fig. 6.10a), from where one major theme was established as village 
community sensitisation/knowledge on forest conservation issues (A). Figure 6.10b and 
table 6.1 further show the types of comments across different levels of stakeholders. 
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Figure 6.10: Word clouds showing most mentioned words from the interview (a) and 
types of comments provided by different levels of stakeholders (b) on communication 
issues around MCNP. 
6.3.5.1 Village community sensitisation/knowledge on forest conservation issue 
GIZ respondent argues that illiteracy does not impede sensitisation within local 
communities though understanding of the Cameroon forestry law is lacking, but seeks 
continuous sensitisation to improve awareness. 
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GIZ: “I wouldn’t say lack of education is a stumbling block to the sensitisation issue 
because most of them are aware that the forest is necessary, but they lack alternative... 
Buea-cluster is quite educated…” 
GIZ: “There is not much understanding of the Cameroon forestry laws in the 
communities. We are trying to sensitise the community…” 
GIZ: “For the last 20 years, there has been continuous sensitisation about conservation 
of the forest areas…They may know more things, but putting it into practice is another 
thing.” 
GIZ: “It took them so many meetings to understand the concepts of conservation credit 
and bonuses. So we need a continuous sensitisation process. Talking about carbon stock 
and carbon related issues, I think it will take a long time to sensitise the community to 
make them aware to a level that they can really participate in this” 
National respondents help clarify the level of engagement of local communities in 
consultations and capacity building, but hold to the perception that lack of education is a 
hindrance to REDD+ understanding at local settings. 
National: “During the R-PP preparation, we ran a lot of consultation with local 
communities to know what they think about REDD+ and what they think they can obtain 
from REDD+.” 
National: “CED and IUCN are local NGO who have already organised local capacity 
building on REDD+.” 
National: “To the best of my knowledge I don’t think local communities have enough 
knowledge about REDD+ issue. All these issues are very complex issues to them 
because they are not so much educated.” 
MINFOF-respondent perceives the villagers as having more information about 
conservation since they have been sending park servicers to sensitise local communities 
through meetings, brochures, and even radio, but no assessment has yet been done to 
assess their level of awareness, and lack of education is blamed for inadequate REDD+ 
knowledge within communities, which contradicts GIZ’s perception. 
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Sub-national: “The Park was created in 2009 and this strategy (conservation 
development agreement) was put in place in 2012. So we are still in the process of 
building the foundation and letting people know about the concept. We are using various 
methods like the sensitisation meeting and brochures. These are the things we use to 
reach the community with our message, so that even if you are not a member of the 
cluster platform, or village committee, you can still have a copy of the brochure to read 
about our objectives and other information about us. We are also using radio.” 
Sub-national: “If you meet a normal villager he will have the least information about the 
conservation.” 
Sub-national: “We send park services to sensitise local communities but we have not yet 
gone there to assess the level of information they have acquired on conservation issues.” 
Sub-national: “To the best of my knowledge I don’t think they have enough knowledge 
about REDD+ issue. All these issues are very complex issues to them because they are 
not so much educated… the local community still finds it difficult to understand.” 
MOCAP-respondent thinks that while sensitisation and training has been provided, 
communities’ members preferred working on their cocoa farms than attending meetings. 
Local-group: “When we call for general assembly meeting, some of the chiefs are inform 
before time. We send the village committee to sensitise them on what MOCAP is doing, 
we explain to them about co-benefits.” 
Local-group: “We sensitised and invited all the villages for a meeting and only few 
came, they complain that this is cocoa season and they don’t have time.” 
Local-group: “MOCAP trains the youths of this area for job opportunities (Prunus 
harvesting).” 
Despite the fact that local communities have learnt a lot about conservation, they are not 
still employed because of lack of secondary school certificate which is a call of concern. 
LC: “We have a programme that teaches us how to manage a forest…” 
LC: “We have learnt a lot about forest preservation.” 
LC: “The people whom the park service employed to work in the forest because they 
have G.C.E ordinary level certificate stand a risk because they do not know the forest.” 
191 
6.4 Discussion 
Participation and leadership of local communities is vital in co-management of MCNP 
because co-management requires a shift from telling people what to do or information 
exchange to an effective and efficient participatory approach that emphasises on groups’ 
interaction (Ramirez & Quarry, 2004) and cannot be achieved without effective 
communication. It is very important to mobilise indigenous people and local 
communities’ members to fully participate in forestry projects, but they can only be 
mobilised when communication is effective enough to stimulate collaboration. 
Following the Preamble of Cameroon’s Constitution, it is mandatory for all citizens to 
protect the environment, and law N° 2003/006 of 21 April states that FPIC is a 
prerequisite to carrying-out ecosystem services. The 1996 Cameroon Framework Law 
on Environmental Management (WIPO, 1996) establishes the rights to public 
participation, access to justice, access to environmental information and capacity 
building (Fig. 6.1) (Njamshi et al., 2008). 
 Access to information is vital in decision-making because it provides the public 
with information and knowledge, generating evidence to make better choices 
about contentious issues; 
 Public engagement enables people to express their views, challenge decisions 
and better design strategies that could hamper communication and development; 
 Access to justice enables community members to seek claims when their right to 
access natural resources are denied, or if they encounter any environmental 
damage; 
 Building capacity is essential because state agencies, civil society and local 
communities need specific knowledge, technical skills and personal abilities to 
enable them access public information, get fully engaged and seek for justice 
(Kiss et al., 2006). 
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6.4.1 Access to information 
Effective communication is a feasible tool to raise awareness, change attitude and 
behaviour, and bring appropriate action for effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ 
projects. In the REDD+ world, communication of information is a currency and a source 
of power (Angelsen et al., 2012). Though, tribal meeting is the most preferred medium, 
public hearing has an increment of +12% in preference because it includes settlers who 
are also members of the community. Participation in MCNP projects directly correlates 
to frequency of information received. All respondents needed more information, they are 
eager to learn, understand and appreciate the conservation projects. 
6.4.2 Capacity building 
In 2007, UNFCCC COP-13 called upon parties and international organisations to 
promote REDD by investing in building capacity and demonstration activities (Cerbu et 
al., 2011). Capacity building of communities helps secure the benefits of REDD+ as 
well as address its risk, therefore, providing cost-effective REDD+ projects with 
sustainable co-benefit. Local communities have good knowledge of forest and climate 
issues as well as knowledge to acquire pollution-free air and the various uses of forest. 
Their perception towards forest conservation supports the idea that local communities 
have been good conservator for centuries. Participation significantly relates to the 
perception of having the ability to protect the forest. Therefore, the perception of  “yes, 
we can” is a powerful tool in enhancing engagement. 
6.4.3 Access to justice 
Protecting the rights of local communities in a REDD+ mechanism is a major area of 
contention in the REDD+ negotiations (Lyster, 2011). One of the main rights applicable 
to REDD+ is the right to FPIC which allows communities to participate in or reject 
decisions that affect them. UNDRIP states that, any relocation requires FPIC of local 
communities concerned and after agreement on fair compensation “States shall consult 
and cooperate in good faith with indigenous peoples concerned through their own 
representative institutions in order to obtain FPIC to approve any project affecting their 
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lands or territories and other resources” (Wiessner & Historical, 2009). Compliance 
mechanism and enforcement of these rights depend on the level of recognition of these 
rights within Cameroon judicial recourse and measures in place. According to 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) convention 169,  “Governments shall have the 
responsibility for developing, with the participation of the peoples concerned and 
coordinates a systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples and to guarantee 
respect for their integrity” (Swepston, 1990). Local communities are left out in 
meaningful participation in MCNP because of illiteracy, inadequate information and low 
political standing within the country’s power structure. If all Parties were signatory of 
the UNDRIP, difficult negotiation might be avoided by referring to such human right 
instruments (Angelsen et al., 2009). 
6.5 Conclusions and recommendations  
A well informed public is crucial for sustainable development. Building capacity, 
stakeholder engagement and rights of indigenous people cannot be achieved without 
effective and appropriate communication because they create public awareness for 
appropriate actions. All actions that are impacting the environment come from 
individual. Government with the best forest projects cannot impose it upon locals who 
neither understand, nor appreciate its importance. Also reluctant government will try to 
engage in good forest management practices when its people demand it insistently. 
Effective communication, therefore, remains a tool that can solve climate change issues 
if carried out effectively. Participation directly correlates to frequency of information 
received, level of education and perception of being able to protect forest while 
perception of having the ability to protect forest also correlates to frequency of 
information received. Effective communication is a tool which can transform people 
from individual centred deficit model of learning, behavioural change to a collective and 
community-focused model of participation, appreciation and equity. Only 1.9% of park 
villagers have heard of REDD+ because proponents want to avoid raising hopes 
unnecessarily, but there is need to avoid asymmetries of knowledge from leading to 
paternalistic modes of management. To facilitate a more people-centred approach in 
mitigating and adapting to climate change, planned continuous communication is needed 
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to facilitate full and effective engagement of local stakeholders in project planning, 
implementation and monitoring. Figure 6.11 may be used as reference point to improve 
communities’ participation through planned and continuous communication. 
 
Figure 6.11: Proposed steps for effective planned communication to enhanced 
communities’ participation in natural resource management with number 1 being the 
starting point. 
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Access to information should be adequate and timely in a language and manner 
understood by local communities. Access to information such as forestry codes and laws 
should be made available in local languages and outreach of applicable management 
regulations be enhanced. Forest managers and community leaders should endeavour to 
engage in clear communication using processes and channels that empower women and 
make them own land. Using the term ‘Mother Earth’ or ‘Our Forest’ gives people the 
urge to claim ownership and fully engage in forest projects. When members of local 
community are involved in communication strategies, it enables them to take ownership 
of natural resource management projects, rather than being mere beneficiaries of the 
projects. Therefore, park managers should engage in clear and effective communication 
to enhance participation of local communities in natural resource management. 
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7 Quantifying local communities’ voices in the 
decision-making process: from Mt. Cameroon 
National Park REDD+ Projects 
Keywords: Appropriate communication, Local consultation, Trinity of voice, 
Environmental legitimacy, Social safeguard 
Abstract 
One key component in developing local communities’ sustainability is the ability to 
negotiate and make contentious environmental decisions. However, few studies evaluate 
the influential role played by local communities during the consultation and decision- 
making process. This study examines the communities’ voices during consultation and 
decision-making process to evaluate its appropriateness for contributing and enhancing 
environmental legitimacy. Cluster multi-stage random sampling was used to collect data 
from 259 respondents around Mount Cameroon National Park (MCNP) which were 
analysed using Chi-square, Mann-Whitney, t-test, Kruskal-Wallis, Jonckheere-Terpstra 
tests and NVivo. Results show that the level of local participation in MCNP-REDD+ 
projects directly relates to both standing and influence accorded to delegates of local 
communities during consultation and decision-making processes. The study reveals a 
direct correlation between level of standing accorded to local stakeholder and ability to 
influence decisions. Although park managers understood local communities’ concerns, 
these concerns are not being addressed. Local communities’ delegates are accorded 
access, but they are neither accorded standing at the decision-making process nor the 
ability to influence REDD+ design within MCNP. Standing and influence accorded to 
all stakeholders must be adequately balanced for equity and ethical considerations as 
well as to generate sustainability and environmental legitimacy of forest projects. 
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7.1 Introduction and background 
The cultural and natural resource management norms of local communities are not 
readily accommodated in conventional resource management planning because of lack 
of appropriate communication and meaningful consultation between regional forest 
managers and local communities (Stevenson & Webb, 2003). Stakeholder engagement 
and social safeguards are essential elements for the success scheme of natural resource 
management. One of the requirements of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
land Degradation, conservation and enhancement of carbon stock (REDD+) under the 
Cancun agreements is full engagement of relevant stakeholders (Lang, 2010). Local 
participation at the national and sub-national levels ensures effective communication, 
dialogue and sharing of information and knowledge among the private, public and civil 
society to better comprehend the needs, capacities and expectations for good governance 
(Robledo et al., 2008). Berkes et al. (2009) argue that, for conservation actions to 
succeed, active negotiation framework must be developed and geared towards 
sustainable resource management. Therefore, there is need for collaborative decision-
making between park managers and local communities (Wells et al., 2004) for 
sustainability of the MCNP project. 
In 2008, during the Global Indigenous Peoples Consultation on REDD, communities’ 
challenges on participation in REDD+ were identified such as lack of traditional 
knowledge and structure for decision-making; recognition of indigenous identity; right 
to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC); indigenous representation and cultural 
process in decision-making; recognition of women and potentials to contribute to 
REDD+ (UN-REDD, 2008). Some challenges included exclusion from REDD+ 
activities or eviction, exploitative carbon contract with unfair benefits to communities, 
inadequate information and elite capture in REDD+ benefits (Lawlor & Huberman, 
2009). In this regard, the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention N° 169 (ILO, 1989; Swepston, 1990) and the United Nation 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007) shall act as a 
reference legal framework. 
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According to Freudenthal (2011), local communities in Cameroon are often excluded 
from participating in forest decision-making process, no rights with little or no support 
from national institution. During the 2013 National Dialogue on REDD+ Governance 
meeting held in Yaounde, one of the challenges identified was how to encourage active 
community engagement in the REDD+ process (Cecile & Augustine, 2012), particularly 
for local communities and women. It was noted that past effort to involve local 
communities did not consider their traditional needs, build interpersonal trust nor 
involve legitimate representation that are chosen by the local communities themselves. It 
was agreed that methods of communication, mode of representation and capacity for 
engaging members of local communities should be improved. With the reported risks of 
conflict in Cameroon between local communities and management authorities, there is 
need to support safeguards that reduce risks of conflict over natural resources in all 
negotiation mechanism (Lyster, 2011; Cotula & Mayers, 2009). 
Community based natural resource management (Cox et al., 2010) and co-management 
models are practise within MCNP and require full engagement of all stakeholders from 
the design, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and decision-making. State 
legislation on participation contributes to good governance and empowers the vulnerable 
local communities (Bond, 2009). As stated by Costenbader (2009); “National legal 
provisions on participation in the forest sector should be created, or strengthened and 
adapted to ensure transparent and informed decision-making, build partnerships, 
facilitate law enforcement, and prevent conflicts and corruption in relation to REDD+.” 
REDD+ donors and civil society stakeholders have emphasised the need for full and 
effective engagement of relevant stakeholders - particularly forest communities in 
REDD+ planning and implementation (Williams, 2013). 
The Mount Cameroon Nation Park conservation initiative is one of the four pilots 
REDD+ projects in Cameroon along with Takamanda National Park, the Korup National 
Park and the Dja Biosphere Regional REDD+ projects (Sama & Tawah, 2009). In 2006, 
the Forest Governance Facility (FGF) was created by the Ministry of Forestry and Fauna 
in partnership with the Department for International Development and the Netherlands 
Development Organisation in Cameroon. In order to enhance stakeholders’ engagement, 
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the FGF, and the Forest and Environmental Sector Programme work together to 
facilitate the active involvement of private and local stakeholders in developing and 
implementing government policies in the forestry sector (The REDDDesk, 2013). Planet 
Survey took over the function of FGF in 2009, as it was required that this function be 
transferred to a national civil organisation after two years (Dkamela, 2011). 
Presently, a National REDD+ Committee, comprising various ministries  and 
stakeholders involved in implementing a national REDD+ strategy has been formed and 
acts as a point of contact between the government and the organisations like the German 
International Cooperation that establishes dialogue and discussions with local 
stakeholders within the MCNP-REDD+ projects. Structural clarification of the REDD+ 
process in Cameroon is carried out by the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). 
Three challenges in REDD+ stakeholders’ process have been identified to be insufficient 
engagement of indigenous peoples, lack of emphasis on incorporating stakeholder 
feedback and poor access to information (Williams, 2013). 
Cameroon Readiness Plan Ideal Note (R-PIN) which was submitted to FCPF in July 
2008 (Cameroon R-PIN, 2008), did not indicate the extent to which meaningful 
participation occurs in practice and local communities engagement is oriented towards 
exchange of information rather than active participation and is largely driven by NGOs 
(Davis et al., 2009). Local communities especially women are mostly not involved in 
decision-making, consultation and participation in REDD+ (Othman et al., 2003). One 
of the external reviews from Cameroon’s R-PIN was the request of effective 
consultation with state and forest sectors stakeholders like hunter-gatherers, community 
forest managers and local communities. In January 2013, FCPF approved $3.6 million to 
fund Cameroon’s Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) (FCPF, 2013). Cameroon is 
now challenged with delivering its R-PP’s commitments. Cameroon’s R-PP proposes to 
develop legislations which include stakeholders’ consultation, transparency, 
inclusiveness, and engagement of indigenous peoples, forest dwellers and women. 
Strategies for achieving these commitments included multi-stakeholder platform, 
procedures for Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) of affected communities and 
feedback mechanism for stakeholders input (Cameroon R-PP, 2012). There is need to 
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ensure engagement of local stakeholders and a two-way dialogue on REDD+ strategy 
development. 
“A public sphere is the realm of influence that is created when individuals engage others 
in communication through conversation, debate, or questioning of subjects of shared 
concern” (Cox, 2012). REDD+ decision-making has triggered competing demands from 
specific experts (scientific/technical), decision-making by government bodies and 
demands inclusion of local communities, and this might flashpoint competing 
perspective escalating to conflict. The Trinity of Voice Theory holds that the key to 
communication process is an ongoing relationship of mutual trust which enhances 
communities’ cohesiveness and capacity, and results in good environmental decisions 
and the practice of access, standing and influence is necessary to build and maintain 
mutual trust and relationship (Depoe et al., 2004). Access refers to sufficient and 
appropriate opportunity to express your opinion or make a choice. Standing refers to the 
civil legitimacy, esteem, respect for all stakeholders’ opinions or perspectives. To 
achieve influence, access and standing must be mutually dependent. Sen (1999) argues 
that, the freedom to have a say (voice), make choices and take appropriate action is an 
end of, as well as a means that is geared towards sustainable development. 
This study examines the communication structures, negotiation and decision-making 
processes and how these affect environmental legitimacy of MCNP-REDD+ projects. It 
examines whether local communities are accorded standing at decision-making process 
to influence contentious decisions. The results are used to access how standing accorded 
to local communities correlates to participation/engagement in MCNP activities and also 
with the ability to influence contentious forest decisions. 
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7.2 Methodology (See 1.6) 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Legitimacy in consultation and decision-making process 
Figure 7.1 shows that respondents agreed on the use of simple sentences, that meetings 
are easy to get involved, there is provision of accurate information, explanations of 
decisions and sensitisation before projects. But respondents slightly agreed that their 
concerns were being understood by proponents and that they were deciding projects. 
Even though park service managers understood their concerns, their opinion did not 
count at discussion-table and they are not influencing final decisions. Bomboko registers 
the lowest degree of agreement for both ‘standing’ and ‘influence’ as well as 
participation in MCNP activities (25.8%) compare with Buea (32.4%), West-Coast 
(39.5%) and Muyuka (42.9%). 
 
Figure 7.1: Mean-score of effective and appropriate communication conditions that 
enhances environmental legitimacy in forest projects. 
2 3 4 5 6 7
Use of simple sentences
Easy to get involved
Accurate information
Explains decisions
Respond to our concerns
Understand our concern
Our opinion counts
Sensitize before  project
We decide projects
Final decision is ours
West-Coast Muyuka Buea Bomboko Overall
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
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7.3.2 The influence of standing on participating in MCNP activities 
Perception of standing is significantly higher for those that participated (Mdn=5) than 
those who did not participate (Mdn=4) (Fig. 7.2a) as well as within each cluster (Fig. 
7.2b). The study shows a significant relationship between participation and standing 
accorded to local stakeholders χ²(6)=17.521, p=.008. Spearman r=.172, p=.005. 
A 
 
B 
 
Figure 7.2: T-test plots showing comparison of standing between participants and non-
participants in MCNP-activities groups (a) and within each cluster (b). 
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Perception of standing is not normally distributed (p-values<.05) except within West- 
Coast (Table 7.2). The variance are generally unequal (p<05), but roughly equal within 
all clusters (p>.05), hence, we use non-parametric test. A Mann-Whitney U test shows 
that participation in MCNP activities is significantly affected by standing accorded at 
decision-making process with a medium effect (p<.001, r=.22) as well as in Buea (p<.05, 
r=.37). Results show a non-significant relation with a small effect size in Bomboko 
(p>.05, r=.18), Muyuka (p>.05, r=-.031) and West-Coast (p>.05, r=.071). The t-test 
shows a significant difference in standing between the non-participants and participants 
in MCNP activity groups (Table 7.2). The study reveals a significant correlation 
between standing (predictor) and participation in MCNP (T=-3.278, df=196.93, p<.001, 
95% BCa:{-.782, -.236}) as well as in Buea (T=-3.278, df=64, p<.005, 95% BCa   CI:{-
1.755, -.426}). 
A regression model analysis  (Table 7.3) to investigate how standing correlates with 
participation, shows an overall direct correlation between participation (P) and standing 
(S) accorded to local stakeholders in MCNP as well as in Buea and they are explained 
by the following significant regression equations:- 
 Overall: P=1.021 + .195(S) 
 Buea:   P=.701 + .374(S) 
Where P=Participation; and S=Standing accorded to local stakeholders at decision 
making process 
The overall model shows that participation will increase by a factor of .195 at every one 
unit increment in standing. The regression model has a small fit of 3.8% degree of 
accuracy and the overall model is significant at F=10.15, p=.002. In the Buea cluster, 
participation will increase by a factor of .374 with a unit increase in perception of 
standing. The regression model has a small fit of 12.7% and the relationship is 
significant at F=10.74, p<.002. A summary of results is found in table 7.3. 
Test of normality shows p-values<.05, therefore, perception of standing is not normally 
distributed though equal variance are assumed (p-values>.05). Therefore, we use non- 
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parametric Kruskal-Wallis test for four independent samples. Kruskal-Wallis test shows 
that, standing is significantly affected by belonging to a particular cluster H(3)=21.288, 
p=0.00. Further pairwise comparison with adjusted p-value shows a significant  
difference between standing accorded to members of Bomboko cluster compare to West-
Coast (p=0.12, r=-.257), Muyuka (p=.028, r=-.264), and Buea (p<.0001, r=-.388). Result 
reveals a non-significant difference in standing accorded to West-Coast compare to 
Muyuka (p=1, r=.007) and Buea (p=.753, r=.126). Study also shows a non-significant 
difference in standing between Muyuka and Buea (p=1, r=.119). Jonckheere-Terpstra 
trend test reveals a significant trend in the data from Bomboko, West-Coast, Muyuka 
and Buea with an effect size of 0.145 (J=14008, z=2.340, p=.019 and r=.145). Summary 
of result is found in table 7.4. 
7.3.3 The influence of standing on ability to influence contentious decision 
The study shows that the ability to influence contentious decision significantly relates to 
the level of standing accorded to local stakeholders (Fig. 7.3) at χ²(6)=114.772, p<.0001. 
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A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
Figure 7.3: Direct-relationship between standing and influence in all clusters (a); and 
Jonckheere-Terpstra tests in standing (b) and influence (c) within clusters. 
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To further investigate the influence of standing on perception of influencing decisions 
within different clusters, a Kruskal-Wallis test and trends (table 7.5) as well as 
regression analysis was conducted and summary of results are shown in table 7.6. 
Test of normality shows p-values<.05 and the variance are not significantly different 
across clusters p-values>.05. Kruskal-Wallis test shows that ‘influence’ is significantly 
affected by being in a particular cluster (H(3)=25.8, p=.00) Further pairwise-comparison 
with adjusted p-value shows a significant difference between influence accorded to 
members of Bomboko cluster compare to West-Coast (p=.001, r=-.311), Muyuka 
(p<.0001, r=-.379), and Buea (p<.0001, r=-.384). Result shows a non-significant 
difference in influence accorded to West-Coast compare to Muyuka (p=1, r=.07) and 
Buea (p=1, r=.072). Finally there was a non-significant difference recorded in influence, 
between Muyuka and Buea p=1, r=.001). 
Trends: Jonckheere’s test reveals a significant trend in the data from Bomboko, West-
Coast, Muyuka and Buea with an effect size of 24% (J=14630, z=3.29, p=.001 and 
r=.24). Significant models showing direct correlation between standing (S) and influence 
(I) accorded to local communities as well as in Muyuka and West-Coast cluster are 
explained by the following significant linear regression equations: 
 Overall:  I=1.088 +.432(S) 
 Buea:  I=1.178 + .453(S) 
 West-Coast: I=.505 + .541(S) 
Where I=Influence at decision making process; and S=Standing accorded at decision 
making process 
The overall model shows that the perception of influence will increase by a factor 
of .423 at every one unit increment in perception of standing. The regression has 18.6% 
degree of accuracy and the overall model is significant at F=58.91, p<.0001. In Buea 
influence will increase by a factor of .453 with a unit increase in perception of standing. 
The regression model has a small fit of 19.3% and the relationship was significant at F 
=17.03, p<.001. In the West-Coast, the regression has a medium fit of 28.3% and the 
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relationship is also significant at F=30.65, p<.001. The study shows that influence will 
increase by a factor of .541 with a unit increment in standing (Table 7.6). 
7.3.4 Qualitative results 
From the word clouds, interviewees talked mainly about cluster, platform, park, village 
and conservation (Fig. 7.4a), from where two themes were deduced: park/village 
conservation development agreement (A) and activities at cluster platform meetings (B). 
Figure 7.4b and table 7.1 further show the types of comments across different levels of 
stakeholders. 
A 
 
B 
 
Figure 7.4: Word clouds showing most mentioned words from the interview (a) and 
types of comments provided by different levels of stakeholders (b) on standing and 
influence at decision-making process within MCNP.  
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
International - GIZ
Sub-national - MINFOF-SWR
Local communities
Positive comments Mixed information Negative comments
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7.3.4.1 Village conservation development agreement 
GIZ elaborated the involvement of local communities during negotiation. Together with 
MINFOF-SWR, they further explained the importance of the conservation development 
agreement in defining roles and responsibility within MCNP. 
 GIZ: “The park service itself is working with the 41 communities and what they are 
doing is that they are trying to implement the ‘conservation development agreement… 
They will be negotiating conservation development agreement with the communities 
where they will look at roles and responsibilities of the park service management and 
local communities. And they write this in a document called the conservation 
development agreement which then will be signed from both sides.” 
Sub-national: “The document of conservation development agreement segregates the 
activities of the conservation and defines also the responsibilities in the park...” 
7.3.4.2 Activities at cluster platform meetings 
Though sub-national respondents said they were not imposing on local communities, all 
five local communities’ respondents hold firmly that the park managers are imposing 
and not taking their contribution into consideration. There is evidence to show that the 
cluster platform meetings is mainly an explanation session rather than a negotiation 
forum, where local committee report activities done within the last six months including 
report of any illegal activity, and are assigned  the next six months task. 
Sub-national: “We do not just impose, that is why a preliminary study was needed so 
that they can appreciate what is being done to them. We realise that if the community 
are not well informed about the activities of the park management, there are going to be 
suspicious and we will not be able to assess them well in decision-making. So the 
platform meeting holds once every six months to present what we have achieved in the 
last six months and what will be done in the next six months. We have the opportunity in 
this meeting to get report of the different activities, the main findings, observations as 
far as park management is concern. We also use this as a sensitisation platform where 
we explain to the conservation members the approach we are using to work sustainably, 
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that they have to abide to the forestry law that have to do with conservation activities 
inside the park or outside the park. So it is such a wonderful exchange.” 
Sub-national: “In each of these villages we have the village sanction committee, three 
members are elected ….one must be a woman. The village committee meet up now in a 
higher level called the cluster platform. … It is in this cluster platform that the park 
service is able to present the activities to participate in the next six months. They (local 
delegates) choose the people who are going to work in this activity and they are 
actually paid. The village committee send three members each to present what have 
been done.” 
Sub-national: “It (Cluster platform) is such an interesting forum because … the park has 
been able to contract a cluster facilitator who can read, write and we are building his 
capacity in what he is doing. It is his responsibility to animate the village committee 
and the cluster platform. We have meetings at the end of every six months where these 
cluster facilitators are participating and they give us reports of everything and illegal 
activities.” 
Sub-national: “The cluster platform is where we sensitise them about the plans. We 
have a cluster facilitator who understands English and the local language very well so 
that he can communicate with us and the villagers effectively. Most of the people at the 
cluster platform are educated to a certain level so when we make presentations even in 
pidgin, we expect them to go and explain to the villagers in the village meeting in a 
language that is best understood by them. But we don’t leave the task only to the cluster 
facilitator or members of the cluster platform that is why we organise meetings with 
village heads who are not part of the cluster platform and we explain to them in an 
easier way because the knowledge about park management and conservation varies with 
the level of education of the people …, but members of the cluster platform have more 
knowledge than those at the village meetings.” 
Sub-national: “The park collaboration management unit can show you some reports, but 
they cannot give you everything like that because there is a lot of information in the 
reports.” 
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LC-Respondent: “They ask us to form forest committees and they tell us what to do. 
They sometimes impose, like when they propose an idea and we argue against it, they 
don’t listen to us.” 
LC-respondent: “When they write or say anything, they expect us to just follow without 
arguing and that is not correct.” 
LC-respondent: “They cannot better preserve the forest without the help of the 
indigenous people. We want to join hands and work with them, but they should not 
impose on us again.” 
LC-respondent: “We suggested that we should catch people who are doing illegal 
activities in the forest, but they refused that we should only report to them. But when we 
see such illegal activities and report to them, before they reach at the scene the person 
committing the act has escaped. So you see that they are imposing and it is not helping.” 
7.3.5 Communication and negotiation processes 
The cluster-platform is the information hub between park managers and park villages 
(Fig. 7.5). It is a medium for planning, implementation and evaluation of co- 
management and development issues. Three members of each village are represented at 
the cluster-platform and one of them must be a woman. These members are elected from 
the Village Forest Management Council (VFMC) (Fig. 7.6), which each village is 
obliged to have. 
The cluster facilitator facilitates the communication between park service, the villages 
and the cluster-platform (Fig. 7.6). He/she builds and maintains a trust-worthy 
relationship within his/her cluster. The cluster facilitator reports on latest developments 
concerning the management activities (work-plan, records), agreement and illegal 
activities. Together with park service, s/he organised the cluster platform meetings 
proposed two months in advance. The agenda is discussed with the park service and 
village suggestions are collected during regular village meetings. 
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Figure 7.5: Structure of communication in the co-management of MCNP 
 
Figure 7.6: A schematic representation at cluster platform showing the role played by 
the cluster facilitator in coordinating and facilitating information-flow within and 
outside each cluster. 
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Negotiation and signing of CDA (Fig. 7.7a) are carried out by relevant stakeholders on 
park and three village delegates. It is signed by a conservator and a chief who is seldom 
educated enough to make sound decision. The CDA defines roles and responsibility and 
states incentives for collaboration. The park service together with the conservation 
partners proposed a six months work plan for each cluster (Fig. 7.7b). The Collaborative 
Management Activities (CMA) proposed by park managers is discussed, complimented 
and adopted by the members of the cluster. These activities are performance-based 
rewarded and include boundary tracing, reporting illegal activities and encroachment, 
and sustainable harvesting of NTFP. 
A 
 
B
 
Figure 7.7: The conservation development agreement elaboration process (a) and 
negotiation process (b) for collaborative management activities in MCNP. 
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7.4 Discussion 
According to Preskett et al. (2008), effective substantial dialogue with local 
communities is essential in determining equity, effectiveness and efficiency of projects. 
One of the key components in local communities’ sustainability relies on its ability to 
negotiate and make contentious environmental decision. The 1996 Cameroon 
Framework Law on Environmental Management (WIPO, 2006) (art. 7) states that “All 
persons shall have the right to be informed on the negative effects of harmful activities 
on health and the environment as well as the measures taken to prevent or compensate 
these effects” while art. 9(e) emphasis on “the right of every citizen to have access to 
environmental information” and further requires that “decisions on the environment 
shall be taken after consultation with the sector of activity or groups concerned, or after 
a public debate when they are of general nature.” The 1994 Forestry Law emphasises 
on public engagement especially within local community forest with involvement of the 
government, private sectors, communities and forest dwellers. This study shows that full 
engagement of local communities is lacking due to lack of standing and influence 
accorded to local communities at consultation and decision-making process within 
MCNP conservation projects. 
7.4.1 Access to information 
In communication process, interpersonal trust is defined as “reliance upon the 
communication of another person in order to achieve a desired but uncertain objective 
in a risky situation” (Giffin, 1967). Griffin argues that it depends on the listener’s 
perceptions of a speaker’s expertise, activeness, intentions, reliability, personal qualities 
and perception of the listener’s association. A message might not achieve its objective if 
interpersonal trust is lacking. In MCNP, information is provided in simple 
understandable language which is easy to get involved. Villages have access to 
information, but there is doubt if members of local stakeholders adequately understand 
this information prior to decision-making. The low level of literacy is also a contribution 
to lack of adequate understanding, capacity and skills to debate and decide on 
contentious issues. There is sensitisation before projects and proponents do explain 
decisions of projects. But local stakeholders should have been involved in suggesting the 
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projects rather than proponents providing them with different projects and allowing them 
only to prioritise them. However, they are accorded access at cluster-platform. The 
cluster facilitator may have been doing a good job. 
7.4.2 Consultations, negotiation and decision-making process 
The aim of effective communication is to empower local communities with information 
so they can engage in the decision-making process. It is very important to mobilise local 
communities to fully participate in forestry projects, but they can only be mobilised 
when communication is effective enough to stimulate collaboration. Local communities 
are at the centre of forest discussion and communication is important for their 
mobilisation, decision-making and action, awareness-raising, sharing knowledge, 
changing attitudes, behaviours and lifestyles. Local communities involved in MCNP- 
REDD+ projects should be influencing project design and implementation through 
effective consultation during the cluster platform meeting held every six months. If 
communities are not accorded standing, how then can they influence projects? The lack 
of standing accorded to local community voices at cluster platforms renders the 
decision-making process illegitimate and inappropriate. 
Co-management of MCNP entails full participation of local communities that are also 
co-managers with park service workers. As reported by the German International 
Cooperation, the co-management and communication structure (Fig. 7.5) is constructed 
to:- 
 Enable availability of full information on the values, needs and consent related to 
forest, create a sense of ownership among participating stakeholders and 
facilitate law enforcement (Christy et al., 2007); 
 Increase accountability, legitimacy and credibility of public authority (Shelton, 
2009) and probably minimising corruption; 
 Facilitate institutional cooperation, provide opportunities for exchange of 
information and idea before final decisions are made; 
  Create a climate of mutual trust and understanding among participating 
stakeholders that enhance effective collaboration and co-management 
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 Raise awareness and build capacity of stakeholders to improve sustainable 
management of forest; and 
 Identify existing land uses and facilitate mutual agreement attainment between 
park villages thereby, preventing or resolving conflict. 
The study found out that this is practically not working because local stakeholder’s 
voices are, neither taking into account, nor are influencing decisions. Inappropriate 
communication process may lead to lack of mutual trust and conflict.  
Local stakeholders are provided access to negotiate, but are denied real standing and 
influence. While the park service have had access and standing on issues beforehand, 
local stakeholders are not players until they are invited to be part of meeting sessions. 
Their comments and opinions are recorded, but the big question is: to what degree were 
their opinion honoured, considered and reflected upon? Respondents do not agree that 
their concerns are being addressed, nor their opinions count at decision-making process 
(no standing). Though they decide what projects they want, final decisions do not 
depend on their opinion (no influence). The small decision time and lack of adequate 
forest education for local communities, coupled with the fact that most decisions have 
already been taken before meeting sessions; which is much of explaining decision with 
activities schedule; deprive local communities the right to influence decisions. 
7.4.3 Access to justice 
In 2007, the United Nation Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 
was adopted by the UN general assembly, recognising the collective right to self-
determination of local communities. The right to have a say and influence your own 
future is known as the right to self-determination. UNDRIP states: “Indigenous peoples 
have the right to self-determination. Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in 
decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives 
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain 
and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.” (Culotta et al., 2011). 
In MCNP, community concerns are poorly addressed; though they decide which projects 
220 
they want, the final decision does not lie on their opinion, thereby, revealing a trace of 
marginalisation. 
Within local communities, access is easier to provide, but standing is often trickier. 
When local delegates are elected to represent the community, and given the opportunity 
to comment at cluster platform, they exercise a practice of access. Allocating access to 
decision-making process and denying standing means delegates are technically being 
denied access. The disparity between expectations and real experiences might make 
delegates sceptical, distrustful and angry (Cox, 2012). Without legitimacy in standing 
there is little expectation of influencing outcomes. Similarly, community members with 
standing who have no access to meetings where their standing may be recognised still 
have little expectation of influencing any outcome. Denied access and/or standing lead 
to no influence in decision outcomes, and therefore, is considered as an act of injustice. 
Though social conflict is sometimes necessary to challenge social assumption, raises 
awareness and brings about social change, however, when local conflict occurs, the 
anger and scepticism persist far beyond a lawsuit with long lasting effect that remain in 
communities and further erode the fragile confidence or trust with elected officials 
causing civic disengagement (Depoe et al., 2004). A participatory decision-making 
process builds communities’ ability to engage in a productive ways that enhance their 
experiences, relationships and sustainability. As of now, only amicable resolution and 
mediation by cluster facilitators and park managers have been used, there has been no 
case of arbitration or court judgment. Respondents agreed that forest management 
system helps to solve forest conflict. 
7.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
Effective participation enables meaningful influence of all relevant rights holder and 
stakeholders especially local communities’ members who are interested in the process, 
and includes access to information, consultation, participation in decision-making and 
projects implementation (CCBA, 2013). The study reveals a direct correlation between 
participation and standing, and also standing and influence accorded at consultation and 
decision-making processes within MCNP projects. Delegates have access to cluster 
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platforms, but are neither accorded standing, nor influencing decision-making. Therefore, 
local communities are not influencing MCNP REDD+ design. This is evident of a top- 
down management approach which does not fit into the context of co-management. 
 The trinity of voice during consultation and decision making process encourages local 
communities’ engagement. Consultations should be timely and effectively conducted 
with relevant stakeholders. Participation should be appropriate with feedback procedure. 
Standing and influence accorded to all stakeholders must be adequately balanced to 
ensure equity, ethics, sustainability and environmental legitimacy of MCNP 
conservation projects. 
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8 Examining benefits-sharing mechanism within Mt. 
Cameroon National Park REDD+ projects 
Keywords: Payment for ecosystems services, socio-economic expectations, Social 
safeguards, Local communities, Forest conservation, Cameroon 
Abstract: 
Local communities perceive REDD+ as having the potential to conserve forest, generate 
income, develop communities and increase foreign exchange and are curious to know 
the extent to which expectation will be met. Yet there are few consensuses with regard 
to benefit expected by community and how these are influencing local engagement in 
forest projects. Whether REDD+ will marginalise, or benefit local communities, depends 
on benefit allocation to communities. Cluster multi-stage random sampling was used to 
collect data from 259 respondents that were analysed using Chi-square, Mann-Whitney, 
t-test, Kruskal-Wallis, Jonckheere-Terpstra, tests and NVivo. The study shows that 
participation is significantly affected by perception that payment for ecosystem services 
is necessary to sustain forest (U=10,165; p<.0001, r=30%) and expectations that MCNP 
will promote local development (U=10,576, p<.0001, r=43%) and also generate income 
(U=9,742, p<.0001, r=33%). 53% of local communities do not yet know how forest 
revenue are distributed, but they are expecting more developmental projects (46%) and 
employment (36%) to ensure equity in REDD+ benefits, though present benefits are 
negligible. It is crucial to secure benefits throughout the design, implementation and 
monitoring of REDD+ because community members who have gained confidence in 
REDD+ would find it painful if expectations are not met, or even halted. So there is 
need for more clarity on benefit-sharing mechanism to confirm adequacy and 
sustainability of compensation. Community rights, social safeguards and equity in 
benefit-sharing from REDD+ incentives should be seen to enhance health, biodiversity, 
livelihoods amongst other co-benefits. 
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8.1 Introduction 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, sustainable use of 
natural resources and enhancement of carbon stock (REDD+), may result to sustainable 
protection of ecosystems services with high expectation to improve livelihood and social 
outcomes from REDD+ initiatives (Karsenty, 2011). Payment for Ecosystem Services 
(PES) and REDD+ initiatives have become popular (Minang et al., 2012; Hoang et al., 
2013), and local communities see REDD+ as an opportunity to conserve forest and earn 
income (Awono et al., 2014). During the Conference of Parties at COP-16 (2010) in 
Cancun, COP-17 in Durban (2011) and COP-18 in Doha (2012), parties were still 
concerned with sustainable financing of REDD+ and efficiency, effectiveness and equity 
in benefit-sharing mechanism. One of the ongoing debates on REDD+ has been 
safeguard policies to protect local communities as there is fear that property rights 
ambiguity, weak governance and forest carbon revenue may lead forest managers to 
engage in actions that threaten local livelihoods (Pham, 2013). It is argued that unlike 
previous conservation initiatives, REDD+ has a higher potential in providing socio-
economic and ecological benefits because the transfer of fund is performance based, and 
both private and public actors are expected to fulfil social safeguards (Seymour & 
Angelsen, 2010). While some actors are adopting social safeguards, others are focussing 
on socio-economic benefits of REDD+ (Brown et al., 2008). 
REDD+ has sparked a renewed hope that conservation initiative will deliver a win-win 
scenario by saving the environment and improving livelihood and wellbeing of the rural 
poor. Bhattarai & Hamming (2001) argue that, an increase in income might shift the 
economic and energy demand patterns towards coal and petroleum-based fuel, thereby, 
reducing pressure on forest and halting deforestation. The widespread uptake of 
voluntary certification standards (like Plan Vivo), proves that forest carbon projects does 
deliver socio-economic co-benefits (Diaz et al., 2011; Peter-Standley et al., 2012), yet 
the empirical support on the environment-poverty win-win scenario is not adequately 
established in forest policy (Pham, 2013). When property rights are well established 
with enhanced tenure security, the win-win scenario can be achieved and livelihood 
improved (Barbier & Tesfaw, 2012). But there are legitimate concerns about who should 
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benefit - those with legal rights and/or customary rights, those incurring cost, low 
emitting forest stewards or effective facilitators of implementations (Luttrell et al., 
2012)? Though international debates and discourse treat allocation of benefits to low 
emitting forest steward as priorities, both government and projects manager show little 
concerns (Pham, 2013). 
Larson et al. (2010b) argue that, REDD+ is a climate change strategy rather than a 
poverty alleviation strategy, but Ze Meka (2007) states that we cannot combat the rate of 
deforestation without tackling the root causes like poverty. According to Somorin et al. 
(2014), REDD+ multiple benefits like biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviation, and 
socio-economic developments are vital to legitimise REDD+ mechanism. Poverty 
alleviation is central to any developmental initiative, therefore, for REDD+ to gain 
credibility, its programmes and policies need to align with the goals of poverty reduction 
for enhanced livelihood. REDD+ will not only generate benefits, but also incur 
implementation and transaction cost as well as opportunity cost, so a better 
understanding of cost and benefits need to be examined. As Luttrell et al. (2012) put it, 
“It is the net benefit that matters” and there are also three main different types of 
benefits; direct financial payments, better provision of ecosystem services, and improved 
governance, capacity, technology transfer and infrastructure. REDD+ policies and 
legislations help create two forms of benefit-sharing mechanism, compensating for 
forgone opportunities and providing incentives that enable appropriate behaviour 
(Brown et al., 2008), which can all be paid up-front or dispersed over time. Benefit-
sharing may occur from the state to local communities as well as across local 
stakeholder (Lindhjem et al., 2010), regional and governmental levels which need to be 
design. 
Though a Special Fund for Mutual Assistance to Councils (FEICOM) was established 
(1974) in Cameroon to rationalise funds allocation from logging to councils and village 
communities, the participatory forest governance framework of the 1994 forestry law, 
failed to produce the targeted community development goals due to poor representation 
of local communities and lack of consideration of local needs and concerns (Edoa et al., 
2013). Cameroon Readiness Preparatory Plan recognises the importance of engaging 
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local communities in REDD+ activities, but there is no discussion as to which level they 
can engage in revenue management or benefit-sharing, with no definition of 
communities’ roles. There is need to build on existing benefit-sharing framework to 
reduce cost of establishing and operating new REDD+ benefit-sharing institutions which 
could gain national political support (Pham et al., 2013). Lessons learned from benefits-
sharing schemes in previous forest projects highlight the importance of clarifying and 
securing tenure rights for equitable and effective benefit-sharing of REDD+ forest 
revenue (CIEL& RFN, 2011). Defining carbon rights and developing benefit-sharing 
system serve as an opportunity to address the gaps and re-structure readiness efforts in 
tackling tenure weaknesses. 
Input-based benefit-sharing are recommended in the early phase of REDD+ while 
performance based benefits-sharing fits more during phase three (PwC, 2012). One of 
the challenges in establishing benefit-sharing mechanism that delivers benefits to 
appropriate actors while improving forest management has been the variety of 
stakeholders, scale of partnerships, clear objectives and benefit-sharing arrangement 
(World Bank, 2009). Despite large body of literature on REDD+ benefit-sharing 
mechanism, few studies have investigated national forest policies and socio-economic 
interest that enhance or reduce efficiency, effectiveness and equity of national benefit-
sharing policies and approach (Nkhata et al., 2012a). This study highlights expectations 
of local communities and the socio-economic outcomes of present conservation projects 
to support policy debate in further design and implementation of sustainable REDD+ 
projects by; 
 Investigating how perception of PES, financial and development expectations 
influence participation in MCNP; 
 Examining existing benefit-sharing mechanism within MCNP-conservation 
projects; and 
 Determining if the existing benefit-sharing mechanism meets up with local 
communities’ expectations. 
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8.2 Methodology (See 1.6) 
8.3 Results 
8.3.1 PES, financial and development expectations within MCNP 
A Kruskal-Wallis test shows a significant difference in the perception that PES is 
necessary to sustain the forests within different clusters (H(3)=13.57, p=.004) (Fig. 
8.1a). Pairwise comparison shows a significant difference between Bomboko-Buea 
(H(3)=-34.981, p=.024, r=25.4%), and Bomboko-Muyuka (H(3)=-40.402, p=.014, 
r=28.6%). But result shows a non-significant trend between clusters (J=13,053.0; 
p=.364, r=5.8%). 
Figure 8.2a also shows a significant difference in the perception that MCNP-projects 
will bring local development (H(3)=67.88, p<.0001) between clusters. Pairwise 
comparison shows a significant difference between Buea-Bomboko (H(3)=67.141, 
p<.0001, r=48.7%), Buea-West-Coast (H(3)=-85.986, p<.0001, r=62.3%), Muyuka-
Bomboko (H(3)= 52.095, p<.0001, r=37.5%) and Muyuka-West-Coast (H(3)=-70.940, 
p<.0001, r=50.7%). 
Jonckheere-Terpstra test shows a significant trend between cluster (J=12,800; p=.019, 
r=15%) from Buea, Muyuka, Bomboko and West-Coast in ascending order. Result 
shows a significant difference in the perception that MCNP-projects will generate 
income (H(3)=62.154, p<.0001) (Fig. 8.3a). Pairwise comparison shows a significant 
difference between Muyuka-Bomboko (H(3)=56.845, P<.0001, r=40.8%,), Muyuka- 
West-Coast (H(3)=-80.693, p<.0001, r=57.5%), Buea-Bomboko (H(3)=53.086, p<.0001, 
r=38.5%) and Buea-West-Coast (H(3)=-76.934, p<.0001, r=55.7%). Results show a 
significant Jonckheere-Terpstra trend between cluster (J=12,798; p=.019, r=15%) from 
Muyuka, Buea, Bomboko, and West-Coast in ascending order with an effect size of 
15%. 
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Figure 8.1: A Kruskal-Wallis plot showing variance in perception of PES as being 
necessary to sustain the forest within different clusters (a), t-test showing relationship 
with participation in MCNP-activities in all clusters (b) and within each cluster (c). 
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Figure 8.2: A Kruskal-Wallis plot showing variance in reasons for participating in 
MCNP between clusters (promotion of local development) (a), t-test showing its 
relationship with participation in MCNP-activities (b) and within each cluster (c). 
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Figure 8.3: A Kruskal-Wallis plot showing variance in generation of income as a reason 
for participating in MCNP between clusters (a) and t-test showing its relationship with 
participation in MCNP-activities (b) and within each cluster (c). 
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T-test shows a significant relationship between participation in MCNP-activities and 
perception that PES is necessary to sustain forest (F= 17.18, t=-5.55, df=244.95 
p<.0001) (Fig. 8.1b(c)) expectation that MCNP will promote local development (F= 
16.32, t=-8.170, df=240.38, p<.0001) (Fig. 8.2b,c); and income generation expectation 
(F=13.81, t=-5.899, df=226.96, p<.0001) (Fig.8.3b,c) within MCNP-clusters. 
Mann-Whitney U test shows that participation is significantly affected by perception that 
payment for ecosystem services is necessary to sustain forest (U=10,165; p<.0001) with 
an effect-size (r) of 30% in MCNP-clusters. Bomboko, Buea, Muyuka and West- Coast 
register effect sizes of 28%, 34%, 29%, and 26% respectively (Table 8.3a). Participation 
is significantly influenced by local development expectation in MCNP- clusters 
(U=10,576, p<.0001, r=.43) with an effect size of 43% within MCNP clusters. Bomboko, 
Buea, Muyuka and West-Coast register effect sizes of 66%, 48%, 47% and 46% 
respectively (Table 8.3b). The study also shows that participation is significantly 
influenced by expectation that MCNP-projects will generate income (U=9,742, p<.0001, 
r=.33) with an effect size of 33% in all clusters as well as in Bomboko (39%), Buea 
(39%), Muyuka (42%) and West-Coast (43%) (Table 8.3c). 
Significant linear regression models presenting how expectation of local development 
(B) and income generation (C) contribute to participation (Table 8.4) is explained by the 
following significant linear regression equations: 
 Overall: P=.615 + .353B + .118C 
 Bomboko: P=.611 + .368C 
 Buea:  P=.668 + .434B +.169C 
 Muyuka: P=.766 + .456C 
 Muyuka: P=.683 + .483B 
 West-Coast: P=.645 + .268B 
Where P=Participation; B= Expectation of local development; and C= Expectation of 
income generation. 
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8.3.2 Present benefit-sharing mechanism from forest projects 
Only 15% of respondents are aware of local developmental projects carried out from 
forest-revenue and these ranges from provision of zinc to roof local market places, pipe- 
borne water, to construction of public toilet, community hall and schools/classroom (Fig. 
8.4a). While 7% of respondents in Buea know that 100,000-250,000CFA has been given 
for community hall/chair and/or construction of public toilet, only 3% know in 
Bomboko that less than 100,000CFA has been given for construction of toilets and/or 
pipe-borne water and respondents in Muyuka and West-Coast, neither know, nor are 
aware of any projects (Fig. 8.4b). 
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Figure 8.4: Percentages of projects carried out in MCNP-clusters (a) and amount given 
for projects (b). 
Figure 8.5a shows that 53% of respondents did not know how forest-revenue are 
distributed. Despite the unawareness, 97% of respondents know that community 
developmental projects (46%) and employment (36%) are the major ways to ensure 
equitable revenue distribution with employment expectation highest in Bomboko (Fig. 
8.5b). 
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Figure 8.5: Percentages of present distribution of forest revenue (a) and ways to ensure 
equitable distribution of revenue (b). 
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8.3.3 Local community expectations 
It is evident from figure 8.6a, that the presence of community development projects is 
almost negligible (14%) because of lack of funds or unknown reasons (Fig. 8.6b). 
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Figure 8.6: Has there been any developmental projects carried out (a)? If no, why (b)? 
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The absence of basic necessities like electricity, tap water, health centres, market and 
roads in some villages and lack of formal/informal credit institutions to generate capital 
for investment (8.7a) have deprived local communities of improved livelihood. To 
enable better livelihood, communities are expecting that MCNP-REDD+ projects will 
provide the following benefits:  
1 Employment through which income will be generated; 
2 Finance for establishing small businesses; 
3 Provide them with pipe-borne water; 
4 Training on animal husbandry and breeds; 
5 Hospitals or health centres; 
6 Schools to enhance education and technical skills; 
7 Establishment of markets to sell surplus food and forest products; 
8 Better access of motor-able roads; 
9 Community halls for community gathering, discussion of community issues, 
socialising;  and 
10 Electricity supply to process and store food (Fig. 8.7b). 
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Figure 8.7: Percentages of present infrastructure within MCNP-clusters (a) and 
expected developmental projects from MCNP-projects (b). 
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8.3.4 Qualitative results 
The word clouds shows that interviewees talked mostly about village, benefits, 
community, forest, conservation and money (Fig. 8.8a); from where two themes were 
established: community development and/or benefits (A), and park activities linked to 
village forest conservation-credits (B). Figure 8.8b and table 8.1 further show the types 
of comments across different levels of stakeholders. 
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Figure 8.8: Word clouds showing most mentioned words from the interviewees (a) and 
types of comments provided by different stakeholders (b) on PES issues around MCNP.  
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8.3.4.1 Community development and benefits 
Though a management plan has been approved for Prunus harvesting, money from the 
block harvested in 2010 has not yet been re-distributed to local communities despite the 
strenuous harvesting process. Ecotourism too is being re-structured and there is hope 
that money from tourism will also be re-distributed to communities. 
GIZ: “At the moment there is no definite benefit-sharing structure set-up…. There has 
been a management plan approved for Prunus-harvesting…. We are representing the 
local communities and we meet with the buyers, but the local community get most of the 
benefit that is coming from Prunus-harvesting. They have harvested just five blocks 
(2010)…. But for now, nothing has been given to the community because we want to 
make this an integral part of the conservation development agreement. But the money is 
there, I know how much was harvested and how much is there (about 7,000,000CFA).” 
GIZ: “We are trying to be a role model in benefit-sharing. MOCAP is representing only 
33 out of 41 communities and we want it to represent all the 41 communities to avoid 
conflicts… The expected revenue is not as high as they expected in the beginning 
because they did an inventory and a prognosis fell below expectation… The harvesting 
is not fast enough as they thought and it is strenuous…. They cannot harvest it as before 
because it was unsustainable, but now they have to plant the trees and harvest with a 
specific method which we are training them and only specific trees are harvested.” 
GIZ: “Mount Cameroon Equatorial Organisation… collect fee from visitors going up 
the mountain and a stakeholder fee which are supposed to be distributed to the 
community…. It is now dormant because the tourism sector is being restructured… We 
are still working on a mechanism on how all the benefits can be shared to the entire 
community.” 
Though some development measures and agricultural training are on the way to generate 
income like nursery, no tangible benefits could be traced because there is yet no market 
for the nursery. 
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GIZ: “There are village development measures… to assist the communities in some 
specific development areas like small-scale water supplies and income generating 
activities like …multi-purpose nursery projects and cocoa improvement projects… 
(aimed at) improving the land and the output of the current land and not expansion of 
any agriculture.” 
LC: “They trained us on how to nurse plants and we did produce many nurseries, but 
there is no market for the nurseries… we have planted the nurseries in our farms until 
there is no more space.” 
National: “We are trying to see how local communities will be involved in the benefits.” 
As revealed by MOCAP and MINFOF-SWR, only 16% of revenue from Prunus 
africana harvesting are dedicated to the village development fund (Fig. 8.9) and only 
150CFA/kg is paid for Prunus harvested which is lower than the 375CFA which was 
being paid before the establishment of the park. This inequality in benefit has impeded 
engagement because “payments are ridiculous.” 
Sub-national: The benefit-sharing mechanism decides how much goes to the harvesters, 
MOCAP and park management (Fig. 8.9 for elaboration). This money is used as village 
contributions for different projects…, it should be around 40 million CFA. …we make 
sure that the funds (16%) are used to the satisfaction of the villagers (about 7,000,000 
CFA). 
Local-group: “Revenue from forest exploitation is divided among the community. Some 
are paid as salaries, some goes to developmental projects that are designed by the 
community (Fig. 8.9)… They (local community) plant in plantation. When the Prunus 
are mature; they harvest and sell to us every five years.” 
Local-group: The 33 communities have just seven harvesters and they are paid just 
150CFA/kg when they carry a harvest from up the mountain right down. So people don’t 
want to work as harvesters because payment is ridiculous. Everybody is complaining 
about the price. Before, they used to sell for more than 350CFA/kg, but now the price of 
Prunus is determined by the park committee”. 
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Figure 8.9: Revenue distribution from the sale of Prunus africana (summary from 
interview with MOCAP and sub-national respondents). 
Though MOCAP respondent claimed to allocate money to local communities’ projects, 
only one local respondent revealed that MOCAP has given them money to assist with 
building community hall and the amount seems negligible. 
Local-group: “We hold meetings with the assembly and the village committees and 
sensitised them that we have this amount of money to spend on the village. So they 
should come up with projects which we can carry out with the benefits… the money is 
spent on projects that are designed by the community.” 
LC: “MOCAP has helped by giving us some money about 250,000CFA to mould blocks, 
but the contractor started the project and did not complete it.” 
Communities are concerned that, though they have learned a lot about conservation, they 
are not employed to work in the park because employment is based on G.C.E Ordinary 
level certificate and blamed their dependence on forest resource to lack of jobs, school, 
and other alternatives to improve livelihoods and wellbeing. 
LC: “We have learnt a lot about the forest preservation, but as for benefits we have 
nothing… they did not employ the local people to work, so actually we have not 
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benefited anything. If they employ us as forest guards and give us the authority to secure 
the forest, we will do that well than any other person, because we know that securing the 
forest will yield benefits which will help develop our community.” 
LC: “My dad worked in the forest and harvested from the forest. I am doing the same 
thing now… if I had a different job I would not be doing same… maybe our children will 
also grow up to work in the forest and harvest from it.” 
LC: “We ask the national park to build schools for those around the mountain areas, but 
they refused.” 
LC: “We are suffering, no school, we don’t have pipe born water and no health centre. 
We are suffering a lot.” 
LC: “The youths have to work. If they employ the youths, they will work and feed 
themselves…. But if we have no jobs and we are hungry, we will go directly to the forest 
to hunt or harvest food.” 
LC: “They are employing based on G.C.E certificate, but that is wrong because common 
sense is more important than certificate… If I was working somewhere, I would not have 
time for hunting. If my kids had schools they would be occupied with school work… Do 
we have to die because we are not educated or what? If they go up to the mountain and 
an animal attacks them, is it the certificate that will save them? We are the ones they 
will call for help because we know how to tame these animals.” 
8.3.4.2 Park activities linked to village forest conservation credits and bonuses 
Benefits are also re-distributed through a performance-based approach by allocating 
conservation credits (CC) and bonuses (CB) to motivate local communities to engage. 
But allocated amount is often negligible as compared to effort needed as shown in table 
8.2. 
GIZ: “It took them so many meetings to understand the concepts of conservation credit 
and bonuses… (See table 8.2). So we need a continuous sensitisation process.” 
Sub-national: “We have one incentive measure in our programme; conservation credit 
which they can earn for assisting in managing the MCNP. …if they collaborate well with 
the park service and other activities, they will get this money.” 
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Sub-national: “We have introduced the conservation-credits and conservation-bonuses 
in this collaboration management approach…. Conservation-credit is a virtual voucher 
aimed at motivating the communities to contribute and respond to conservation needs of 
the MCNP management. It doesn’t support illegal activities and that is how this 
conservation credit is used…. For conservation credits, we calculate 20% of what the 
park spends on any activity in the village where any member of the village is 
participating… If 300,000CFA was spent on village ‘A’ (income)… 20% of 300,000CFA 
is registered for that village and the money is not given to them directly. We spend the 
money on water projects and other development projects for that community. The person 
in charge of these funds makes sure that the community contribute at least 10% of the 
cost of the project in kind or in cash. Say if a water project cost 1,000,000CFA, the 
community will contribute 10% of that cost in cash or kind by digging the pipelines 
where the pipes have to pass. So if they have their conservation-credit say 100,000CFA, 
they will not contribute anymore.” 
Sub-national: The conservation-bonus goes to the whole village for participating in the 
conservation activities…. An assessment criterion determines what percentage of this 
conservation-bonus they would receive (See table 8.2)… If an elephant is killed today 
and after one week another elephant is killed within that same area, you are 
automatically going to lose all… even at five O’clock; people call me to report that there 
are people with engine saw going to cut trees around. The use of this bonus must be for 
a project that is conservation friendly…. We are not going to approve buying of an 
engine saw… We will approve buying of desks…, give the money to the president of the 
conservation committee of that village, and then come back after three weeks to inspect 
if the desk are there. So this is how it is designed to function and the strategy or 
approach is explained to the community.” 
Most local respondents are not happy with the benefit-mechanism because the 
conservation credits and bonuses are too small and can be reduced to nothing in the case 
of illegal activities which is mostly carried out by outsiders. But they are, neither 
employed as forest guards, nor given the authority to effectively stop encroachment. 
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LC:  “We are not motivated. They (park managers) also said if they want to give us 
money or benefits, they will come and check in the forest to see if people are harvesting 
there. Some outside people, sometimes, come and cut down trees and export them to 
other countries, but when they come and see that, they will say we are the one who cut 
the trees. So it is better for them to give us authority because we know who is doing any 
illegal activity, better than them and if we see someone not from this village who is 
cutting trees, we can interrogate the person to know if he has a license or not.” 
LC: When there is any illegal activity in the forest, they will reduce the 125,000CFA that 
was supposed to help the village. But if some of the villagers were forest guards, they 
will make sure that no illegal activity is carried out in their forest so as to save that 
money for the benefit of the village.” 
LC: “They want us not to harvest from the forest because they want to preserve it, but at 
the same time they are not supporting us to live. We can sell what we get from the forest 
and provide for our needs…, how are we going to get money to buy other provisions? So 
they really have to help us and the 125,000CFA allocated for us is too small.” 
Apart from securing conservation credits for community development, local participants 
are also demanding individual payment for activities carried out especially in difficult 
terrain and under hard labour. 
LC: “They asked me to accompany someone to the forest…. On the way he could not 
walk anymore, I carried him on my back and carried his bag also until we reached the 
place we were going… When we came back from visiting the mountain, the man did not 
pay me, he said payment will be counted as part of the conservation-credit. The credit is 
for the whole village and not for me, what I did was an individual task. Moreover the 
credit is about 125,000CFA a year and that is very small… They expect us to do jobs on 
the mountain on rocks with no insurance… if I die what will my family and I benefit? If I 
had killed antelopes and carried them down here, I would have sold them for maybe 
160,000CFA. But I used the energy to carry a man on my back for nothing… What I am 
saying is that the forest officials are paid far higher than what they give us just because 
we don’t have certificates, but we are forced to do all the work. Unfair!” 
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Table 8.2: Summarised conditions for acquiring conservation-bonuses (CB) within 
MCNP-cluster conservation zone as explained by GIZ and MINFOF-SWR respondents. 
 Contribution to conservation efforts:  CB (%) Expectations 
Cluster conservation zone with report of 
all illegal poaching for the year (report 
of illegal activities that lead to effective 
seizure of illegal items). 
+50 Respect minimum park patrols effort, 
keep records of illegal activities and 
deliver seized items to the ministry of 
Forestry and Fauna. 
Report of class ‘A’ animal’s poacher by 
patrol team. 
-25 to -
100 
Village forest management unit should 
report all illegal activities. 
Eco guards report class ‘B’ and ‘C’ 
animal poacher (commercial purposes). 
 -10 to -50 Patrol team meet hunter with arms or 
killed animal. 
Eco guards reports illegal logging 
activities. 
 -10 to -50 Proof - Patrol team deliver GPS of 
location and picture. 
Eco guards report illegal harvesting of 
non-timber forest products. 
 -10 to -50 Members of local communities are 
often rule violators. 
Eco guards report unexpected bush-fire.  -10 to -50 Evidence of fire for the year. 
Park encroachment   -10 to -50 Evidence of current year encroachment 
Sub-total  50,000CFA 
Good Collaboration :  +25  
Conservation management activities not 
carried out as scheduled. 
-10 to -25 Conservation management unit need to 
report activities irregularity 
Inadequate job standards.  -10 to -25 
Poor work spirit.  -10 to -25 
Inadequate coordination of activities.  -10 to -25 
Sub-total  25,000CFA 
Adequate performance within cluster +25 Conservation management unit 
need to be actively engaged. Irregularity in cluster Platform meetings  -10 to -25 
Inadequate conservation efforts 
coordination. 
-10 to -25 
Sub-total  25,000CFA 
Total  100,000CFA 
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8.4 Discussion 
REDD+ has the potential to provide better logical incentive for the community to engage 
in forest management, therefore, adjacent local communities should be invited and 
sensitised to engage in REDD+ activities for improved livelihoods and reduced 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (Munishi, 2013). The uncertainty in 
REDD+ policy and market for forest carbon have made forest managers to delay sharing 
information, consulting community and avoiding the use of the term REDD+ to prevent 
raising expectations of local communities concerns on potential carbon payments and 
ecosystems benefits (Awono et al., 2013; Sunderlin & Sills, 2012). REDD+ national 
benefit-sharing mechanism should be shaped by legal and regulatory framework with 
clear objectives and targeted beneficiaries (Luttrell et al., 2012). However, Cameroon 
does not yet have any legislation defining carbon rights or benefits-sharing mechanism 
at national level. The existing 1974 Forestry Laws, the 1995 Implementation Decree and 
the 1996 Framework Law on Environmental Management applies in addition to other 
international conventions to which Cameroon is a signatory like the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Indigenous People among others. According to Pham (2013), Cameroon 
is challenged with corruption and managing REDD+ finances, and analysis has shown 
that previous finances for forestry programmes have not been effectively managed so 
accountability is key. Due to lack of transparency and accountability most of the MCNP 
community members are not aware of how much is given to local communities as forest 
revenues. 
8.4.1 PES, financial and community development expectations 
According to Peskett et al. (2008), benefit-sharing mechanism should be equitable to 
poor forest communities. Community forest will be an essential part of most equitable 
REDD+ projects because a bottom-up approach will ensure addressing, understanding 
and consideration of the needs and concerns of local communities. Presently, MCNP-
REDD+ projects have not realised benefit-sharing, but international (North-South and 
South-South technology transfer through workshop) and national level (enshrined in the 
1994 Forestry Law) of benefit-sharing, have been proposed by projects initiator GAF-
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AG (Sama & Tawah, 2009). Though carbon has not yet been sold, members of MCNP-
clusters are engaging in conservation effort with perception that payment for ecosystem 
services are necessary to conserve forest, and expecting to generate income and promote 
community developmental projects. 
REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanism can be designed upon lessons learned from 
community forest and forest taxation schemes (Somorin, 2014). The dominant form of 
tenure is forest concessions. Fees and royalties are paid to the state before granting 
concession to exploit forest resources which are then re-distributed across national, sub- 
national and community levels. According to 1994 Forestry Law, 50% of all forest 
revenue goes to the state, 40% to rural council and only 10% plus village tax goes to 
local communities adjacent to forest concessions (50:40:10) (Morison et al., 2009). Also 
section 50 and 61(3, and 4) requires proponents to establish developmental projects that 
provide social amenities to local communities such as roads, schools, hospitals, among 
others. Scaling-up the benefit-sharing mechanism of forest revenue may be efficient, but 
low equity with community in payments and poor effectiveness in under-payment are 
evident in Cameroon. Mpoyi et al. (2013), found out that the land rent re-distribution is 
neither effective, efficient, nor equitable because the land fee sharing model is 
incomplete, inadequately designed, and lacks adequate monitor, thereby, making the 
payment of compensation ineffective while jeopardising communities’ resource rights 
and counteracting poverty alleviation objectives as the case of MCNP. Difficulties in 
obtaining Forest Environmental Programme Funds and ignorance of procedures of 
disbursement have been identified by the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (Dkamela, 
2011). Also uniformity in benefit-sharing turns to neglect local transaction differences 
and opportunity cost, leading to inequitable benefit-sharing among local stakeholders 
(Costenbader, 2011). Though jobs are created, qualified positions are filling-up by 
external professionals because of lack of local capacity/skills relevant to forest 
management (Mpoyi et al., 2013). Forest certification schemes might be a better option 
in mitigating inequality in benefit-sharing and improving management of forest 
concessions. 
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MCNP-projects entail both Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), 
and Payment for Ecosystem Services. It is expected that the market-based instruments 
will ensure that PES and REDD+ outcomes meet the 3Es criteria with conditionality as 
key element, but inadequate forest governance may make PES vulnerable to elite capture 
(Paudel et al., 2013; Pham et al., 2013). The lack of access and restricted rights over land 
and trees make them unable to influence benefit-sharing, thereby, removing them off 
main financial stream. Relationship between PES’s actors and benefactors depends on 
trustworthiness, legitimacy in making decision, better knowledge and understanding of 
benefits, including obligations (buyers/sellers) and above all willingness to pay. 
Therefore, REDD+ needs all stakeholders, especially local communities to better 
understand equity in benefit-sharing and adopt adaptive management approach to 
address opportunity cost as well as build capacity and trust among stakeholders. 
Cameroon has also criticised the complexity of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
because of complexity in administrative procedures (Dkamela, 2011). 
A study carry out by Munishi (2013) shows that, participation in REDD+/CBFM and 
forest management initiatives significantly correlate with increase in benefits and 
incentives for forest management, especially, the potentials for future carbon market and 
the selling of forest products under REDD+ mechanisms. But payment depends on 
property rights. Authoritative rights in vertical benefit-sharing are held by both the 
Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, and the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable 
Development, dominating benefit-sharing mechanism while proponents also share 
authoritative rights in horizontal benefit-sharing. According to Dkamela (2011), 
dominant REDD+ actors (donors, NGO, Government) dominate the REDD+ policy 
arena with authoritative and control rights, thereby, making the process externalised and 
elitist with zero involvement of local actors. There is also uncertainty in leadership and 
coordination roles of government and even when control rights are granted to local 
communities, they do not have the capacity to carry out their full responsibility (Pham et 
al., 2013) because they are always heavily depended on state’s instructions and rules. 
Even when forest stewards are granted user-rights for NTFP and non-protected wildlife 
for subsistence, which also provide indirect benefits in the form of revenue from taxes 
paid for exploiting natural resources, the ratio of 50:40:10 still keeps local communities 
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far from adequate benefits. While only elites have financial capacity to register land, 
zoning and overlapping rights have also resulted into conflict among stakeholders. 
Power disparity between dominating proponents and local beneficiaries may lead to elite 
capture, corruption and disengagement of local stakeholders, who are vital for REDD+ 
sustainability. 
8.4.2  Present benefit-sharing mechanism within MCNP 
In MCNP, rewarded behaviours are repeated because individuals think through what 
they want and shape their actions to achieve their hopes. This strategy controls 
communities’ behaviour by manipulating reward value of desired outcomes, yet 
participants keep asking for personal compensation alongside conservation credit for 
their communities. This creates a shift from behaviour-reward hypothesis to a practical 
theory of goal seeking. But achieving one goal may contradict another, so there is need 
to build mutual relationship where there is integration of all interests, challenges and 
options. So a cost-benefit analysis is needed for appropriate reward estimation. 
MCNP projects has elaborated the village development plan and implemented few 
socio-economic infrastructures like pipe-borne water, community hall/chair and public 
toilet. Some communities’ members feel that benefit-sharing unit should be household 
or individualised rather than community projects because the income generated from 
forest are used to solve unique family issues, so direct payment should be directed to 
those providing services to ensure sustainability of REDD+. It is hard to prove that 
everyone will benefit from the projects (exclusion of external users), and if adequate 
compensation will enable provision of alternatives and feed the growing population. The 
lack of adequate benefits may also be due to unclear tenure. 
Developmental community projects, improve livelihood and wellbeing, and employment 
are the major benefits expected by local communities. PES transfer to local 
communities’ projects with more benefit opportunity will run longer re-afforestation, 
creating more jobs and protecting standing volume. MCNP-initiative is expected to 
create employment and community revenue streams, but existing size of payment 
transfer from previous forest projects is almost negligible. This study supports Sofala 
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findings that carbon payment did not significantly impact household income (Lawlor et 
al., 2013). Therefore, while REDD+ could provide a new income stream to 
communities, it has little impact on household poverty reduction except if direct 
payment through employment, financial incentives to households and provision for 
alternate livelihood (such as finance for small businesses and engagement in animal 
husbandry) are enhanced. 
Even if benefits are shared to customary rights owners, what about claims from outsiders 
and/or migrants who are also members of these communities? 53% of respondents do 
not know how forest revenue is distributed, but they know that they have to engage in 
the project and expect financial returns. To avoid conflicts amongst various categories of 
community members, there is need to increase local engagement in decision-making on 
benefit-sharing before introducing financial compensation. According to Oyono et al. 
(2006), lack of transparency and mismanagement of funds by both the state and local 
delegates in Cameroon have been experienced in community forestry in rural areas. 
8.4.3 MCNP benefit-sharing framework 
There is still no benefit-sharing mechanism for REDD+ in Cameroon (Awono et al., 
2014). But members of local communities very well understand that they have to 
conserve the forest while expecting benefits through conservation-credits (CC) and 
Conservation-bonuses (CB) which are earned through Collaborative Management 
Activities (CMA) that contributes to Village Development Measures, thereby, mitigating 
climate change, increasing carbon stock, biodiversity and wildlife, while simultaneously, 
developing communities. Revenue distribution for local development is gained both 
directly on individual basis through employment to work in the park and earning an 
income (Prunus africana harvesters are paid depending on the weight of fresh barks 
harvested at a price of 150CFA/kg) and indirectly through conservation credits and 
bonuses. While waiting for REDD+ payment, park managers negotiate Community 
Development Agreement with communities, using a co-management approach to link 
conservation and community development and this has enabled communities to gain 
enough time in expressing their needs and prepare themselves in carrying out their 
conservation activities as well as define developmental expectation. Effective, efficient 
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and equality in benefit-sharing mechanism depend on national transparency and capacity 
to manage finances. The insecure tenure systems and national control rights have limited 
the scope of local communities in deciding benefit-sharing of REDD+ revenue with park 
services deciding on price of Prunus for farmers. This action has discouraged 
communities from engaging. 
8.4.3.1 Conservation-credits 
Each year a village is supposed to be allocated a minimum of 200,000CFA for 
Collaborative Management Activities, though, members of local communities know the 
amount to be 125,000CFA. Conservation-credit is designed to facilitate the 10% 
compulsory contribution from each village towards their developmental measures. 
Conservation-credit is additional credit generated which is actually 20% of money 
earned from CMA. If a village earns 100,000CFA from CMA, it will generate an 
additional 20CC for the village (1000CFA = ICC). With a minimum of 200,000CFA 
allocated to each village, it can earn at least 40CC per year. The average amount 
allocated to village projects is three million. Therefore, for a village to carry out a 
project like this, it is obliged to contribute 10% which is 300,000CFA or 300CC. If it has 
about 200CC accumulated say over 5yrs, then it would be left with 100,000CFA to 
contribute in cash, or in kind, or wait for two more years (total of seven years) to gain 
the required 300CC. This time frame of seven years, delays development and 
development delayed is development denied! 
8.4.3.2 Conservation-bonuses 
Conservation-bonus is earned from participation and local communities’ commitment to 
co-management of the National Park. The conservation bonus evaluation grid serves as a 
guideline in determining the amount to be paid to different villages within a cluster. As 
reported by GIZ Technical Assistant; 
 50% of the bonus is evaluated based on village contribution to conservation 
efforts (illegal activities are regularly reported - crosschecked with results from 
eco-guard patrols). 
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 The second portion of the bonus (25%) will depend on the level of collaboration 
of the village (work spirit, efficiency to perform CMA). 
 Payment of the last portion of 25% will depend on the overall cluster 
performance (regular cluster platform meeting attended by all members and 
coordinated conservation efforts).  
The full amount is made available to park villages that report illegal activities regularly 
and carry out the CMA properly, but a village community can lose its bonus (partially or 
completely) if the mentioned conditions are not fulfilled. However, the Conservation 
Development Agreement is used to settle disputes and get villages ‘on board’ for co- 
management. The conservation bonuses rewarded can only be access through a 
Conservation Management Unit, where a village proposes a village development project 
in line with conservation objectives, and its used bonus gets monitored by the unit. This 
benefit-sharing mechanism is meant to enable the indigenous people to link benefits to 
the Park’s conservation initiatives. The village development fund project is supervised 
by park managers and not the community chief or head, therefore, the community does 
not freely decide on how to use their bonuses - their choices are highly influence by the 
park services. 
8.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
Though there is limited understanding of the link between poverty determinant in local 
communities and deforestation, Leimona et al. (2009) suggested that sustainable 
management of natural resources and improved livelihood of local communities should 
be considered so that predicted benefits could match the need and expectations of the 
communities. Therefore, a rethink of a fair financial mechanism to attract indigenous 
peoples and forest stewards in rural communities is urgent. Beside efforts needed to 
make emission reduction effective, assurance is needed that cost will be efficient and 
responsibilities and revenues will be shared equitably amongst all stakeholders involved. 
REDD+ has the ability to provide a win-win scenario for environment and reduce 
poverty, though at this early stage, the study found low benefits opportunities to local 
population in terms of employment and developmental projects. REDD+ should support 
forest stewardship activities of local communities providing benefits such as: 
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strengthening of community and resource rights, empowering local community 
institutions, improving income and livelihoods through benefit-sharing. 
REDD+ finance depends on national broader development and climate adaptation 
strategies with strengthened institutional capacity for forest and land management. The 
design and implementation of national benefit-sharing mechanism will ensure 
sustainability of REDD+, so there is need to improve financial transparency, law 
enforcement, information sharing, capacity and coordination amongst all stakeholders. 
The effectiveness of REDD+ depends on how its cost and benefits are shared and if 
incentives are sufficient enough to enable behavioural changes and policies. 
Legitimising REDD+ will depend on specifying clear objectives, inclusion, equality and 
benefit-sharing analysis in order to identify effects on mitigation efforts and 
beneficiaries. Park managers should focus on social and livelihood aspects of REDD+ to 
provide strong incentive in clarifying doubts and convincing sceptical community 
members to engage. Community members who have gained confidence in REDD+ will 
find it painful if expectation are not met, or even halted, so there is need for more clarity 
on benefit-sharing mechanism to confirm both adequacy and sustainability of 
compensation. 
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9 Investigating the role of local community as co-
managers of Mt. Cameroon National Park projects 
Keywords: Community based natural resource management, Integrated conservation 
and development projects, Social safeguards, Powerful forest stakeholders 
Abstract: - Community-based natural resource management and integrated conservation 
and development projects have often not realised local expectations due to problems of 
application and impracticable legislation. There are concerns that Reduced Emission 
from Deforestation and land Degradation, forest conservation, sustainable management 
of forest resources and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) might be the next 
affected. Projects failure may be avoided by involving communities and developing an 
effective co-management approach. This study analyses the progress of REDD+ from an 
early stage to help inform proponents in adapting strategies that are geared towards 
appropriate satisfactory outcomes; especially for local communities; to prevent early 
failure of initiative. This study identifies the roles/functions of local communities by 
using cluster multi-stage random sampling to collect data from 259 respondents that 
were analysed using Chi-square, Mann-Whitney, t-test, Kruskal-Wallis, Jonckheere-
Terpstra tests and NVivo. Results show that local communities have been involved in 
forest management practices before the establishment of the park. Respondents support 
the establishment of strict conservation zone and hope to promote local participation 
with high expectation of benefits. Insecure tenure reduces project support and local 
engagement. Though, they massively support the initiative, participants are not carrying 
out any tangible roles. They function mainly as manual labourer or mere committee 
members whose main roles are to enforce rules/regulations within communities. The 
state has become more influential that, communities delegates have become powerless 
and often remain captives of incentives (motivations) than community representatives. 
Local forest management is essential in sustainability of both communities and REDD+ 
projects. Trade-off between conservation and development should be acknowledged, 
negotiated and accepted by both REDD+ promoters and community’s representatives 
during project planning to enable realistic appraisal and legitimisation of projects. 
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9.1 Introduction 
About 80 million sq. km is covered by protected areas which makes up 12.2% of the 
land surface and almost one-sixth of the world’s population (1.1 billion) depend on them 
for livelihood (Brandon & Wells, 2009). Indigenous peoples have inhabited and 
conserved forest for centuries and much land is still managed by them (Crider & Anaya, 
1996). Although members of local communities are not the major cause of climate 
change, the impact is felt mostly by them (IPCC, 2007a). As cited by Ngbo-Ngbangbo et 
al. (2010), protected areas have existed in different forms within different cultures as far 
back as pre-agrarian societies and sacred forest existed before, in which, extractive use 
of natural resources was prohibited. Royalty sets aside land for game hunting which acts 
as reserve with exclusion of commoners. Therefore, conservation is an old practice to 
indigenous people and local communities should be considered in all forest projects 
where their rights to ownership are not interfered. 
Though REDD+ is based upon experiences with PES and United Nations forest-related 
negotiations, which have slowly shifted conservation programmes from local to a more 
global scale (Humphreys, 2006), its implementation still requires sub-national projects 
such as Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP) and Community- 
Based Natural Resource Management (CBMRM) (Angelsen & Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 
2008). But few studies have examined how REDD+ is being examined at this scale. 
MCNP-REDD+ has an element of ICDP (conservation project) as well as CBNRM 
(sustainable management of Prunus africana), therefore, the principles and lessons 
learned from ICDP and CBNRM are essential tools in designing and implementing 
MCNP-REDD+ projects. 
As reported by Minang & van Noordwijk. (2013), conservation is among the key ways 
of achieving REDD+ and many REDD+ pilot projects are currently built on ICDPs. The 
collaborative management approach and the conservation incentives concept of MCNP 
are considered as implementing strategy for REDD+ which aims at effective 
management, and conservation of natural resources and biodiversity while rendering 
socio-economic benefits. ICDP is a conservation project with the inclusion of rural 
development component (Hughes & Flintan, 2001) for achieving sustainable 
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development and this is a widely applied approach to achieving conservation which also 
holds a wealth of experience for REDD+ including lessons on inherent and design 
challenges. Conservation can be deployed in REDD+ strategies in two ways: when 
ICDP is used as a platform for launching REDD+ at landscape/sub-national level; and 
when conservation is one of several strategies for REDD+ at national level (Minang & 
van Noordwijk, 2013). According to Cerbu et al. (2011), integrated conservation and 
development projects are part of REDD+ strategies and using REDD+ incentive for 
forest conservation will only compliment emission reduction management objectives for 
park conservation because present REDD+ projects follow ICDP concepts, and local 
knowledge and capacity developed on conservation activities can be used for 
measurement, report and verification requirements for REDD+. Conservation also 
emerges from the Cancun agreement making MCNP suitable as REDD+ projects. 
CBNRM is a holistic approach that supports participatory, interdisciplinary and multi- 
level stakeholders networking in addressing complex socio-ecological issues that are 
geared towards sustainable development. Collaboration of experts, non-experts and 
members of local communities is instrumental in structuring effective CBNRM initiative 
(Child & Lyman, 2005), though, lack of recognition of communities’ values, market 
values and elite capture often contradict concept (Child, 2007). Therefore, a holistic 
interdisciplinary approach is necessary to better understand and address these complex 
socio-environmental issues. Organisational design principles that are frequently 
associated with successful CBNRM include sensitisation and community engagement, 
collaborative partnership, resource and equity, effective communication and 
dissemination of information, research and development, local empowerment, 
legitimacy and trustworthiness, monitoring and feedback, adaptive leadership and 
affective co-management, participatory approach to decision-making, cooperation and 
conflict resolution (Gruber, 2009). These principles enhance effectiveness and efficiency 
in natural resource management, while supporting communities socially, economically 
and educationally. Mount Cameroon Prunus Common Initiative Group (MOCAP-CIG) 
is a local CBNRM initiative responsible for the organisation and monitoring of 
sustainable exploitation and management of Prunus at village level. Together with 
MCNP management unit, they carry out the following functions: 
262 
 Train villagers on sustainable harvesting techniques, 
 Establish inventories of Prunus together with local communities and ANAFOR; 
 Distribute Prunus seedlings to farmers to be planted into the agro-forestry 
systems; 
 Establish village development fund in park villages; 
 Reduce illegal exploitation of Prunus. 
The Ministry of Forestry and Fauna (MINFOF) through MCNP is responsible for the 
management of Prunus africana. So the Management Plan for Prunus is fully integrated 
into the park management plan which is co-managed between park managers and local 
communities. Since most Prunus fall within the national park, exploitation is in 
conformity with conservation objectives, based on the following principles:- 
 No felling of trees, be it wilted or dead; 
 Harvesting of only healthy trees following sustainable harvesting guidelines; 
 Minimum exploitable diameter of 30cm respected; 
 Intense supervision and monitoring; 
 Annual off-take of 130 tons adopted for first quota (5yrs) 
While ensuring that; 
 Viable population of resource base is maintained; 
 There is improvement of  livelihood and poverty is alleviated from revenue 
generated; 
 Local communities fully participate; 
 Prunus is planted on support zones, community forest and private farms; 
 Management, harvesting and trades follow both, international and national 
norms. 
According to Blom et al. (2010), CBNRM, forest certification, market access for non- 
timber forest products (NTFP) and ICDP which were once hailed in tropical forest 
conservation did not meet-up to expectations due to application of impracticable 
assumptions and there is fear that REDD+ might be next on the list. Therefore, there is 
need to analyse the progress of REDD+ from an early stage and adapt strategies that are 
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geared toward appropriate satisfactory outcomes especially for local communities to 
prevent early failure of initiative. Stating ‘what to do’ is far easier than stating ‘how’ to 
accomplish these principles. This study seeks to examine ‘what has been done’ by local 
communities in providing practitioners with useful information (state-of-the-art) that 
need to be considered in enhancing effectiveness, efficiency and equity in MCNP-
REDD+ projects. This study focuses on practical local community engagement within 
the co-management approach of MCNP. 
9.1.1 Background – Prunus management unit within MCNP 
MCNP was established in December 2009 and launched on Wednesday 17 February 
2010, at the Pan African Institute for Development to support conservation of 
biodiversity, reduce deforestation and land degradation, and improve livelihoods of 
forest dwellers (Moki, 2010). The report further states that, Frank Stenmanns (GFA) 
disclosed a programme to help divert villagers from encroaching into the park through 
provision of small income generating projects such as improved cocoa and oil palm, 
domestication of non-timber forest product (NTFP), improved palm oil and cassava 
processing and establishment of community forest. Projects designed for village 
development plans included pipe born water, farm-to-market roads and crops 
preservation facilities with implementation partners being GIZ, WWF, Wildlife 
Conservation Society (WCS), MINFOF and MINEPDED. 
MOCAP is a local CBNRM initiative responsible for the organisation and monitoring of 
sustainable exploitation and management of Prunus (established in 2005). The Ministry 
of Forestry and Fauna (MINFOF), through MCNP is responsible for the sustainable 
management of Prunus africana. The management plan for Prunus is fully integrated 
into the park management plan which is co-managed between park managers and local 
communities and its exploitation is in conformity with conservation objectives. The park 
is aimed at linking conservation, community development, poverty alleviation and 
improving livelihood. 
Prunus africana is an Afro-montane light demanding hardwood tree attaining more than 
30m in height with a rough and dark bark whose thickness varies with age, ecology and 
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size. It is commonly known as Pygeum, a medicinal plant used as health supplement and 
for treatment of prostate cancer, and as a major source of income for forest dwellers and 
enterprises, providing about 1,320 million CFA ($2,686,000) export revenue to 
Cameroon with an annual 2000 tonnes exportation permit (Ingram & Nsawir, 2007). The 
international trade of pygeum was restricted in 1995 because of the fear of unsustainable 
exploitation due to high demand (Eben, 2011). In this regard, there was need for the 
creation of a national plan for the management of Prunus africana to ensure that the 
resource is not endangered and that the benefits flow improve livelihood of indigenous 
people and local communities while respecting both international and national norms. 
In 1981, Cameroon joined the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) which was later enacted into Cameroon law on 29 
July 2005 (Decree no. 2005/2869/PM) and ANAFOR was designated in 2006 as the 
scientific authority for plants, specifying the organisation, functioning and monitoring of 
how CITES is implemented. In 1995, Prunus was listed as an Appendix-II species and 
classified; therefore, its trade needed to be regulated because bark sold at international 
market were from wild harvest (Amougou et al., 2011). To ensure that trade did not 
threaten the survival of wild animal and plants, a technical report which specifies the 
method of harvesting and quantities harvested, was submitted by the Provincial Chief of 
Forestry as demanded by the Forestry Law of 1994. Since then, an annual based 
exploitation permits system for dried barks, has been used to regulate harvesting and 
exportation of this ‘special forest product’. But illegal bark exploitation soon cropped in 
bringing a ban on export and commercial exploitation in 2007 by CITES. All 
stakeholders (Fig. 9.1) especially local communities involved in the trade of Prunus, 
faced economic hardship until 2011, when this ban was up-lifted after the government 
reviewed its methods of attributing special permits, took an inventory of existing stock 
and prescribed new sustainable exploitation methods satisfactory to CITES. 
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Figure 9.1: Roles and responsibility of stakeholders in sustainable management of 
Prunus (SMP). 
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This led to the adoption of permit allocation called Prunus Allocation Units (PAU) 
which grants exploitation rights within a specified unit or territory based on inventory 
and management plan for that unit. So Mt. Cameroon is considered as a PAU with a five 
year rotation Prunus management plan. The PAU is made up of the MCNP and its 
support zone. MCNP contains about 90% of exploitable Prunus africana within the 
PAU which is divided into five management clusters (3,691ha, 3,939ha, 6,291ha, 
12,248ha and 6,699ha) totalling 32,868ha (Table. 9.1; and Map 9.1). Only one cluster is 
harvested each year with a five-year rotation (quota) harvesting plan. Healthy trees are 
harvested while wilted trees are left untouched, and felling of trees is restricted within 
the national park. 
 
Map 9.1: Map of Prunus management clusters as a sub-set of MCNP management unit 
showing distribution of trees (Eben, 2011). 
267 
For a five year rotation, 377,482tons of fresh bark can be harvested resulting into 
178,741tons of dry weight (Eben, 2011). Only one authorised buyer, identified through a 
transparent bidding procedure by MINFOF is allowed - for effective monitoring and 
accountability. With increase in international trade, pharmaceutical industry has changed 
the use of Prunus bark as a local medicine, timber and fuel wood to a high volume 
export goods for the treatment of prostatic hyperplasia. Cameroon has exported more 
than 7300 tons since 2005 and this has provided the country with more than $2,738,027 
making it a major source of income for local communities in the highland area. 
Presently, Cameroon supply almost half of  the world’s Prunus bark with major 
importers as France (53%), Spain (31%), Madagascar (11%), India (1%), USA (1%), 
Belgium (1%), China (1%) and others  (1%) (Eben, 2011). 
Table 9.1: Density and exploitable Prunus on Mount Cameroon (Amougou et al., 2011). 
Location Density 
(number of 
trees) 
dbh<30cm 
Density 
(number of 
trees) 
dbh>=30cm 
Total 
density 
(number  
of trees) 
Stock of 
fresh 
bark 
(tons) 
Annual 
quota 
(tons) 
R:5yrs 
National Park 1.92 
(27,984) 
2.01 
(28,740) 
3.93 
(56,724) 
1580,701 316,140  
Support zone 1.65 
(10,635) 
0.79 (3,758) 2.44 
(14,394) 
206,710 41,342 
Average  1.79 1.40  3.19    
Total (38,454) (32,498) (71,117) 1787,411  357,482 
Total dry bark 
equivalent 
   893,705 178,741 
Participation of local communities is an integral part of Prunus management plan, 
whereby, each village signs a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the park 
management services with stated roles and responsibilities of the villages and benefits- 
sharing-mechanism for poverty alleviation, geared toward sustainable development. 
Harvesting, trade and management are also done following specified Prunus africana 
norms. Villagers are also encouraged to regenerate Prunus plantation and integrate 
Prunus into agro-forestry. Only trained and certified harvesters are allowed to harvest 
under strict supervision. It is believed that through this management plan, the resources 
are able to regenerate and increase both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
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9.2 Methodology (See 1.6) 
9.3 Results 
Few members of Bomboko and Buea clusters (<2%) have been involved in forest 
management projects before 2005, but with the launch of MCNP in Dec. 2009, all four 
clusters had become engaged in forest management projects as from 2010 and in 
2012/2013, 17% of respondents participated in park activities (Fig. 9.2a). Before the 
creation of the park, communities’ common forest practices included protection of 
specific tree species, education on forest management, mapping/inventory of forest 
resources, enactment of forest by-laws, cutting down of competing trees and 
establishment of clear use rights for special products (Fig. 9.2b). 
 
 
Figure 9.2: Increased percentage of participants engaged in forest projects with the 
launch of MCNP (a) and common forest practices before the launching of the park (b). 
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9.3.1 Community perception towards establishing strict conservation zone 
A Kruskal-Wallis test shows a significant difference in perception that, strict 
conservation zone enhances efficiency of conservation within different clusters 
(H(3)=12.55, p=.006) (Fig. 9.3a). Pairwise comparison shows significant differences 
between Muyuka-Bomboko (H(3)=37.876, p=.032, z=2.788, r=26%) and Muyuka-Buea 
(H(3)=41.158,  p=.014,  z=3.049,  r=28%).  Result shows a significant trend between 
cluster (J=10,868.5; p=.013, z=-2.493, r=15.5%) from Buea, Bomboko, West-Coast and 
Muyuka in descending order with an effect size of 15.5%. 
Independent sample t-test also shows a significant relationship between participation in 
MCNP-activities and perception that, strict conservation zone enhances conservation 
initiative (t=-3.346, df=257 p=.001) (Table. 9.3) (Fig. 9.3b). Results also show 
significant relationships in Muyuka (p=.008) and West-Coast (p=.004), but non- 
significant relationships in Bomboko and Buea (p>.05) (Fig. 9.3c). 
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Figure 9.3: Kruskal-Wallis plot showing variance of perception of strict zone between 
clusters (a), and t-test plots showing how perception of strict conservation zone 
influences participation in MCNP-activities in all clusters (b) and within each cluster (c). 
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Mann-Whitney U test shows that participation is significantly affected by perception that, 
strict conservation zone is necessary to enhance efficiency of conservation (U=9,332.5; 
p=.002 z=3.129) with an effect-size (r) of 20% in MCNP-clusters. Bomboko and Buea 
show non-significant relationships with effect sizes of 16% and 8% respectively, while 
results reveal significant relationships for Muyuka (U=410.5, p=.015, z=2.436) and 
West-Coast (U=922, p=.009, z=2.614) with effect sizes of 35% and 30% respectively 
(Table 9.3). 
Significant linear regression model presenting how perception of strict conservation 
zone (A) contributes to participation in MCNP-activities is significant at F=11.2, p=.001, 
adjusted R=.038 and is explained by the following equation: 
 Overall: P=.827 + .204(A) 
Where P=Participation, A=Perception in support of strict conservation zone. 
9.3.2 Community support of MCNP-conservation initiative 
Results show that most members of community support the MCNP-initiative (Fig. 9.4a) 
because they wish to improve the natural environment, enhance carbon stock, promote 
local participation, generate income, promote community development and solve land 
ownership conflict (Fig. 9.4b). But few members do not support the initiative because of 
no benefit to them, loss of rights over forest, lack of awareness, conflict resulting from 
spying on each other and exclusion of local people in decision-making (Fig. 9.4c).  
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Figure 9.4: Percentages of respondents supporting MCNP-initiative (a), and reasons for 
supporting (b), or not supporting (c) MCNP conservation initiative. 
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A kruskal-Wallis test shows that promotion of local participation as one of the reasons 
for supporting MCNP-initiative is significant between clusters (H=42.192, p<.0001) (Fig. 
9.5a). Pairwise comparison shows significant differences between Buea-Bomboko 
(H=58.727, p<.0001, z=5.05, r=.446), Buea-West-Coast (H=-62.105, P<.0001, z=-5.458, 
r=.471), Muyuka-Bomboko (H=42.368, p=.004, z=3.393, r=.391) and Muyuka-West- 
Coast (H=-45.747, p<.0001, z=-3.733, r=.342). Result reveals a non-significant trend 
(J=11,907, z=.915, p=.360) from West-Coast, Bomboko, Muyuka to Buea in descending 
order with an effect size of 6%. 
Independent sample t-test shows that, participation significantly relates to perception of 
promoting local engagement (t=-6.561, p<.0001) (Fig. 9.5b) as well as in each of the 
clusters (p<.05) (Table 9.4; Fig. 9.5c). A Mann-Whitney test also shows that 
participation is significantly influenced by perception of promoting local engagement 
(U=9,778, z=5.452, p<.0001, r=34%) as well as in each of the clusters with Bomboko, 
Buea, Muyuka and West-Coast registering effect sizes of 39%, 35%, 52% and 33% 
respectively (Table 9.4). 
Significant linear regression model, revealing contribution of perception of promoting 
local participation to actual engagement is significant at F=36.46, p<.0001, adj. R=.126 
and explained in the equation: 
Overall: P=.566 + .360(PLP) 
Where P=Participation; and PLP= perception of promoting local participation 
  
274 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
Figure 9.5: A Kruskal-Wallis plot showing variance in promoting local participation 
within clusters (a), and t-tests showing how perception of wanting to promote local 
participation influences participation in MCNP-clusters (b) and within each cluster (c). 
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9.3.3 Influence of perception of tenure, cost-bearer and benefactors on support of 
MCNP-projects 
Figure 9.6 shows that some reasons for not supporting MCNP initiative is because of 
government ownership (Fig. 9.6a) control (Fig. 9.6b) and decision-making of forest 
policies (Fig. 9.6c), and these factors also affected participation in MCNP-activities even 
within supporters. Non-supporters perceive that the local communities are bearing the 
cost of the projects while the government remains main benefactor, but the reverse is 
true for supporters (Fig 9.6d and 9.6e). 
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Figure 9.6: Variance of forest ownership (a), control (b), policy makers (c), cost bearers 
(d) and benefactors (e) between supporter and non-supporters of MCNP projects. 
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9.3.4 Level of engagement in MCNP-activities 
Though 95.4% of respondents supported MCNP, only 34.7% have ever taken part in 
forest management projects at any given time (Fig. 9.7a), one of the reasons being that 
most of them have never been invited to participate, especially, in Bomboko (Fig. 9.7b) 
which also shows the lowest percentage in participation. Respondents are therefore, 
seeking for more mobilisation and sensitisation, direct employment to work in the park 
and incentives to get them on board (Fig. 9.7c). 
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Figure 9.7: Percentages of local communities’ member that have ever participated (a), 
reasons for not participating (b) and ways to enhance participation (c) in MCNP-
activities. 
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Although the study shows that only 1.9% of respondents have ever heard of REDD+, 
they were all aware of projects like conservation of MCNP, sustainable management of 
Prunus and/or reforestation/tree planting which are an integral part of MCNP-REDD+ 
projects (Fig. 9.8a). Though 14 different functions/roles are carried out by local 
participants, results show that they are mostly involved in manual labour (one-off 
involvement) or being member of committee, whose main role are to enforce regulation 
within their community, therefore, real engagement is negligible (Fig. 9.8b). 
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Figure 9.8: Percentages of different projects participated in (a) and function/role 
carried out (b) by participants within all clusters. 
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An average of 6-10 members have been trained to carry out forest activities (9.9a), but 
most community members do not know how many members have been trained 
(especially in Bomboko, Buea and West-Coast). 17% of respondents are not aware of 
any training opportunity especially in Muyuka (45%). Figure 9.9b goes further to show 
that 35% of these information recorded by participants, concern illegal activities, 
especially in Bomboko (42%). 
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Figure 9.9: Percentages of average number of community members trained for (a) and 
types of information recorded during (b) MCNP-activities. 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Bomboko
Buea
Muyuka
West…
Overall
1-5 members 6-10 members 11-15 members 16-20 members
>20 members I don't know None
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
Bomboko Buea Muyuka West-Coast Overall
Biodiversity NTFP
Timber Hunting
Game/bushmeat Education
Illegal activities Wellbeing
Volume of timber harvested Quantity of firewood
Number of animal grazing
280 
Result shows that only 11.8% of respondents have used electronic devices in carrying 
out any MCNP-activities (Fig. 9.10a). These instruments include GPS, camera and 
phones which are mostly used in the West-Coast, followed by Buea, Bomboko and 
Muyuka (Fig. 9.10b). Figure 9.10c shows that other non-electronic devices like cutlasses 
are also being used, though 6% of participants do not know if there is any use of 
equipment. 
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Figure 9.10: Percentages of electronic devices used (a), types of electronic devices (b) 
and non-electronic devices used (c) in carrying out MCNP-activities. 
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9.3.5 Qualitative results 
The word clouds show that, respondents talked mostly about community, park, 
involvement, working, development, conservation, activities and management (Fig. 
9.11a), from where two major themes were established; village community 
development/benefits (A), and park conservation management activities (B). Figure 
9.11b and table 9.2 further show the nature of comments from different levels of 
stakeholders. 
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Figure 9.11: Word clouds showing most mentioned words from interviewees (a) and 
types of comments provided by different levels of stakeholders (b) on co-management 
issues around MCNP. 
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9.3.5.1 Village community development and benefits 
GIZ interviewee perceives MCNP initiative as having the potential to deliver its 
sustainable development objective, if and only if, the state dominant power structure is 
diluted to empower local communities’ participation as well as resolution of other 
challenges like migration. 
Question: “Do you think that MCNP-REDD+ activity will lead to sustainable 
development of local community?” 
GIZ: “In general yes. If we involve local communities in the participation of forest 
activity, it will lead to sustainable development. But in Cameroon, we are at the initial 
stage to really involve communities in REDD+ issues. Moreover, Cameroon has a very 
hierarchical structure. So it will take a long time for communities to see that they are 
empowered enough to participate. In the long run it will certainly lead to sustainable 
development if other problems like migration are also addressed.” 
Local communities’ respondents are concerned about lack of employment, financial 
assistant, agricultural training as well as other basic necessities. They also show total 
dissatisfaction in the way communities are treated by park services. 
LC: “We need financial assistance and training to do large scale farming.” 
LC: “It is better they employ us the indigenous people because we know and understand 
the forest better.” 
LC: “We have also asked them to employ the village boys who know more about the 
forest because they live there, but they refused.” 
LC: “There is no light, no good road, no health centre, no bank or credit union, but 
there are private money lenders. Only two houses have lights, no pipe-water. We travel 
to other villages to fetch water very far from here. We are not motivated. We need 
microfinance, institutions, schools to train us, we need jobs.” 
LC: “We are just praying that the REDD+ should put into practice all their 
conservation ideas. We love the national park too, we love the conservation programme, 
but we are not happy with the way they are treating us. Our cry is that we need 
283 
employment, we must not work only on the mountain, and we can work anywhere else. 
We just need a job and a salary at the end of the month.” 
9.3.5.2 Park conservation management activities 
GIZ interviewee reveals a top-down governance approach; whose main reason to include 
local communities is to amass state benefits; though the national stakeholders assure that 
they are trying to involve communities. These perceptions contradict statement by sub-
national stakeholders as concerns inclusion of local communities as partner because 
members of local communities function mostly in cheap labour (demarcating 
boundaries) and reporting illegal activities, while committee members urge their 
communities’ members to implement rules and regulation. 
GIZ: “It is a top-down approach, not a bottom-top. So it is not the community asking for 
more involvement in the park management, it is coming from the park service trying to 
involve more local stakeholders because we see more benefit in involving the 
communities.” 
National: “We involve the local community in identifying the key drivers of deforestation 
and land degradation.... local communities are involved in carbon sequestration like 
CED.” 
Sub-national: “We are implementing collaborative management approach, whereby, we 
mobilise the community towards appropriate measures. We try to involve the community 
as partners and the villagers can tell you how involved they are.” 
Sub-national: “The clusters are divided by natural boundaries; by hills, rivers etc. ... It 
enables the conservation members to really know the boundaries ... We employ local 
community here to demarcate the boundary. ...they (boundary tracers) inform other 
members of community that any activities on certain areas are illegal. Illegal activities 
are reported and the park service takes necessary actions. They choose the people who 
are going to work in this activity and they are actually paid. The village committee send 
three members each to present what have been done”. 
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The approach is more of explanation by park services and instruction compliance by 
members of communities which contradict co-management approach. Though the sub-
national respondent claims that they are not imposing on local communities, the limited 
function of communities in reporting illegal activities proves that communities are 
marginalised. 
Sub-national: “We are implementing a collaborative management approach, where, 
those who are elements of the community development explain about conservation and 
development. The park was created as a motivator for development… We are assisting 
villagers to come out with conservation development agreement. We assisted the villages 
to carry out the ‘agro-ecological socio-economic assessment’ to know what the villages 
are really doing to earn a living, what they are collecting in the forest, how they use the 
forest, what are their problems.” 
Sub-national: “We have to sensitise the communities and negotiate with them. Based on 
funds available, we can select one or two micro-projects to be funded. It is after this that 
we can add it in the document of conservation development agreement. It is this 
document that segregates conservation activities and defines also the responsibilities in 
the park and conservation development agreement. Stating clearly how we can assist the 
community by building roads, buying cassava machine etc. So we do not just impose…” 
Sub-national: “We are working within the framework of MCNP. This park was created 
in December 2009 with the objectives to ensure sustainable management. The MCNP is 
peculiar in plants and animals species and also to promote aqua-tourism which is one 
big objective in this forest projects… One of our responsibilities now is to see, how we 
can put in place structures for park management. We are looking at the park and 
activities of the surrounding park… these 41 villages already give you an idea of the 
pressure around this area. It has a human population of more than 100,000 and a 
surface area of 58,178 ha. So it is a big challenge to take this responsibility.” 
Sub-national: “The Park has a lot of protective units like the collaboration management 
unit which does a lot of patrol to ensure that no illegal activity is done.” 
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MOCAP respondent reveals the fact that more communities have engaged in forest 
projects since the creation of MCNP, and Prunus harvesting, though strenuous, is now 
done in a sustainable way. 
Local-group: “MOCAP was created in 2005 before the national park was created. We 
started with 13 villages.... After the creation of MCNP, we had about 31 villages that 
registered with MOCAP.” 
Local-group: “They cannot harvest it as they used to harvest because it was 
unsustainable, but now they have to plant the trees and harvest with a specific method 
which we are training them and only specific trees are harvested though strenuous.” 
Though communities are preserving plant species and felling some, they pride 
themselves as forest custodian and score their conservation effort at 80%. 
LC: “We are falling down trees, but we are also planting and preserving some 
particular trees species.” 
LC: “We are the ones preserving the forest. If we have to rate ourselves in the 
involvement in forest activity, we would earn 4/5.” 
9.4 Discussion 
Local forest management and access to forest resources are essential in maintaining 
functioning of local communities and culture (Shepherd, 2004) and also vital in the 
implementation of sustainable REDD+ projects (Peskett et al., 2008). The Programme 
for Sustainable Management of Natural Resources (PSMNR-SWR) was launched in 
2004 when a financial agreement was signed between Cameroon (MINEFI and 
MINFOF) and Germany (GIZ) as a development aid for sustainable management of 
natural resources within the South West Region (SWR) and €7,000,000 was disbursed 
(Mbolo, 2012). The aim was to sustainably manage forest, promote community 
participation and alleviate poverty, but this has also increased the grip of MINFOF over 
local communities. MINFOF depends on GIZ and other western donors for financing the 
programme and this has strengthened their influence in national forest policy and 
implementation strategies. Thus, projects are operating on a set of foreign ideas and 
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values which do not fit local ideas. This €7,000,000 development assistance budget was 
enough incentive to incite appropriate behaviour within MINFOF. Few community 
projects have also induced behavioural change within members of local communities 
who stand to lose expected benefits, in case they resist, and their chance of positive 
outcomes from the battle is negligible. 
Before 2009, there were few forest projects operational within MCNP-clusters, but 
communities had already been practicing forest management such as protection of 
specific plant species, extension on forest management, inventory of special forest 
products, enactment of forest by-laws and establishment of clear use rights for specific 
products among others. The establishment of MCNP in Dec. 2009 registered an increase 
in forest projects participants. With knowledge of these prior forest practices, it is 
expected that members of local community would play a major role in MCNP, but the 
results fall short of this expectation. 
9.4.1 Community support for MCNP initiative 
According to Krott et al. (2014), the concept of Actors Centred Power (ACP) is “a social 
relationship, where actor A alternates the behaviour of actor B without recognising B’s 
will”, while trust is when actor B, accepts actor A’s information without proof/check. 
Actor A can persuade, provide or with-hold specific information and interacts with B so 
much so that, B gains confidence in A and acts accordingly, especially, when B is 
expecting benefits at the end of his/her action. A may use incentives to motivate B’s 
behaviour and trigger appropriate action so long as A attends to B’s interest. This has 
made local communities, to willingly, support MCNP-REDD+ projects bestowed on 
them, as they are reluctantly losing their land rights and access rights to forest and forest 
resources; with expectation of financial benefits and community development projects. 
Local communities perceive the establishment of strict conservation zone as absolutely 
necessary in enhancing conservation effort and this perception significantly influences 
participation in MCNP-activities. The major reasons why local communities support the 
conservation initiative are to promote local communities’ participation, enhance natural 
environment, generate income and improve community development. Incentives and 
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information they received, motivated communities into supporting project, but it may be 
disastrous if their expectations are not met. 
9.4.2 Ownership, control, decision-making and projects benefactors 
The processes of forest governance and outcomes of REDD+ initiatives depend heavily, 
on foreign and national stakeholders who apply elements of ‘actor-centred power’ (trust, 
incentives and coercion) to influence forest management by empowering marginalised 
local stakeholders, who, by virtue of poor financial background, have no choice, than to 
act accordingly, in expectation of developmental and/or financial benefits. According to 
Larson & Ribot (2007), forest policies and manner of implementation exclude local poor 
communities from forest benefits with international and national stakeholders 
influencing outcomes, while manipulating and marginalising local stakeholders. Krott 
(2005) goes on to state that “those who utilise or protect forests are forced to 
subordinate their interests to politically determined programmes in the face of conflict” 
as a result of  “external stakeholders and political players availing themselves of power”  
These findings alongside that of this study are critical in questioning effectiveness of 
REDD+ concept in achieving socio-economic outcomes. 
Power which is considered “a hidden factor in development assistance” is evident in 
MCNP, where external stakeholders have become more influential, while local 
stakeholders are powerless with no option, but to follow reluctantly. A study carried out 
by Mbolo (2012), shows that MINFOF and GIZ are powerful influential actors 
determining outcomes of natural resource management projects in the South West 
Region. While local communities are relying on unchecked information from these 
influential stakeholders, they still comply without checking alternatives because they 
trust MINFOF-SWR who also trusted GIZ and accepted management conditions laid 
down by them without checking for alternatives. MINFOF and GIZ have become more 
influential and powerful (Mbolo, 2012), while local communities have reluctantly lost 
their rights over the same forest that they had control for decades. Thus, rendering 
common initiative groups and/or village forest management committees ineffective, 
powerless and often portray as captives to incentives (motivations) than community 
representatives. 
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The 1994 Forest Law allows state ownership of permanent forest domain, but does 
establish usufruct rights to local communities. This law also enables GIZ, KfW, and 
other international organisation to exert more influence in controlling natural resource 
management policies in Cameroon (Mbolo, 2012) which make them to become a sine 
qua non in formulating and implementing forest project with westernised political 
ideology (Yufanyi & Krott, 2011), that doesn’t fit local perspectives. Before the arrival 
of colonial masters, forest resources were managed according to customary laws with 
chiefs as main administrators (Bigombé, 2003). State ownership, control and decision 
over forest policies have induced some community members not to support forest 
projects and this has significantly affected participation in MCNP-activities. Supporters 
think that they are the benefactors, while the government bear the cost. However, non- 
supporters see local communities as cost-bearers and the government as main benefactor. 
But who really is the main benefactor? The government, international organisation or 
local communities? At the moment the answer is hardly positive for local communities 
because expectations have not been met, but time will tell about what happens when 
carbon is sold. 
9.4.3 Local engagement and expectations 
Most members of local communities support the conservation initiative, but between 
2012 and 2013, only 17% of respondents took part in MCNP-activities because of 
inadequate information or lack of invitation to participate. The high level of support 
shows that they are eager and willing to engage, but the big question is: “Why are local 
communities members not given the chance to take up position, and continue with or 
enhance their common forest practices?” Even those that are opportune to take part are 
not taking-up any tangible positions. Instead, they are used as manual labourer 
(boundary demarcation, tree planting, illegal activities) or mere committee members 
whose main roles are to enforce rules/regulations within communities. An average of 6-
10 members have been trained from each cluster which is relatively low (2.57%) to 
provide the capacity needed to embark on meaningful participation. This also justifies 
why the three major activities/roles carried out by participants are being members of 
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committee, boundary demarcation and tree planting which requires just manual labour. 
Improve training and education on forest/REDD+ issues will enhance local participation. 
According to Kremen et al. (2000), conservation benefits are global, but cost is mainly 
incurred by local communities who must forgo exploitation rights, restriction from forest 
and forest resources for the sake of conservation, despite high cultural and livelihood 
implications. Past PES programmes showed mixed results in benefits to local 
communities (Pagiola, 2008) and the Clean Development Mechanism did not result into 
any substantial benefits to the poor and rural farmers, despite its sustainable 
development objectives due to lack of recognition of customary land claims (Boyd et al., 
2007). In 2000, Plantecam enterprise sold Pygeum at 2000CFA/kg and in 2006 the 
export value was about 2,649 million CFA with price ranging from 660-1000CFA/kg 
(Ingram & Nsawir, 2007). Despite the high price of Prunus, only 150CFA is being paid 
to harvester because of lack of market information, dissemination and market monopoly 
by park managers. Given the availability of capital, more value could be added to 
pygeum through production and transformation (drying, chipping and extraction). The 
government and international organisation have successfully used the element of trust 
and incentives to put local communities under their influence, it is now left for them to 
prove their trustworthiness because there is yet no meaningful community development 
or income generated through employment to improve livelihoods. 
9.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
Despite local communities’ massive support of MCNP-REDD+ projects, forest 
managers have taken advantage of communities’ voluntary/cheap labour, who trust 
forest managers to compensate them, by providing socio-economic benefits and 
improving livelihood. While MINFOF and GIZ are becoming more influential, 
communities are losing their rights over decades of standing control of forest, thereby, 
rendering members of committees powerless and making them captives to motivations 
than community representatives. Some members of local communities do not support 
the conservation project because of perception that their land rights had been seized and 
this has also affected engagement. Members of MCNP-clusters have for decades lived 
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and derived their livelihood from the forest, and it would sound unbelievable if they 
cannot boost of enhancing livelihood, alleviating poverty and community development 
with such bio-diversifying rich natural forest as co-managers. 
As of now, REDD+ is still in its infant stage and has actually not yielded any substantial 
income or development to local communities, though, expectations remains high. Its 
threats are evident, but REDD+ has much potential in showcasing the opportunity it 
holds if carried out through a bottom-top approach where, local communities are main 
stakeholders and managers of the initiative. So trade-off between conservation and 
development should be acknowledged, negotiated and accepted by both, REDD+ 
promoters and community representatives during project planning to enable realistic 
appraisal and legitimisation of the conservation initiative. Project design needs to be 
flexible, and based on adaptive collaborative management approach which aims at 
producing appropriate outcomes that renders project more resilient. National level 
REDD+ should be subject to adaptation and community development objectives as 
agreed at COP-18 in Doha. 
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10 Mt. Cameroon National Park REDD+ project: a 
threat or an opportunity to local communities? 
This study presents an analysis of the involvement of local communities in the design, 
implementation and monitoring of REDD+ projects at an early stage to provide 
information that guide management strategies in ensuring effectiveness, efficiency and 
equitable REDD+ programmes. Such a transition will also prevent early failure of the 
initiative as REDD+ projects get implemented through the UNFCCC process. This 
chapter provides a broad overview of REDD+ concepts, a synthesis of results, and 
conclusion from the research, that evaluates if the MCNP-REDD+ projects is an 
opportunity or a threat to local communities. 
10.1 Introduction 
REDD+ may result to land grab rendering socio-economic consequence to local 
communities; yet, there is no binding commitment to safeguard standards, local rights, 
tenure security and government failure in securing Free Prior Informed Consent (Larson 
et al., 2013). Good forest projects should be more about recognising the rights of 
indigenous people rather than being in control of their territory. As stated by Mbow et al. 
(2012), 70 million hectares of land have been grabbed in unsustainable land deals in 
tropical African countries by multinational investors and this has led to massive 
deforestation without any benefits for local communities. With increase in logging, 
mineral and oil exploitation, large-scale monoculture plantation, grazing, construction 
and big hydroelectricity dams, local territories are being invaded with activities that 
result into major deforestation and land degradation. Both international and 
governmental strategies to reduce deforestation have sometimes, had socio-economic 
consequences on the indigenous people and local communities (Blom et al., 2010). 
Eviction of indigenous people and limited access to forest resources are evident in the 
history of national park and protected or conservation areas creation, though, Burgess et 
al. (2013) argue that local eviction events on some projects site like the Rufiji delta, had 
nothing to do with REDD+ or changes in government policy, but rather a historical 
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event that stretch back over 100 years and therefore, unconnected to REDD+ 
implementation. Deforestation is not a common practice for forest dwellers because they 
cultivate only small farming area for food crops and exploit the forest for basic needs, 
yet, they still preserve the forest which is their home. It is big companies and private 
land owners who gain exploitation rights from government, permitting them to deforest 
and degrade large areas of forest. Quiet often these big companies use local people as 
labourers to deforest their project sites. 
Climate change issues have created an urgent need to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
largely produced by burning fossil fuels. Despite the fact that this fossil fuel is burnt 
mostly by developed countries, lands in the global South now face the threat of being 
grabbed for monoculture tree planting. The replacement of natural forests for 
monoculture tree planting and plantation causes deforestation that only goes to increase 
climate issues. Instead of confronting the root cause of climate crisis, organisation like 
Forest Stewardship Council now legitimise the replacement of natural forest by biomass 
plantation as ‘sustainable certified’ (Larson et al., 2013). This has resulted to an increase 
in price of wood, which in turn causes a rise in demand for woody biomass energy that 
adds pressure to the forest, increase conflict between different land tenure systems and 
affects other tropical ecosystems. 
Contrary to logging companies that cut down trees and sell timber for money, REDD+ 
promoters make money by leaving the trees standing, to enhance the amount of carbon 
stock. Now companies are buying carbon credit; the right to continue emitting carbon by 
paying someone to stop the same amount of carbon to be stored somewhere else in the 
world. The storage of carbon and making of money by REDD+ promoters are 
guaranteed, if and only if, the trees remain standing. This sometimes might lead to 
conflict with local communities who live in and derive their livelihood from the forest, 
as only members of the community benefited. 
REDD+ is now seen as a tool to mitigate deforestation that is fast spreading across 
tropical forest countries because of the potential to store about 50% more carbon per unit 
area than forest outside the tropics. According to Sitoe et al. (2013), REDD+ must be 
implemented in a manner that respects the rights and livelihoods of local communities. 
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But how much information do these people have on REDD+? Is it what they want or it is 
imposed on them? Who is the main benefactor of these projects? The world at large, 
REDD+ promoters, the government or the local community? At COP-16, a consensus 
was reached that REDD+ should be carried out in three different phases; developing an 
action plan, implementation of REDD+ policies and performance based payment, 
though, financial options were deferred to COP-17 in Durban. By using the tripology of 
property rights - authoritative, control and use rights (Sikor et al., 2012), actors and their 
rights need to be identified to determine the allocation of appropriate incentives to 
stakeholders. 
However, REDD+ has become a vital climate change mitigation option in Africa with its 
greatest challenges revolving around implementation and impacts on livelihoods of 
forest dwellers. With 60% of Africans living in rural areas and surviving mostly from 
agriculture, food security (adequate nutrition) should be balanced with efforts to avoid 
deforestation. The major cause of forest loss in this continent has been that of poor 
farming practices such as the use of fire to burn down cultivated land and shifting 
cultivation amongst others. Population increase has led to an increase in the demands of 
food, bio-fuels, minerals and timber, which also contributes to deforestation. Addressing 
the multiple drivers of deforestation is becoming complex, so there is need for a close 
examination of effort to fight climate change, mitigation, adaptation and meeting up 
with developmental goals simultaneously. Therefore, REDD+ if carried out effectively, 
could contribute to poverty alleviation while addressing mitigation and adaptation of 
climate change, hence, in line with sustainable development and meeting-up with the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the upcoming Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). 
Although the eight MDGs provided a focal point for government to establish policies 
and aid programmes to improve livelihood and environmental sustainability, it failed to 
consider the holistic nature of development with no mention of human rights issues. 
Theoretically, the goals applied to all countries, but in reality, it provides achievable 
targets for poor countries (good health, poverty reduction and hunger). Still, more than 
800 million people live in hunger as we approach the MDGs deadline of 2015 (UN-
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MDGs, 2014). From January 2016, it is hope that the 17 SDGs with 169 proposed 
targets and indicators aimed to frame the UN members states agenda and policies to end 
poverty, improve livelihood and wellbeing, good governance, human rights, gender 
equality, biodiversity conservation, sustainable management of natural resources and 
economies, combat climate change and its impacts, promote sustainable use of natural 
ecosystems, social justice and global partnership (local stakeholders inclusive), will 
better transformed the world toward sustainable development. 
State ownership of forest is central in Cameroon and all land without a registered land 
title is treated as state land. The registration procedure is also inaccessible making the 
state to be in control of most of the land. Ngendakumana et al. (2013), argues that the 
success of conservation and REDD+ implementation cannot be effective without 
recognition and enforcement of traditional tenure because the institutional and policy 
frameworks give exclusive land tenure rights to the states, with local farmers having 
limited access to forest and its resources which is their source of livelihood. Cameroon’s 
national REDD+ readiness process is at a pilot stage covering 30% of forested land 
involving nine REDD+ projects. Freudenthal et al. (2011) in his report on REDD and 
Rights in Cameroon, found out that Cameroon REDD+ readiness preparatory plan lacks 
effective strategies to enhance engagement of local communities, insufficient data on 
drivers of deforestation, lack of free prior and informed consent, and unclarified benefit-
sharing mechanism, resource tenure and carbon rights. 
There is need for carbon as well as social and economic data to be validated, verified 
and periodically monitored for all REDD+ projects. Quantifying changes in carbon 
stocks; assessing permanence and leakages; and understanding projects implication for 
biodiversity and local communities remains major challenges in designing, 
implementing and monitoring of REDD+. Though many activities have been launched 
to improve the content and functions of REDD+, these activities seem to be distributed 
into various programmes with different implementation modalities and some 
programmes seem to show redundancies, resulting into complexity in understanding 
major stakeholders, implementation strategies, aims, policies and methodology 
surrounding REDD+. 
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This study supports the findings of Freudenthal et al. (2011), who argues that, REDD+ 
plans include little engagement of local communities, hence, developing in a top-down 
manner and there is fear that REDD projects could marginalise and increase poverty 
among local communities because contrary to the 1994 Forestry Law, local people are 
not aware of REDD+ existence, no evidence of plans for participation of local 
communities in national REDD+ readiness process that connects to FCPF. Only 1.5% of 
respondents in MCNP communities know the reality of REDD+, though, most 
respondents are aware of the need to reduce climate change, deforestation, tree planting, 
conservation of forest and biodiversity. REDD+ promoters also promise employment 
and finance of local projects through a participatory-based approach. With this promise 
of a better life, these vulnerable communities with limited financial resources have no 
other choice, but to follow reluctantly. 
For the past 30 years, the government of Cameroon has not been engaged on the 
management of this reserve and this negligence had encouraged encroachment. Since 
2009, members of park villages are deprived from extending farmlands into the park. 
Although communities’ members do have claims, they still recognise that they were not 
supposed to be in the park. It is due to increased population, farmland scarcity, and state 
laxity that plantations were open in the park, but they still expect compensation. Insecure 
tenure has resulted to land claims and contestation within MCNP. The 1974 Land 
Ordinance allows the government to be guidance of all lands, but traditional rulers have 
rights over land within their territories and this has led to unresolved land claims. For 
communities to actually benefit from forest initiatives the proposals should come from 
within the community itself and members of communities should be the main 
stakeholders managing the initiative. The projects must not be imposed on members of 
communities from the outside (government, NGOs, or multinationals). Most of these 
communities affected by REDD+ projects, rely essentially on farming, agro-forestry and 
harvesting of NTFPs to feed their households and generate income for themselves. 
REDD+ must not be a situation where local communities and forest are subjected to a 
form of expropriation. Excluding indigenous people from accessing forest resources 
(food, fruits, medicines, fibres, fishing and hunting) for basic need is an infringement on 
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their livelihood, survival, and above all, their customs and traditions with limited land 
rights. 
When environmental and developmental concerns/priorities are defined without 
according standing to local voices in decision-making, negative consequences are 
inevitable. Indigenous people in local communities around REDD+ projects areas are 
subjected to sensitisation and awareness raising, leaving out migrants who have been 
living in harmony with each other for more than a decade and this is causing some of 
them to relocate. Some are persecuted for not following the rules, making them to lose 
their freedom and independence. Some members of the community who depend heavily 
on the forest relocate to cities for alternatives. 
Incentives are offered to communities through a participatory-based approach as 
compensation for their support and limited use of forest in the form of jobs and finances 
for community projects. Some community members are recruited for boundary 
demarcation, while most of them work as security guards trapping down defaulters and 
reporting illegal forest activities which result to conflict within MCNP. Community head 
reports any unlawful entrance or activity in the forest, creating hatred and conflict 
amongst them. But then, the most disadvantaged members of the community are 
excluded because they neither get hired nor participate in community projects. 
10.2 Conclusions and recommendations 
Forest dwellers have preserved and coexisted with the forest for centuries before the 
arrival of REDD+, but the vast majority of local community members do not benefit 
from government regulated forest revenue. Instead, they are accused of deforestation 
while polluting companies go scout free with claims that buying carbon credits permit 
them to pollute. Even if leakages are prevented and REDD+ projects are successful, 
climate change might not be mitigated if the polluting countries continue to pollute and 
offset in tropical countries at the expense of local communities’ livelihoods and land 
rights. The future of these forests will continue to be threatened by climate change and 
the raw materials needed by these big polluters such as minerals, oils, coal, timber, will 
be causing deforestation in other areas. Reducing emission (on site) from big companies 
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while supporting community forest management is a more feasible option to mitigate 
climate change and safeguard land rights and livelihood of indigenous people. 
REDD+ donors and managers should support local community quest for secure tenure 
and national level REDD+ programmes should be linked to adaptation and community 
development objectives as agreed at COP-18 in Doha (UNFCCC, 2012). Members of 
local communities are now being restricted access to land, water, food, and firewood for 
daily livelihood because most of them do not hold legal title to the forestland they 
occupy, use and derive their basic needs. Because of decline in forest products due to 
restriction on reserve, developmental projects and provision of improved agricultural 
techniques to farmers to meet up with livelihood challenges should be a priority. 
Therefore, community forest management might be a feasible option in enhancing 
sustainable livelihood and communities’ development while safeguarding their rights 
and values. Lack of recognition of land rights, poor livelihood, unemployment, bad 
roads and absence of markets for forest products are the major problems faced by local 
community that is not being targeted by REDD+. It is unlikely if REDD+ will really 
benefit local communities with associated restrictions, without solving these major 
issues faced by local communities. 
Forest governance or policies should be framed within the context of climate change and 
build capacity for monitoring, reporting and verifying. To avoid projects based 
inconsistency within countries, an institution should be established to measure and 
account for national emission levels while coordinating across different government 
departments and integrating all agencies, programmes and donors for coherency in 
development policies. Cameroon should be capable to keep drivers of deforestation 
under control and embed customary laws into forest laws in such a way that national 
REDD+ strategies will fall under a broad national development strategies without 
marginalising forest dwellers. National institutional framework should be regulated to 
promote equity, efficiency and accountability in verifying results and compensation for 
reduction in emissions or increments in carbon stock while ensuring that local 
communities also benefits from REDD+ activities. Forest policies should ensure 
participation of forest users in developing forest management plan. According to Evely 
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et al. (2011), high level of participation in conservation projects increases sustainability 
and adaptability because they build capacity of participants to learn and better manage 
projects and also stakeholders’ participation in developing policy. Implementing them 
encourages both ownership and responsibility of environmental problems. 
There is need to empower local communities to better engage in decision-making about 
issues that concern them, claim ownership of their land through community forestry and 
participate as major stakeholders in all activities in their environment. State 
establishment of community forest will strengthen community rights and guarantee 
livelihoods. Communities’ rights need to be protected through forest education, gender 
balance, social justice, capacity building, access to information, standing and influence 
accorded at decision-making processes and engagement in sustainable resource 
management. To ensure appropriate tenure at local context, the local communities must 
be involved in decision-making through a Free Prior and Informed Consent. So effective 
communication and education on relationship between climate change, deforestation and 
land degradation, aim of project, roles of villages during implementation and request of 
permission to carry out projects within villages is vital. Local people should be equal 
stakeholders with full information access and consented to planned projects activities 
and intervention. Their opinion should be considered since the outcome of REDD+ can 
have impact on their rights and livelihoods. 
Local communities are raising expectation on REDD+ projects, but there is still no 
benefit-sharing mechanism which may later render projects unsustainable. Define rules 
for accounting, management and transfer of incentives should be set-up to nest MCNP-
REDD+ projects, through a broader approach which does not only monitors, reports and 
verifies carbon stock, but tries to understand and analyses the impact between REDD+ 
policies and other management objectives. Socio-economic availability and deployment 
of finance will enhance forest management, conservation and livelihood of forest 
dependent communities. Incentives need to be created for REDD+ activities alongside 
with government reforms and policies to address the drivers behind deforestation. 
Project performance must be assessed alongside substitute to livelihood (like animal 
husbandry, finance for small businesses, employment), innovative agricultural technique 
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to enhance yield, and other sources of forest products should be explored to maintain 
permanence in forest cover. 
Participation of delegates at cluster platforms may not necessarily indicate a 
commitment to the project, the true extent of engagement can only be known (maybe in 
five years) when participants must have made their own evaluation. With capacity 
building among local institutions, REDD+ should be geared towards sustainable 
development with effective equal local property rights and legal carbon ownership rights 
while creating government mechanism that favours co-benefits and equitable 
distribution of carbon revenue. The status, context and trend of specific sites need to be 
known to support argument and improve capability at negotiation tables accompanied by 
solid review of forms of land tenure, available resources and level of property rights. 
Members of communities should also be given the opportunity to engage in meaningful 
positions (like forest guards, species identification and tree measurement) rather than 
mere labourers. 
Securing tenure rights and effective engagement in decision-making at cluster platforms 
are essential in realising MCNP-REDD+ objectives and community adaptive capacity to 
climate change. Above all, good forest projects should be more about recognising the 
rights of indigenous people rather than claiming ownership and control of their territory. 
Based on the findings, this study proposed the following top 10 recommendations to 
enhance effectiveness, efficiency and equity in MCNP-REEDD+ initiative and prevent 
socio-economic marginalisation of forest dwellers: 
 The goals of REDD+ should be clearly defined with adequate information; on 
processes and outcomes - both positive and/or negative impacts to the 
environment and/or local livelihoods; effectively communicated to local 
communities, and the level of reduced emissions should be measurable and 
verifiable to quantify payment. 
 Alternative livelihoods such as animal husbandry, finance for small business and 
employment (like forest guards and data collectors) should be provided, with 
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schools, hospitals, pipe-born water, markets established to sell local communities’ 
products and services, as well as establishment of farm-to-market roads. 
 Programmes should be built on the understanding and scope of forest 
dependency, progress and outcome of the programmes should be closely 
monitored and evaluated, and the use of an adaptive approach to project 
management should be encouraged. 
 Forest policies should be able to support project activities that yield desirable 
outcomes without marginalising local communities, by clarifying and securing 
community rights, recognising and integrating customary practices and values in 
the REDD+ governance strategies. 
 External threats like plantation expansion, illegal logging and population 
migration should be resolved at sub-national and national levels, while local 
threats should be addressed with locally based conservation solutions such as 
levying of fines and seizure of illegal products or equipment by the Village 
Forest Management Councillors. 
 Trade-offs between conservation and development should be acknowledged, 
negotiated and accepted by both REDD+ promoters and local representatives 
during project planning to enable equitable and transparent benefit-sharing and 
responsibilities, realistic appraisal and legitimisation of MCNP initiative. 
 The heterogeneity and complexity of communities should be acknowledged 
(different cultural and ethnic backgrounds) instead of the ‘one size fit all’ 
approach to avoid elite capture of benefits which could result into conflict of 
interest and encroachment by non-elite such as immigrants and outsiders. 
 Community livelihood needs should be best understood and treated as top 
priority during negotiation and planning while respecting communities’ usufruct 
rights which grant local forest access rights to harvest NTFP. 
 Project design needs to be flexible and based on adaptive collaborative 
management approach which is aimed at producing appropriate outcomes, that 
renders projects more resilient to vulnerable livelihood, by ensuring continuous 
provision of food, enhancement of customary rights, community development 
and provision of alternative livelihoods for the sustainability of REDD+ projects. 
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 Enhanced community engagement in planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation through sensitisation and collaborative decision-making at all project 
levels to enhance long-term communities’ support and project legitimacy. 
The success of REDD+ depends on the effective engagement of local communities 
because they are the ones to implement REDD+ in tropical forest and are the potential 
benefactors, but few researchers have paid attention to what triggers changes in 
perceptions that lead to appropriate behaviours and enhanced engagement of 
communities in forest projects. As the adverse effects of climate change become more 
evident, the REDD+ implementation challenges such as tenure insecurity, inadequate 
forest governance, inequitable benefits-sharing, livelihood challenges and ineffective 
communication should be addressed to get all stakeholders on-board. This study 
attempts to make a contribution to this by carrying out a multi scale analysis of local 
reality to assess the compatibility and influence of land tenure systems, forest policies, 
communication processes, benefit-sharing mechanism and present co-management 
approach to full and effective engagement at local level. Though the future of REDD+ 
initiative is yet unknown, it has the potential of conserving the environment, mitigating 
climate change, generating income, developing communities and improving livelihoods 
for local communities. The present level of community engagement in MCNP projects 
makes the attainment of these goals difficult. This study strongly recommends a 
participatory bottom-up approach that empowers and allows more decision-making 
powers to members of community to achieve the potential co-benefit expectations of 
REDD+. The lessons presented in this research are relevant in (re)designing and 
implementing legitimate management strategies that favour REDD+ social-safeguard 
standards and ensure effective engagement of all stakeholders for legitimacy and 
sustainability of all REDD+ initiatives. 
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Appendices 
1. Definition of terms 
A Cluster Facilitator (CF) ensures the animation and coordination of the cluster 
platform and facilitates the communication between park service, the villages and the 
cluster platform. 
Cluster Conservation Zone (CCZ) is a section of the park allocated to a group of 
villages to facilitate collaborative management. 
Cluster Platform (CP) is the central communication and information hub between the 
park management and the park villages. 
Collaborative Management Activities (CMA) are activities needed for sustainable 
management of the national park and are executed by villagers independently and/or 
together with the park service. 
Conservation Bonus (CB) is a fixed amount per village per year rewarding villagers’ 
efforts in collaborating actively in conservation efforts. 
Conservation Credit (CC) are virtual coupons generated through the participation of an 
individual or group of individuals in remunerated CMA’s, and is used only to facilitate 
village contribution to village development measures. 
Conservation Development Agreement (CDA) is a written agreement between the 
park service and park villages to prove their willingness to collaborate in the 
management of the park and in village development. 
Village Development Measures (VDM) is the main measures identified for support and 
development in park villages (income generating activities and/or infrastructure). 
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2. Supplementary tables 
Table 3.2 Types of comments from different stakeholders on different tenure 
related themes derived from the word clouds. 
Stakeholders Types of comment A B C D Total 
International - 
GIZ 
Positive - 1 - - 1(20%) 
Mixed - - -  - 
Negative 1 - 4 - 5(80%) 
National - 
MINFOF, 
MINEP, Planet 
Survey 
Positive - 1 - - 1(100%) 
Mixed - - - - - 
Negative - - - - - 
Local 
communities 
(LC) 
Positive - 3 - - 3(23%) 
Mixed - - - - - 
Negative 1 4 1 2 8(77%) 
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Table 4.1: Types of comments across different stakeholders on different family 
farming related themes derived from the word clouds. 
Level of stakeholders Types of comments A B C Total (%) 
International - GIZ Positive 1 - - 1(25%) 
Mixed - - - - 
Negative 1 1 1 3(75%) 
Local communities 
(LC) 
Positive - 1 - 1(10%) 
Mixed - 1 1 2(20%) 
Negative 1 - 6 7(70%) 
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Table 4.2: Normality, Mann-Whitney and t-test, showing how participation in MCNP-
activities relates to number of landholding. 
A: Have you 
ever taken part 
in any of these 
forest projects at 
any level? 
Group statistics Test of Normality 
(Shapiro-Wilk’s) 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
N Mea
n 
S.D. Stat. df Sig. U Sig. z r 
No 169 2.17 .970 .843 169 .000 10258 .000 4.522 .30 
Yes 90 2.87 .962 .883 90 .000 
Bomboko 
 
No 49 2.02 .854 .834 49 .000 568 .019 2.351 .29 
Yes 17 2.59 .712 .837 17 .007 
Buea No 46 2.43 1.068 .871 46 .000 683 .017 2.384 .29 
Yes 22 3.23 1.343 .899 22 .028 
Muyuka No 28 2.57 .879 .773 28 .000 394 .023 2.276 .33 
Yes 21 3.19 .750 .840 21 .003 
West-
Coast 
No 46 1.83 .902 .725 46 .000 974.5 .001 3.193 .37 
Yes 30 2.53 .730 .700 30 .000 
B: 
Independence 
samples t-test 
Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for equality of 
Means 
BCa 95% Confidence 
Interval 
 F Sig. T df Sig. Lower Upper 
2.368 .125 -5.507 257 .000 -.944 -.447 
Bomboko .349 .557 -2.458 64 .017 -1.029 -.106 
Buea 1.973 .165 -2.630 66 .011 -1.394 -1.91 
Muyuka 1.442 .236 -2.595 47 .013 -1.099 -.139 
West-Coast 6.789 .011 -3.756 70.461 .000 -1.083 -.332 
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Table 4.3: Linear regression model summary and coefficient showing relationship 
between participation and landholding in all/each cluster 
 Model summary 
Model R R² Adjusted 
R² 
ANOVA 
F Sig. 
Overall .325 .106 .102 30.328 .000 
Bomboko .294 .086 .072 6.043 .017 
Buea .308 .095 .081 6.918 .011 
Muyuka .354 .125 .107 6.734 .013 
West-Coast .385 .149 .137 12.906 .001 
Linear regression Coefficient 
Model B SE β t Sig. 
Overall Constant .981 .072  13.582 .000 
Landholding .152 .028 .325 5.507 .000 
Bomboko Constant .928 .144  6.458 .000 
Landholding .152 .062 .294 2.458 .017 
Buea Constant 1.001 .134  7.462 .000 
Landholding .120 .046 .308 2.630 .011 
Muyuka Constant .854 .231  3.692 .001 
Landholding .202 .078 .354 2.595 .013 
West-Coast Constant .953 .134  7.122 .000 
Landholding .210 .058 .385 3.593 .001 
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Table 4.4: Linear regression model summary and coefficient showing how 
livelihood depends on number of landholding and labour in all/each cluster(s). 
A:  Model summary 
Model R R² Adjusted R² ANOVA 
F Sig. 
Overall .435 .189 .183 29.926 .000 
Bomboko .494 .244 .220 10.179 .000 
Buea .467 .218 .194 9.046 .000 
Muyuka .404 .163 .146 9.179 .004 
West-Coast .303 .092 .067 3.691 .030 
B: Coefficient 
Model B SE β t Sig. 
Overall Constant .900 .199  4.53 .000 
Landholding .453 .067 .394 6.732 .000 
Labour .093 .051 .106 1.820 .070 
Bomboko Constant .661 .304  2.173 .034 
Landholding .532 .129 .474 4.133 .000 
Labour .040 .078 .059 .514 .609 
Buea Constant .855 .506  1.688 .096 
Landholding .551 .130 .469 4.253 .000 
labour -.053 .122 -.048 -.435 .666 
Muyuka Constant 1.094 .538  2.034 .048 
Labour .462 .153 .404 3.03 .004 
West-Coast Constant 1.697 .279  6.081 .000 
Landholding .199 .117 .207 1.707 .092 
Labour .102 .080 .154 1.267 .209 
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Table 5.1: Types of comments across different stakeholders on different forest 
governance related themes derived from the word clouds 
Levels of stakeholders Types of comments A B C D Total 
International - GIZ Positive - - - - - 
Mixed - - - 1 1(20%) 
Negative 3 1 - - 4(80%) 
National - MINFOF, 
MINEP, Planet Survey  
Positive - - 1 4 5(83%) 
Mixed - - - 1 1(17%) 
Negative - - - - - 
Sub-national - 
MINFOF-SWR 
Positive - - - - - 
Mixed - - 2 - 3(67%) 
Negative 1 - - - 1(33%) 
Local communities Positive - 1 - - 1(17%) 
Mixed - 2 - - 2(33%) 
Negative 1 2 - - 3(50%) 
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Table 5.2: Mann-Whitney test (a), independent samples t-test (b) and significant linear 
regression models and coefficient (c) within MCNP showing how participation depends 
on perception of land-rights enhancement. 
A: Mann-Whitney test U Z p Effect-size (r) 
Overall 10,6770 7.11 <.0001 .452 
Bomboko 708.0 5.11 <.0001 .639 
Buea 606.0 2.19 .029 .274 
Muyuka 827.0 2.88 .004 .412 
West-Coast 493.5 4.21 <.0001 .503 
 
B: Independence 
samples t-test 
Levene’s Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for equality of 
Means 
95% BCa CI 
Equal variance 
assumed 
F Sig. t df Sig. Lower Upper 
Overall Land-rights .400 .528 -7.714 245 .000 -1.249 -.741 
Bomboko Land-rights 1.136 .291 -6.409 62 .000 -1.478 -.779 
Buea Land-rights 3.599 .062 -2.794 62 .007 -1.377 -.229 
Muyuka Land-rights .059 .808 -4.939 47 .000 -2.077 -.875 
West-
Coast 
Land-rights .187 .666 -3.005 68 .004 -1.095 -.221 
C: Significant  model summary  Coefficient 
 R R²  Adj. 
R² 
ANOVA  B β t Sig. 
F Sig. 
Overall .442 .195 .192 59.512 .000 Constant .585  5.586 .000 
Land-rights .196 .442 7.714 .000 
Buea .334 .112 .098 7.808 .007 Constant .841  4.457 .000 
Land-rights .139 .334 2.794 .007 
Muyuka .585 .342 .328 24.395 .000 Constant .555  2.976 .005 
Land-rights .231 .585 4.939 .000 
West-
Coast 
.342 .117 .104 9.031 .004 Constant .635  2.350 .022 
Land-rights .178 .342 3.005 .004 
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Table 6.1: Types of comments across different stakeholders on different 
communication related themes derived from the word clouds. 
Level of stakeholders Type of comments A Total (%) 
International - GIZ Positive 3 3 (75%) 
Mixed 1 1(25%) 
Negative - - 
National - MINFOF, MINEP, 
Planet Survey 
Positive 2 2(50%) 
Mixed 1 1(25%) 
Negative 1 1(25%) 
Sub-national - MINFOF-SWR Positive 2 2(50%) 
Mixed 1 1(25%) 
Negative 1 1(25%) 
Local groups - MOCAP Positive 2 2(67%) 
Mixed - - 
Negative 1 1(33%) 
Local communities (LC) Positive 2 2(67%) 
Mixed - - 
Negative 1 1(33%) 
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Table 6.2: Kendall’s τ-values showing significant correlation between participation 
and knowledge and/or understanding of REDD+. 
 Participation in MCNP 
activities 
Have you ever 
heard of 
REDD+? 
If yes, what 
are its 
objectives? 
Participation in 
MCNP activities 
1 .133* .132* 
Have you 
ever heard 
of 
REDD+? 
 NO YES 1 .998** 
NO 168 (66.1%) 86 (33.9%) 
YES 1 (20%) 4 (80%) 
If yes, what are its 
objectives? 
.033 .000 
95% BCa CI (.997 
– 1.00) 
1 
*p < .05, **p < .001.
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Table 6.3: Normality and Mann-Whitney U tests for various communication predictors of participation 
(a), independent samples t-test (b) and significant regression model (c) within MCNP 
A: Have you ever 
taken part in any 
of these forest 
projects at any 
level? 
Group statistics Test of Normality 
(Shapiro-Wilk’s) 
Test of 
homogeneity 
of variance 
Mann-
Whitney 
U Test 
N Mean S.D. Stat. df Sig. F Sig. 
Level of 
education 
No 169 2.31 .645 .803 169 .000 5.389 .021 U=93870. 
p=.001 
r=.332 
Yes 90 2.79 .989 .755 90 .000 
Perception 
of ‘we can’ 
No 169 5.38 1.658 .803 169 .000 21.36 .000 U=10532 
p=.000 
r=.088 
Yes 90 6.34 .938 .715 90 .000 
Frequency 
of 
information 
No 169 2.74 .908 .859 169 .000 29.64 .000 U=10734 
p=.000 
 r=.362 
Yes 90 3.46 .706 .824 90 .000 
B: Independence 
samples t-test 
Levene’s Test for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for equality of 
Means 
95% BCa CI 
Equal variance not assumed F Sig. T df Sig. Lower Upper 
1. Education 21.571 .000 -4.169 130.45 .000 -.730 -.223 
2. Perception of ‘we can’ 16.459 .000 -5.984 256.04 .000 -1.257 -.705 
3. Frequency of information 3.700 .050 -7.016 223.22 .000 -.909 -.518 
C: Significant  model summary  Coefficient 
Model R R²  Adj. 
R² 
ANOVA  B β t Sig. 
F Sig. Constant .522  4.367 .000 
Overall  .416 .173 .167 26.863 .000 Perception .060 .192 3.155 .002 
Info. freq. .161 .306 5.021 .000 
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Table 6.4: Mann-Whitney and t-test showing relationships between participation and various predictors within 
MCNP clusters 
Have you ever taken part 
in MCNP activities? 
Mann-Whitney U 
Test 
Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for equality of 
Means 
BCa 95% 
confidence 
interval 
U Sig. r F Sig. T df Sig. Lower Upper 
Bomboko Frequency of 
information. 
603 .002 .190 .559 .458 -3.117 64 .003 -.992 -.295 
Perception 503.5 .158 .088 .581 .449 -1.261 64 .212 -.653 .174 
Level of 
education 
491.5 .203 .080 9.24 .003 -1.695 19.5 .106 -1.241 .087 
Buea Frequency of 
information. 
679 .016 .150 2.45 .122 -2.801 66 .004 -1.104 -.288 
Perception 714.5 .005 .175 8.352 .005 -3.430 60.1 .001 -2.375 -.701 
Level of 
education 
690.5 .009 .163 6.42 .014 -3.281 30.1 .008 -1.3.9 -.194 
Muyuka Frequency of 
information 
409.5 .006 .172 2.454 .122 -2.801 66 .007 -1.043 -.241 
Perception 444.5 .001 .199 8.352 .005 -3.430 60.1 .001 -2.435 -.703 
Level of 
education 
392 .028 .137 6.419 .014 -2.850 30.1 .008 -.941 -.179 
West-
Coast 
Frequency of 
information 
1010 .000 .222 1.362 .249 -3.037 47 .004 -1.319 -.490 
Perception 1041 .000 .246 13.13 .001 -3.726 37.4 .001 -1.061 -.364 
Level of 
education 
758.5 .403 .052 1.333 .254 -2.534 14 .015 -.605 .042 
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Table 6.5: Significant models summary presenting the relationships between participation and various 
communication predictors in all clusters. 
Model R R² Adj. 
R ² 
ANOVA Coefficients 
F Sig.  B β t Sig. 
Bomboko .363 .132 .118 9.717 .003 Constant .656  3.286 .002 
Frequency of 
education 
.201 .363 3.117 .003 
Buea .339 .159 .133 6.159 .004 Constant .716  3.871 .000 
Perception .057 .252 2.026 .047 
Frequency of 
education 
.109 .225 1.812 .075 
Muyuka .405 .164 .146 9.223 .004 Constant .591  2.081 .043 
Frequency of 
education 
.276 .405 3.037 .004 
West-Coast .433 .188 .165 8.435 .001 Constant .661  2.993 .004 
Level of 
education 
.067 .098 .917 .362 
Frequency of 
education 
.189 .404 3.765 .000 
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Table 6.6: Kruskal-Wallis test for frequency of information received as predictors for perception of local 
ability to protect forest, trends and pairwise follow-up comparison 
Local people 
have the ability 
to protect forest 
Kruskal-Wallis 
test 
Trends Significant pairwise-comparison 
H df Sig. J Sig. r Groups T Sig. r 
Different clusters  14.50 3 .002 11.905 .371 -.056 Buea - Bomboko 46.95 .001 .328 
Frequency of 
information 
37.33 4 .000 14775 .000 .354 Never -Quarterly -70.34 .000 -.398 
Never - Monthly -92.22 .000 -.542 
Never - Weekly -150.7 .000 -.887 
Yearly - Monthly -44.88 .014 -.342 
Yearly - Weekly -130.4 .009 -.477 
Freq. 
of 
info. 
Bomboko 11.34 3 .010 860.5 .006 .340 Never -Quarterly 25.26 .034 -.432 
Never - Monthly -32.38 .005 -.746 
Buea 11.00 4 .027 1024 .006 .331 None 
Muyuka 10.04 4 .040 462.0 .002 .439 None 
West-
Coast 
14.25 4 .007 1419.5 .000 .423 Never - Monthly -25.89 .020 -.521 
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Table 6.7: Significant models summary presenting the relationship between local ability to protect forest and 
frequency of information in all clusters. 
Model R R Adj. 
R ² 
ANOVA Coefficients B β t Sig. 
F Sig. 
Overall .363 .163 .128 38.963 .000 Constant 3.902  12.862 .000 
Frequency of 
information 
.606 .363 6.242 .000 
Bomboko .425 .181 .168 14.131 .000 Constant 5.174  16.892 .000 
Frequency of 
information 
.373 .425 3.759 .000 
Buea .402 .161 .149 12.689 .001 Constant 2.411  3.227 .002 
Frequency of 
information 
.856 .402 3.562 .001 
Muyuka .485 .235 .219 14.478 .000 Constant 1.951  1.994 .050 
Frequency of 
information 
1.191 .485 3.805 .000 
West-
Coast 
.426 .182 .171 16.429 .000 Constant 4.992  18.952 .000 
Frequency of 
information 
.337 .426 4.053 .000 
321 
Table 7.1: Types of comments across different stakeholders on different decision-
making related themes derived from the word clouds. 
Level of stakeholders Types of comments A B Total (%) 
International - GIZ  Positive - - - 
Mixed 1 - 1(100%) 
Negative - - - 
Sub-national - 
MINFOF-SWR 
Positive - 1 1(33%) 
Mixed 1 4 5(67%) 
Negative - - - 
Local communities  Positive - - - 
Mixed - - - 
Negative - 5 5(100%) 
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Table 7.2: Normality test, Mann-Whitney and t-test relating participation and 
standing in MCNP clusters. 
A: Have you 
ever taken part in 
any of these 
forest projects at 
any level? 
Group statistics Test of Normality 
(Shapiro-Wilk’s) 
Homogeneit
y of 
variance 
Mann-
Whitney 
U Test 
N Mean S.D. Stat. df Sig. F Sig. U=9145, 
Z=2.766, 
p=.006, 
r=.22 
No 169 4.26 1.283 .931 169 .000 5.6 .019 
Yes 90 4.78 1.169 .927 90 .000 
Bomboko 
 
No 49 3.76 1.234 .897 49 .000 2.33 .132 U=513, 
p=.136, 
r=.18 
Yes 17 4.24 1.091 .859 19 .015 
Buea No 46 4.50 1.346 .940 46 .020 1.60 .111 U=733, 
p=.002, 
r=.37 
Yes 22 5.59 1.141 .891 22 .020 
Muyuka No 28 4.46 1.201 .796 28 .000 1.54 .221 U=284, 
P=.823, 
r=-.03 
Yes 21 4.52 .873 .791 21 .000 
West-
Coast 
No 46 4.43 1.205 .901 46 .001 .948 .333 U=746, 
p=.539, 
r=.071 
Yes 30 4.67 1.155 .935 30 .066 
B: 
Independence 
samples t-test 
Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for equality of 
Means 
BCa 95% 
Confidence Interval 
Equal variance 
not assumed 
F Sig. T df Sig. Lower Upper 
3.037 .083 -3.278 196.9 .001 -.782 -.236 
Bomboko .763 .386 -1.422 64 .161 -1.155 .194 
Buea .500 .482 -3.278 66 .002 -1.755 -.426 
Muyuka 1.248 .270 -.192 47 .849 -.683 .564 
West-Coast .562 .456 -.834 74 .407 -.786 .322 
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Table 7.3: Model summary presenting the relationship between standing and 
participation in MCNP activities. 
Model summary 
Model R R 
square 
Adjusted R ANOVA 
F Sig. 
Overall .195 .038 .034 10.150 .002 
Bomboko .175 .031 5 1.022 .160 
Buea .374 .140 .127 10.742 .002 
Muyuka .028 .001 .-.020 .037 .849 
West-Coast .096 .009 -.004 .695 .407 
Linear regression Coefficient 
Model B SE β t Sig. 
Overall Constant 1.021 .106  9.600 .000 
Standing .073 .023 .195 3.186 .002 
Bomboko Constant 1.01 .182  5.547 .000 
Standing .064 .045 .175 1.422 .160 
Buea Constant .701 .197  3.551 .001 
Standing .128 .039 .374 3.278 .002 
Muyuka Constant 1.369 .316  4.330 .000 
Standing .013 .069 .028 .192 .849 
West-Coast Constant 1.213 .225  5.390 .000 
Standing .040 .048 .096 .834 .407 
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Table 7.4: Normality test, Kruskal-Wallis test, trends and effect sizes of standing at 
decision-making process within MCNP clusters. 
Everyone's 
opinion/contribution 
counts 
Group statistics Test of Normality 
(Shapiro-Wilk’s) 
Homogeneity 
of Variance 
N Mean SD Statistic df Sig. F p 
Bomboko 66 3.88 1.209 .900 66 .000 .788 .502 
Buea 68 4.85 1.374 .936 68 .002 
Muyuka 49 4.49 1.063 .787 49 .000 
West-Coast 79 4.53 1.183 .929 76 .000 
Effect size from pairwise comparison Non-parametric test 
 Adj. p z r   T p r 
Bomboko-West-Coast .012 -3.09 -.257 Kruskal-
Wallis Test 
21.29 0.00 - 
Bomboko-Muyuka .028 -2.83 -.264 Trends-
Jonckheere-
Terpstra 
Test for 
order 
alternatives 
14008 .019 0.15 
Bomboko-Buea .000 -4.49 -.388 
West-Coast-Muyuka 1.00 .076 .007 
West-Coast-Buea .753 1.53 .126 
Muyuka-Buea 1.00 1.29 .119 
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Table 7.5: Relationship between standing and influence in different cluster 
 Group statistics Test of Normality 
(Shapiro-Wilk’s) 
Homogeneit
y of 
variance  
N Mea
n 
S.D. Cor.  Stat. df Sig. F Sig. 
Bomboko Influence 66 2.33 .997 .043 .868 66 .000 .331 .803 
Standing 66 3.88 1.187 
Buea Influence 68 3.28 1.314 .000 .938 68 .002 
Standing 68 4.85 1.374 
Muyuka Influence 49 3.22 1.159 .109 .893 49 .000 
Standing 49 4.49 1.063 
West-
Coast 
Influence 76 3.07 1.237 .000 .911 76 .000 
Standing 76 4.53 1.183 
Effect-size from pairwise comparison Non-parametric Test 
 Adj. p z r   Statistics  
Bomboko-West-Coast .001 -3.706 -.311 Kruskal-
Wallis Test 
H=25.810 
df=3, p=.000 
Bomboko-Muyuka .000 -4.064 -.379 
Bomboko-Buea .000 -4.448 -.384 Trends 
Jonckheere-
Terpstra 
Test for 
orders 
alternative 
H=14630.5 
df=3 
p=.001 
r=.24 
West-Coast-Muyuka 1.00 .779 .070 
West-Coast-Buea 1.00 .869 .072 
Muyuka-Buea 1.00 .012 .001 
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Table 7.6: Linear regression model summary (a) and coefficient (b) indicating 
how standing contributes to influence. 
A)  Model summary  
Model R R-
square 
Adj. R2 ANOVA 
F Sig. 
Overall .432 .186 .183 58.91 .000 
Bomboko .213 .045 .030 3.030 .087 
Buea .453 .205 .193 17.03 .000 
Muyuka .179 .032 .012 1.562 .218 
West-Coast .541 .293 .283 30.65 .000 
B) Linear regression Coefficient 
Model B SE β t Sig. 
Overall Constant 1.088 .254  4.278 .000 
Standing .423 .055 .432 7.675 .000 
Bomboko Constant 1.653 .409  4.041 .000 
Standing .175 .101 .213 1.741 .087 
Buea Constant 1.178 .529  2.227 .029 
Standing .433 .105 .453 4.127 .000 
Muyuka Constant 2.346 .722  3.251 .002 
Standing .196 .157 .179 1.250 .218 
West-Coast Constant .505 .478  1.057 .294 
Standing .566 .102 .541 5.536 .000 
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Table 8.1: Types of comments across different stakeholders on different PES 
related themes derived from the word clouds. 
Level of stakeholders Types of comments A B Total (%) 
International - GIZ Positive 1  1(20%) 
Mixed 1 1 2(40%) 
Negative 2 - 2(40%) 
National - MINFOF, 
MINEP, Planet Survey 
Positive - - - 
Mixed 1 - 1(100%) 
Negative - - - 
Sub-national - 
MINFOF-SWR 
Positive - - - 
Mixed - 3 3(100%) 
Negative - - - 
Local groups - 
MOCAP 
Positive 1 - 1(33%) 
Mixed 1 - 1(33%) 
Negative 1 - 1(33%) 
Local communities Positive 1 - 1(8%) 
Mixed - 1 1(8%) 
Negative 7 4 11(85%) 
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Table 8.3: Mann-Whitney U test showing how participation is influenced by 
perception of PES (a), expectation of local development (b) and income (c) with 
their corresponding effect sizes. 
Mann-Whitney test U Z p N Effect-size 
(r) 
A 
(PES) 
Overall 10,165 4.758 .000 259 .296 
Bomboko 563 2.263 .024 66 .279 
Buea 698 2.768 .006 68 .336 
Muyuka 381 1.994 .046 49 .290 
West-Coast 890 2.245 .025 76 .258 
B  
(Local 
development) 
Overall 10,575.5 6.734 .000 245 .430 
Bomboko 727 5.259 .000 64 .657 
Buea 725 3.851 .000 64 .481 
Muyuka 447 3.332 .001 49 .476 
West-Coast 895 3.851 .000 70 .460 
C 
(Income 
generation) 
Overall 9,742 5.129 .000 245 .328 
Bomboko 590 3.094 .002 64 .387 
Buea 680.5 3.148 .002 64 .394 
Muyuka 434 2.916 .004 49 .417 
West-Coast 867 3.554 .000 70 .425 
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Table 8.4: Significant linear regression models showing how participation is influenced by perception of PES, expectation of 
local development and income generation with corresponding coefficients. 
Significant linear regression model summary Coefficient 
 R R²  Adj. R² ANOVA  B β t Sig. 
F Sig. 
Overall .435 .189 .182 28.398 .000 Constant .615  5.90 .000 
Local development .117 .353 4.900 .000 
Income generation .038 .118 1.638 .103 
Bomboko .368 .135 .121 9.712 .003 Constant .611  2.825 .006 
      Income generation .132 .368 3.116 .003 
Buea .537 .288 .265 12.341 .000 Constant .668  4.576 .000 
Local development .128 .434 3.501 .001 
Income generation .045 .169 1.361 .178 
Muyuka .456 .208 .191 12.307 .001 Constant .766  3.839 .000 
Income generation .171 .456 3.508 .001 
Muyuka .481 .232 .215 14.175 .000 Constant .683  3.285 .002 
      Local development .171 .481 3.765 .000 
West-Coast .268 .072 .059 5.716 .019 Constant .645  2.025 .046 
PES .125 .268 2.391 .019 
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Table 9.2: Types of comments across different stakeholders on different co-
management related themes derived from the word clouds. 
Level of stakeholders Types of 
comments 
A B Total  
International - GIZ Positive - - - 
Mixed 1 - 1(50%) 
Negative - 1 1(50%) 
National - MINFOF, 
MINEP, Planet Survey 
Positive - - - 
Mixed - 1 1(100%) 
Negative - - - 
Sub-national - MINFOF-
SWR 
Positive - 2 2(33%) 
Mixed - 3 3(50%) 
Negative - 1 1(17%) 
Local groups - MOCAP Positive - 2 2(100%) 
Mixed - - - 
Negative - - - 
Local communities Positive - 1 1(17%) 
Mixed 3 - 3(50%) 
Negative 2 - 2(33%) 
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Table 9.3: T-test and Mann-Whitney test showing relationship between participation and perception that 
strict conservation zone enhances conservation initiatives. 
Clusters Levene’s 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for equality of 
Means 
BCa 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
F Sig. t df Sig. Lower Upper U p r 
Overall 4.18 .042 -3.35 257 .001 -.720 -.187 9,333 .002 .200 
Bomboko .001 .979 -1.27 28.466 .210 -1.047 .241 503.5 .183 .166 
Buea 2.97 .089 -1.05 54.589 .299 -.702 .219 555 .500 .084 
Muyuka 2.06 .158 -2.79 39.835 .008 -1.498 -.240 410.5 .015 .348 
West-
Coast 
2.63 .109 -2.95 68.646 .004 -.998 -.193 922 .009 .300 
332 
 
Table 9.4: T-test and Mann-Whitney test relating participation and perception of promoting 
local participation 
Clusters Levene’s 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for equality of 
Means 
BCa 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Mann-Whitney U 
Test 
F Sig. t df Sig. Lower Uppe
r 
U p  r  
Overall 2.900 .090 -6.561 230.9 .000 -1.050 -.565 9,778 .000 .339 
Bomboko 2.160 .147 -3.298 23.51 .003 -1.124 -.258 582.5 .002  .389 
Buea 5.155 .027 -3.444 62 .001 -1.670 -.512 655.5 .004 .346 
Muyuka 5.886 .019 -4.210 47 .000 -1.882 -.665 463.0 .000 .524 
West-
Coast 
.654 .421 -3.100 65.27 .003 -.712 -.154 812.5 .004 .331 
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3. Focus group discussion guidelines 
Project schedule 
Time spent in each village is 4 days given a total of 48 days for 12 park village surveys. 
Task Date(s) Status OK? If not, give comments 
Meeting with chiefs and 
councillors 
  
Village/focus group meetings   
Village survey   
Checking questionnaire   
Coding questionnaire   
Entering data   
Checking & approving data entry   
Section A. Demographics 
1. In what year was the village established?  
2. What is the current population of the village?  
3. How many households live currently in this village?  
4. What was the total population of the village 10 years ago?  
5. How many households lived in the village 10 years ago?  
6. How many persons (approx.) living here now have moved 
to the village in the past 10 years (in-migration)? 
 
7. How many persons (approx.) have left the village over the 
past 10 years (out-migration)? 
 
8. How many different groups (ethnic groups or tribes) are 
living in the village? 
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Section B. Infrastructure 
1. How many households (approx.) in the village have access 
to electricity (from public or private suppliers)? 
 
2. How many households (approx.) in the village have access 
to (use) piped tap water? 
 
3. How many households (approx.) have access to formal 
credit (government or private bank operating in the village)? 
 
4. Are informal credits institutions such as savings clubs and 
money lenders present in the village? 
 
5. Is there any health centre in the village?  
6. Does the village have at least one road useable by cars 
during all seasons? If ‘yes’, go to 8. 
 
7. If ‘no’: what is the distance in km to the nearest road 
usable during all seasons? 
 
8. Is there a river within the village boundaries that is 
navigable during all seasons? 
 
9. What is the distance to the MCNP boundary  
9a. What is the impact to the park area? (1=high, 2=medium 
3=low) 
 
10. What is the distance from 
the village centre to the 
nearest…(in km and in 
minutes by most common 
means of transport) 
 km min transport 
1. District market    
2. Market for major 
consumption goods 
   
3. Market where agricultural 
products are sold 
   
4. Market where forest 
products are sold 
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Section C. Forest and land cover/use 
1. Land categories in the village  
Note: The purpose is to link forest types to ownership status 
1. Land category 
(code-land) 
Ownership 
 3. State 4. Community 5. Private 6. Open 
access 
Forest:     
1. Reserved forest     
2. Managed forests     
3. Plantations     
Agricultural land:     
4. Cropland     
5. Pasture      
6. Agroforestry     
7. Silvi-pasture     
8. Fallow     
Other land categories:     
9. Shrubs     
10. Grassland     
11. Residential areas, 
infrastructure 
    
12. Wetland     
13. Other (specify)     
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C2. What are the 3 main livelihoods, food crops, cash crops and non-timber forest products 
in the village? 
 
Main livelihoods 
(max 3) 
Food crops 
(max 3) 
Cash crops 
(max. 3)  
Non-timber forest products 
(max 3) 
    
    
    
 
Section D: Village forest management practices 
D1: Does the village practice any form of active and deliberate management?................ 
D2: If yes, type of management? Code 
1. Planting of trees  
2. Cutting down undesired (competing) trees  
3. Protecting certain desired (patches of) trees in the forest 
to promote the natural regeneration of these species 
 
4. Protecting areas of forest for particular environmental 
services, like water catchment 
 
5. Establishing clear use rights for a limited number of 
people to particular forest products (e.g. honey trees) 
 
6. Extension/education about forest management  
7. Enacted bylaw (e.g. no bush burning in or near forest)  
8. Mapping/inventory forest resources   
9. Other (specify)  
1) Codes: 0=no, not at all; 1=yes, but only to a limited extent; 2=yes, they are common. 
D2: If No, why? 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
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Section E. Forest resource base 
Note: The questions will be asked for each of the categories in turn (i.e. column by column) 
 1. Firewood 
or charcoal 
2. Timber 
or other 
wood 
3. Food 
from the 
forest 
4. Medicine 
from the 
forest 
5. Forage from 
the forest 
6.Others 
(1) 
1. What is the most important product (MIP) for the livelihood 
of the people in the village in this category (2)? (name) 
      
2. (code-products)       
3. How has availability of the MIP changed over the past 5 
years? Codes: 1=declined; 2=about the same; 3=increased 
      
4. If the 
availability 
of the MIPs 
in this 
category has 
declined, 
what are the 
reasons? 
Reasons Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 
1. Reduced forest area due to small-scale clearing for 
agriculture 
      
2. Reduced forest area due to large-scale projects (plantations, 
new settlements, etc.) 
      
3. Reduced forest area due to people from outside buying land 
and restricting access 
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Please rank 
the most 
important 
reason, max. 
3 (leave rest 
blank). 
 
4. Increased use of MIP due to more local village people 
collecting more 
      
5. Increased use of MIP due to more people from other villages 
collecting more 
      
6. Restrictions on use by central or state government (e.g., for 
forest conservation) 
      
8. Climatic changes, e.g. drought and less rainfall       
9. Other (specify)       
10. Timber harvesting       
11. Charcoal burning       
12. Brick burning       
13. Poor harvesting practices       
14. Product attacked/consumed by forest dwelling vermin       
15. Bush burning       
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16. Increased marketing potential for product       
5. If the 
availability 
of the MIP 
in this 
category has 
increased, 
what are the 
reasons? 
Please rank 
the most 
important 
reasons, 
max. 3. 
Reasons Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 
1. Less clearing of forests for agriculture        
2. Fewer local (village) people collecting less       
3. Fewer people from other villages collecting less       
4. Reduced use from large-scale commercial users/projects       
5. Changes in management of forests       
6. Climatic changes, e.g. more rainfall       
7. Forest clearing that increases supply of product e.g. fire-
wood 
      
8. Tree planting       
9. Other (specify)       
10. More illegal access of protected area       
11. Improved access rights to product       
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12. More secondary forest (as people clear land and forest 
regenerates) 
      
6. What 
would be 
most 
important to 
increase the 
benefits (use 
or income) 
from the 
MIP? 
Please rank 
the most 
important 
reasons, 
max. 3. 
Action Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 Rank 1-3 
1. Better access to the forest/MIP, i.e., more use rights to 
village 
      
2. Better protection of forest/MIP (avoid overuse)       
3. Better skills and knowledge on how to collect/use it       
4. Better access to credit/capital and equipment/technology       
5. Better access to markets and reduced price risk       
6. Invest in planting trees/forest product       
7. Develop forest user groups/collective action in harvesting       
8. Control fire       
9. Other (specify)       
1) Select the most important product for the village that do not fall into any of the other five categories. 
2) “Most important” is defined as the most important for the wellbeing of the village, whether it be through direct use in the home and/or through sale for cash  
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Section F. Forest institutions, policies and strategies 
Note: The MIP in each category will be identical to those in the table above. 
 1. Firewood 
or charcoal  
2. Timber 
or other 
wood 
3. Food 
from the 
forest 
4. Medicine 
from the 
forest 
5. Forage 
from the 
forest 
6. Others 
(1) 
1. What is the most important product (MIP) for the livelihood of the 
people in the village (in this category)? 
      
2. (code-product)       
3. In what type of forest do you get the MIP? (code-forest)       
4. What is the ownership status of this forest (code-tenure)       
5. Are there customary rules regulating the use of the MIP in the 
village? Codes: 0=none/very few; 1=yes, but vague/unclear; 2=yes, 
clear rules exist If code ‘0’, go to 7. 
      
6. If ‘yes’: are the customary rules regarding forest use enforced or 
respected by the population of the village? 
      
7. Are there government rules that regulate forest use? 
Codes: 0=none/very few; 1=yes, but vague/unclear; 2=yes, clear rules 
      
342 
exist If code ‘0’, go to 9. 
8. If ‘yes’ (code ‘1’ or ‘2’ above): are the government rules 
enforced/respected by the members in the village? 
      
9. Do the villagers require any permission to harvest the MIP?  
Codes: 0=no; 1=yes, users have to inform the authorities; 2=yes, 
written permission needed If code ‘0’, go to next section. 
      
10. If ‘yes’ (code ‘1’ or ‘2’ above): does the user have to pay for the 
permission? (1-0) 
      
11. If ‘yes’: who issues this permit? 
Codes: 1=village head; 2=FUG; 3=forest officer (forest departments); 
4=other government official; 9=other (specify) 
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Section G. Forest User Groups (FUG) and their involvement in forest projects 
1. How many forest user groups (FUG) are there in the village? ................................... 
2. Information about each FUG (use one column per FUG). 
 FUG1 FUG2 FUG3 
1. When was the group formed? (year)    
2. How was the group formed? 
Codes: 1=local initiative; 2=initiative from NGO; 
3=initiative from government, e.g., Forest Department; 
4=other (specify) 
   
3. Is the FUG’s main purpose related to the management of 
a particular forest area or of particular forest product(s)? 
Codes: 1=area; 2=product(s); 3=both 
   
4. If for a product (code 2 or 3 above), what is the (main) 
product? (code-product) 
   
5. How many members are there in the group?    
6. How many times per year does the FUG have meetings?    
7. Does the group have a written management plan?    
8. What are the main 
tasks of the FUG? 
Select as many as 
appropriate: 1-0 code 
1. Setting rules for use    
2. Monitoring and policing    
3. Silviculture & management    
4. Harvesting forest products    
5. Selling forest products    
6. Tree planting    
7. Tourism (i.e. maintaining tourist 
infrastructure; guiding tourists etc.) 
   
8. Education/extension support    
9. Other (specify)    
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10. Savings and credit    
9. Has any development project been implemented in the 
village over the past 5 years using proceeds from the FUG? 
   
10. Has anyone in the village been violating the rules of the 
FUG over the past 12 months? If ‘no’, go to 14 
   
11. If ‘yes’: did the FUG impose any penalties on those 
violating the rules? If ‘no’, go to 14 
   
12. If ‘yes’: what type of penalties? 
Codes: 1=fee (cash payment); 2=returning collected 
products; 3=labour (extra work); 4=exclusion from group; 
5=warning; 9=other (specify) 
   
13. Which group of forest users have most commonly 
violated the rules over the past 5 years? 
Codes: 1=members of FUG; 2=non-FUG members in the 
village; 3=people from other villages; 9=other (specify) 
   
14. Overall, on a scale from 1-5 (1 being highest, 5 being 
lowest) how effective would you say that the FUG is in 
ensuring sustainable and equitable forest use? 
   
Note: Any FUGs in the village will be further discussed in the village narrative. 
Section H: Communication process and local contribution at decision-making process 
(open-ended questions to assess level of interaction during discussion) 
H1. How does forest or conservation information circulate within this village? 
H2: What types of information are given out? 
H3: Who gives out the information? 
H4: Where does this take place? 
H5: Do you contribute in discussion or sharing your own views? 
H5: If yes, give examples? 
H5b: If no, why? 
H6: What happen at cluster platform during the decision-making session? 
H7: What is your own contribution/idea/view to this conservation initiative? 
Thank you for participating 
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4. Questionnaire for park villages 
Local communities, forest users, NGOs, forest users group 
Forest is an economic resource and provides environmental services to planet earth. Human 
survival and wellbeing depend on the forest reserves because it provides oxygen, food, 
shelter, recreation, raw materials and spiritual sustenance. Africans depends mostly on 
natural resources from forest and non-forest ecosystems. With the upcoming global climate 
change negotiations, more value has been put on forest ecosystems which have proven to be 
relevant to mitigation and adaptation in terms of carbon stock and sequestration potentials. 
So we are faced with major challenges to preserve ecosystems while pursuing socio-
economic development by avoiding deforestation and land degradation. Thus, a balance 
between production and conservation need to be found. REDD+ is considered as one of the 
mitigation strategies as well as an adaptation strategy for climate change and is geared 
towards sustainable development of local communities. 
This questionnaire is being undertaken to collect data as a part of PhD degree at the 
University of York, for a study titled ‘Assessing Community Involvement in the Design, 
Implementation and Monitoring of REDD+: a case study of Mount Cameroon National 
Park’ conducted by Nvenakeng Suzanne Awung - a PhD student of the Department of 
Environment, University of York. The information is for academic and learning purposes 
only. All information provided will be treated in strict confidence and used ONLY for the 
purpose intended. Your names will not be used against you, but to cross-check in case of 
missing data. This survey will help in establishing a benchmark for current capacity and area 
of improvement through critical analyses of current situation to enhance local community 
participation in REDD+ design, implementation and monitoring strategies. Key findings will 
be provided back to the community. 
You are kindly requested to answer the questions below as honestly as possible. Your 
responses are very important, and I encourage you to respond as best as possible. 
● Please answer all questions 
● Please cross, circle, tick or write clearly with a blue or black pen (  ) 
● No pencil please 
● Write in CAPITAL LETTERS where appropriate. 
Thank you for your co-operation 
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Questionnaire 
Enumerator code……………………………………………………………………………… 
Name of Respondent …………………………………………………………………………. 
Address: ……………………………… Town/Village: ……………………………………… 
Division: …………………………………… Region: ……………………………………….. 
Date: …………………………………Phone number………………………………………… 
Questionnaire No: …………………..………………………………………………………..... 
Instruction: Please tick, cross, circle or write where appropriate 
Numbers highlighted are code, for example 1 
Section A. Demography and socio-economic characteristic of respondents 
1.Head of family 1 No 2 Yes    
2.Sex 1 Male  2 Female    
3.Age 1 20-40 2 41-60 3 >60   
4. Marital status 1 Single  2 Married  3 Divorced 4 Widow(er)   
5. Year of 
schooling 
1 0 2 1-5 3 6-10 4 11 -15 5  
6. Level of 
education  
1
education 
2
school 
3 econdary 
school 
4 High 
school 
5
school 
7. Landholding 
(Ha) 
1 0 2 1-2 3 3-4 4 -6 5  
8. Annual cash 
income (frs CFA) 
1  
<250,000frs 
2 250,000-
500,000frs 
3 501,000-
750,000frs 
4 751,000 
1000,000frs 
5
000frs 
9. Sources of 
income 
1  2 h 
crops  
3
plant 
4 Animal 
husbandry  
5 Fishing 
6  7
labourer 
8
servant 
9 Business 10Timber 
10.Household  size  1 1-2 2 3-4 3 5-6 4 6-8 5  
11. Member of 1 The 
community 
2 Local 
NGO 
3 Forest 
User Group 
e.g. MOCAP 
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Section B. Land tenure and crops harvested within Mount Cameroon National Park villages 
B1. Please name the type of crops harvested in this community (code only)? 
1vegetables, 2cocoyams, 3maize, 4fruits, 5plantains, 6banana, 7coffee, 8cocoa, 9palms, 
10rubber, 11cassava, 12yams, 13groundnuts, 14potatoes 15egusi, 16njansanga, 17casu, 
18eru, 19bush mango, 20kola 21 beans 22 sugar cane 23bush pepper 24 honey, 25 tea 
Food crops  
Cash crops  
Non-timber forest products  
 
B2. Please tick where necessary (one or more answers are allowed) 
 
 1Chief 2Local 
community 
3NGO 
(Specify) 
4Gov’t 5Others 
(specify) 
99 I don’t 
know 
a. Who owns the 
forest?  
      
b. Who controls the 
forest? 
      
c. Who decides forest 
policies? 
      
d. Who bear the cost 
of forest projects? 
      
e. To who is the 
benefit paid? 
      
Section C: Forest governance, regulation and law enforcement 
C2a.  Has anyone been caught violating the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed 
between the park villages and park services?  1 No 2 Yes 
C2b.  If YES, was there any penalty levy on the culprit?  1 No  2 Yes 
C2c. If YES, what was the nature of the penalty? 
1 Fee (cash) 2 Return of product 3 Extra work/labour 4 Warning 5 Other  
C2a. Was this executed or enforced? 1  2  
C3b. If NO, why? ...................................................................................................................... 
.....................................................................................................................................................
.....................................................................................................................................................
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Section D. Knowledge/perceptions of local communities in forest/climate/REDD+ issues 
and communication practices within Mount Cameroon National Park initiative 
D1a. Do you believe that breathing pollution-free air is a right of an individual? 
1 NO  2 YES 
D1b. If YES, what can be done to achieve this? 
Using a scale from 1 to 7 (7 being strongly agree and 1 being strongly disagree). 
 Strongly disagree>>>>>>>>>Strongly agree 
a. Limit emissions from industries 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Decrease traffic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Felling trees  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Planting more trees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Burning the bushes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Composting rather than burning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Increased use of fertilizer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Participatory action and awareness 
raising 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Others (specify)……………………. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
D2. If NO, Why? 
................................................................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................................................... 
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D3. Perception about forest  
Forest is? Strongly disagree>>>>>>>>>>>Strongly agree 
a. Source of rain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Resource for maintaining the 
fertility of the land 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Is worth protecting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Supplement income  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Has no importance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
D4. Use of forest resources 
a. Wood 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Hardwood for construction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Forest conversion for agriculture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Medicinal plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Bush Meat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Edible (Fruit, yam, green leaves) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Mining 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Fuel wood 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Fibres 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. Others (specify)………………. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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D5. Perception towards forest conservation Strongly disagree>>>>>>Strongly agree 
a. Forest cover has declined over the past 5 years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Livelihoods are affected by forest decline 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. The local people have the  ability to protect the 
forest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Sustainable forest management must be 
implemented to sustain forest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Payment for ecosystem services is necessary to 
sustain the forest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Implementation of the strict conservation zone 
is require for efficiency of the conservation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. The forest management system solved the 
conflict over forest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Establishing the MCNP REDD+ project is 
necessary to sustain the forest in your area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
D6. How often do you get information about forest conservation? 
1 Never 2 Yearly 3 Quarterly 4 Monthly 5 At least weekly  
D7. Which media are used to communicate this information? 
1 Tribal meeting 2 Radio 3 Focus group 4  Project workshop 
5 Newspaper  6 TV   7 Public hearing  8 Others………………………….. 
D8.Which of these methods do you prefer the most…………………………………………... 
D9. Would you like to get more information about forest projects? 1 NO 2 YES 
D10a. Have you ever heard of REDD+?   1 NO   2 YES  
D10b. If YES, what are its objectives? …………………………………………………….... 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
D10c. If YES or NO, answer section G 
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Section E. Conditions for appropriate communication process that encourages active local 
participation at decision-making process within Mount Cameroon National Park 
E. How will you evaluate the communication process in your village under the following 
situation? Using a scale from 1 to 7 (1 being very poor and 7 being excellent). 
 Very poor>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Excellent 
a. Use of simple and easy to understand 
sentences 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Easy to get involve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Provide needed and accurate information  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Explaining decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Responding to your concerns 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Understanding your concern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Everyone’s opinion/contribution counts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Sensitisation and awareness raising 
before any forestry project 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. We decide what projects we need 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. The final decision lies on our opinion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Section F: Benefit-sharing and local expectations from Mount Cameroon National Park 
F1: How is the revenue from forestry projects distributed? ............................................................. 
.......................................................................................................................................................... 
F2: What is the nature of the benefit? 
1 Cash 
distribution 
2 Material 
benefit 
3 Individual 
employment 
4 Community 
projects 
5 Others 
(specify) 
99 I don’t 
know  
F3. Has any developmental project been carried out in this village within the last 5 years with 
revenue from the forest? 1 2 S 
F3a. If YES, Which project is/was that? …..…………………………………………………….. 
F3b. How much was given for the projects? …………………………………………………….. 
F3c. If NO, why? ………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………..……….……………………………………………………………………………….. 
F4. How can we ensure equitably distribution of forest revenue? ………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
F5. What type of development do you expect MCNP project to bring to this community? Rang 
them according to importance, 1 being most important and 14 being least important. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Community hall               
2 Piped water               
3 Schools               
4 Electricity               
5 Roads               
6 Market               
7 Hospital               
8 Finance for small 
business 
              
9 Cocoa oven               
10Training on 
animal husbandry 
              
11 Employment               
12 Chief palace               
13 Village library               
14 Others (specify)               
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Section G. Local support and actual role/responsibility within MCNP REDD+ projects 
G. Do you support the MCNP conservation project? 1 NO  2 YES 
Respond using a scale from 1 to 7 (1 being strongly disagree and 7 being strongly agree). 
G1. If YES, what are your reasons for supporting the conservation project? 
 Strongly disagree>>>>>>>Strongly agree 
a. Solution for land ownership conflict  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Promotion of local development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Generation of income  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Promotion of local participation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Improvement of the natural environment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Enhance community land rights 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Enhance carbon stock (more trees) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Others (specify) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G2. If NO, what are your reasons for not supporting the conservation projects 
a. No benefit for me and my family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Loss of right over forest  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Generate interest conflict  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Exclusion of local people  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Lack of awareness  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Spying on each other causes conflict 
amongst us 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Others (specify) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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G3. Please respond if you have heard or never heard of REDD+. 
G3a: Which of these forest 
projects have you heard of? 
G3b. What are the objectives of these projects? 
1 Conservation of MCNP  
2 Sustainable management of 
forest resources - Pygeum 
 
3   
4
tree planting 
 
G4. Which of these forestry project(s) is/are taking place in this community? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
G5. Have you ever taken part in any of these forestry projects at any level? 1 NO 2 YES 
G6a. If YES, when was that? …………………………………………………………………. 
G6b. Which project is/was that? Name of the projects(s)? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
G6c. What is/was your function/role played? 
1 Boundary 
demarcation  
2 Assessment of  
emission source 
3 Compilation of 
existing data 
4 Carbon stratification, 
5 Tree measurement 6 Data entry 7 Sampling design 8 Data collection 
9 Species 
identification/counting 
10 Set rules and 
 regulations 
11 Training on  
verification 
technique (field) 
12 Sustainable 
harvesting of Pygeum 
13 Tree planting 14  15 Forest guard 16 Monitoring/policing 
17 Wild life 
conservator 
18  19
committee 
20  
G7. If NO, why? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
G8. What do you think can be done to improve your participation in forestry projects?  
1  2  3  4 ves 
5  6  7  8  
G9. Please provide an estimate of the number of community members trained to take part in 
MCNP-REDD+ conservation project …………………………………………………………… 
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G10. What information do community members collect as part of their involvement with the 
project? Please select all options which are applicable. 
1Biodiversity 2Fishery  3NTFP 4Timber 5Carbon 
6Hunting 7Fire 8Game/bush-meat 9Culture 10Education 
11Gender 12Health 13Land-use 
change 
14llegal 
activities 
15Livelihoods 
16Wellbeing 17Volume of 
timber harvested 
18Quantity of 
 firewood 
19Amount of 
fertiliser applied 
20Number of 
animal grazing 
G11. In recording and collating these data, do your community participants make use of mobile 
electronic devices? 
1 Yes 2 Not currently, but we are exploring 
this option 
3 We have no plans to explore this 
technology 
G11a. If YES, which electronic devices are/were used? .............................................................. 
G11b. If NO, why? ........................................................................................................................ 
G12. What other tools are/were used to carry out these forest project activities? 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
G13. To what extent are you satisfied with the following: Using a scale from 1 to 7 (1 being not 
satisfied and 7 being very satisfied) 
Statements  Not satisfied>>>>>Very satisfied 
a. Forest user’s right provided to your community 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Functioning of MCNP-REDD+ initiative leaders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Involvement of the local people in the decision-
making process within the MCNP-REDD+ projects 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Participation of the local people within MCNP-
REDD+ projects development and implementation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Developing project design within the MCNP-
REDD+ plan  to improve your well-being  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Capacity building provided by MCNP project  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Community development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Empowerment  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Thank you very much for responding to this questionnaire 
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Acronyms 
ANAFOR Agence Nationale d’Appui au Développement Forestier 
ASB Alternative Slash and Burn 
AWG-LCA Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action  
CB Conservation Bonuses 
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity 
CBFF Congo Basin Forest Fund 
CBNRM Community Based National Resource Management 
CC Conservation Credits 
CCZ Cluster Conservation Zone 
CDA Conservation Development Agreement 
CDC Cameroon Development Cooperation 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CFM Community Forest Management 
CGIAR Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research 
CIFOR Centre for International Forestry Research 
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora 
CMA Collaborative Management Activities 
COMIFAC Central African Forest Commission 
COP Conference of Parties 
DFID Department For International Development 
DNA Designated National Authority 
FCPF Forest Carbon Partnership Facility  
FEICOM Special Fund for Mutual Assistance to Councils 
FLEGT Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
FPIC Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
GEF Global Environmental Facility 
GFW Global Forest Watch 
GHG Greenhouse Gases 
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GIS Geographical Information Systems 
GIZ German International Cooperation 
ICDP Integrated Conservation and Development Project 
ICRAF World Agroforestry Centre 
IISD International Institute for Sustainable Development 
IPCC Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change 
IUCN International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
KFW German Development Bank 
LC Local Communities 
LULUCF Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry  
MCNP Mount Cameroon National Park 
MINEPDED Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection and Sustainable 
Development 
MINFOF Ministry of Forestry and Fauna 
MIPs Most Important Products 
MOCAP-CIG Mount Cameroon Prunus Common Initiative Group 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NTFP Non Timber Forest Products 
ONACC National Observatory on Climate Change  
PES Payments for Ecosystem Services 
REDD+ Reducing Emission from Deforestation and land Degradation, 
conservation, reforestation and enhancement of carbon stock 
R-PIN Readiness Plan Ideal Note 
R-PP Readiness Preparatory Plan 
SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
SFM Sustainable Forest Management 
SWR South West Region 
UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
UNEP United Nation Environment Programme 
UNFCCC United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change 
VFMC Village Forest Management Committees  
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VPA Voluntary Partnership Agreement 
WCS Wildlife Conservation Society 
WWF World Wide Fund for nature 
 
